The Siege of
Savannah
in December, 1864, and the Confederate Operations in Georgia
and the Third Military
District of South Carolina during General
Sherman's March
from Atlanta to the Sea:
Electronic Edition.
Charles Colcock Jones, 1831-1893
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1998.
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Library of Congress Subject Headings,
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LC Subject Headings:
Jones, Charles Colcock, 1831-1893.
Sherman's March to the Sea -- Personal narratives.
Savannah (Ga.) -- History -- Siege, 1864 -- Personal
narratives.
Georgia -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal
narratives.
South Carolina -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal
narratives.
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns.
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Destruction and
pillage.
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal
narratives, Confederate.
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THE
SIEGE OF SAVANNAH
IN
DECEMBER, 1864,
AND THE
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS IN GEORGIA
AND
THE THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DURING
GENERAL SHERMAN'S MARCH
FROM ATLANTA TO THE SEA.
BY
CHARLES C. JONES, JR.,
LATE LIEUT. COL. ARTILLERY, C. S. A., AND CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
DURING THE SIEGE.
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.
ALBANY, N. Y.:
JOEL MUNSELL.
1874.
Page verso
Entered according to Act of Congress,
in the year 1875,
by CHARLES C. JONES, Jr.,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress
at Washington, D. C.
To perpetuate the
Confederate memories connected
with the march of General Sherman from Atlanta to
Savannah is the design of the following pages. To be
guided in all that he relates by the genuine circumstances
of the action has been the author's care. This sad
chapter in the history of Georgia has been written only
by those who made light of her afflictions, laughed at her
calamities, gloated over her losses, and lauded her
spoilers. A predatory expedition, inaugurated with full
knowledge of her weakness, conceived in a spirit of
wanton destruction, conducted in violation of the rules of
civilized warfare, and compassed in the face of feeble
resistance, has been magnified into a grand military
achievement worthy of all admiration. The easy march
of a well appointed army of seventy thousand men
through the heart of a state abounding in every supply
save men and materials of war, and at the most delightful
season of the year, has been so talked of and written
about by those who either participated in the enterprise
or sympathized with its leaders, that multitudes have
come to regard this holiday excursion as a triumph of
consummate military skill and valor--as one of the most
wonderful exploits in the history of modern warfare.
Audi alteram partem.
CHAPTER I.
General Sherman's Intentions in Projecting his Expedition from
Atlanta to the Coast--Composition and Strength of the Federal
Army--Defenceless Condition of
Georgia--Inability of the
Confederate Leaders to Concentrate an Army of Opposition--The Federal
Advance--General Beauregard's Dispatches--A Levy en masse ordered by the
Legislature--Proclamation
of Governor Brown--Circular from Georgia Representatives
in Confederate Congress, to their Constituents--Supplemental
Proclamation of General A. R. Wright, . . . . .1
CHAPTER II.
Operations of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith in the Vicinity of
Atlanta--He Retires upon Griffin, and falls back to Macon--Movements of
the Confederate Cavalry under Maj. Gen.
Wheeler--Macon Defenses, their Armament and Garrison--Federal
Demonstration against Macon--Battle of Griswoldville--Report of Brig.
Gen. Phillips, . . . . .21
CHAPTER III.
The Federals occupy Milledgeville--Maj. Genl. Smith moves his
Command from Macon, by way of Thomasville, to Savannah--Ordered by Lieut.
Genl. Hardee at once to Grahamville, S. C.--Admirable Conduct of the
Georgia State Forces--Battle of
Honey-Hill--Signal Defeat of the Federal Expedition from Boyd's Neck,
under the Command of Brig. Genl. Hatch--Complimentary
Resolutions adopted by the Georgia Legislature, . . . . .32 Page viii
CHAPTER IV.
Adjutant General Wayne occupies Gordon--Retreats to Oconee
Bridge--Major Hartridge's Report of Confederate Operations at
that Point--Wayne's Command retires to Millen--Confederate Movements at
Number 4 1/2 and Number 2, Central
Rail Road--Col. Fizer disputes Osterhaus's Crossing at the
Cannouchee--Maj. Gen. Wheeler's Report of the Operations
of the Confederate Cavalry, . . . . . 44
CHAPTER V.
The Siege of Savannah--Concentration of Confederate Forces
for the Defense of the City--Investment by the United States
Forces--Federal Attempts to communicate with the Fleet--Confederate Line
at Monteith--Obstruction of Roads leading
into Savannah--Western Line for the Protection of the City,
its Location, Principal Batteries, and Armament--Enumeration
of Light Artillery Companies concentrated for its
Support--Inundation of the Low Grounds in Front of this
Western Line--the Western Line, how Subdivided, Commanded,
and Garrisoned--Supply of Ordnance, Quarter-Master, and
Commissary Stores--Statement of Rations issued, . . . . . 73
CHAPTER VI.
Confederate Forces in the 3d Military District of South Carolina,
under Maj. Genl. Sam Jones, guarding the Line of the Charleston
and Savannah Rail Road--Federal Advance from Gregory's Point,
and its Repulse near the Tullifinney Trestle--Original Confederate
Line conceived for the Protection of the Sea Coast of Georgia--Advanced
Line controlling the Water Approaches to Savannah--Line of Defense for
the Immediate Protection of the Eastern and
Southern Exposures of the City--Location and Armament of the
Savannah River Batteries, and of the Forts and Earth-works
erected to guard the Water Approaches to the City--Relative
Bearings and Distances of these Fortifications from Oglethorpe
Barracks--Genl. Beauregard's Instructions for the Defense
of Savannah, . . . . . 92 Page ix
CHAPTER VII.
Distribution of Confederate Forces along the Western Line--Federal
Timidity and Hesitation--Capture of the Dispatch Boat
Ida--Affair at Shaw's Dam--Repulse of the Assault upon Fort
Hardeman--The Tender Resolute captured by the Enemy--Federal Movement
against Fort McAllister--Assault upon and
Capture of that Work by Hazens's Division--Reports of Major
Anderson and of Brig. Genl. Hazen--Gallant Conduct of the
Garrison, . . . . . 111
CHAPTER VIII.
Federal communication established with the Fleet--Evacuation of
Savannah rendered Imperative--Line of
Retreat considered and determined upon--Location and
Construction of Pontoon Bridges across Savannah River--Progress of the
Siege--Heavy Skirmishing between Confederate
Cavalry and the Enemy on the Left Bank of the Savannah--Desertions from
Brooks's Foreign Battalion--Sherman's
Demand for the Surrender of Savannah, its Garrison, and
Dependent Forts--Lieut. Genl. Hardee's Refusal--Maj.
Genl. Sherman prepares to Bombard the City, . . . . . 131
CHAPTER IX.
Progress of the Siege--Maj. Genl. Wheeler's Cavalry Operations
on the Left Bank of the Savannah and in Rear of the Federal
Army--Confidential Circulars from Lieut. Genl. Hardee's
Head Quarters directing the Evacuation of Savannah--Evacuation of the
City--Order in which the Confederate
Forces were withdrawn--Good Conduct of the Troops--Movement successfully
concealed from the Enemy, until fully
Accomplished--Line of Retreat--Heavy Guns disabled,
Ammunition destroyed, and the Naval Vessels in the River
burnt and sunk--Reports of Coln. Anderson commanding
the River and Shore Batteries, and of Lieut. Coln. Jones,
Chief of Artillery--Genl. Beauregard's Orders for the
Disposition of the Confederate Forces after their Retreat from
Savannah--Formal Surrender of the City by the Mayor
on the Morning of the 21st of December, 1864--The Federals
occupy Savannah, . . . . . 145 Page x
CHAPTER X.
Extravagant and Unjustifiable Destruction of Property along the
Line of March--Comparison between the Conduct of Confederate
and Federal Invading Armies--Sherman's Violations of the Accepted
Rules of Civilized Warfare--Wanton Insults, Wholesale Plunder, and
Barbarous Treatment of Unarmed Citizens and Defenseless
Women, Children and Negroes, by Federal Soldiery--The
Conduct of the Royalist Prevost in 1779 outheroded in 1864 by that
of the Republican Sherman--The Campaign criticized as a
Military Movement--Its Success entirely attributable to the
Weakness of the Confederacy--Federal and Confederate Losses--Capture of
Savannah in 1778--The Evacuation of the City, under
the Circumstances, a Severe Reflection upon the Activity and Skill of
the Federal Commander, and a marked Achievement on the part of
the Confederates, . . . . . 164
ERRATA.
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. . . . . Heywards.
p. 64 13th line succeeded . . . . . should be
. . . . . exceeded.
p. 85 9th line mayor . . . . . should be . . .
. . major.
p. 91 9th line 1,1291 . . . . . should be . .
. . . 11,291.
p. 106 last line banks . . . . . should be .
. . . . ank.
p. 151 14th line points . . . . . should be .
. . . . point.
p. 155 7th line mariners . . . . . should be
. . . . . marines.
p. 159 27th line 300 . . . . . should be . .
. . . 500.
p. 163 20th line may orrequested . . . . .
should be . . . . . mayor requested.
General Sherman's Intentions in Projecting his Expedition from
Atlanta to the Coast--Composition and Strength of the Federal Army--
Defenceless Condition of Georgia--Inability of the Confederate
leaders to Concentrate an Army of Opposition--The Federal
Advance--General Beauregard's Dispatches--A Levy en masse
ordered by the Legislature--Proclamation of Governor Brown--
Circular from Georgia Representatives in Confederate Congress,
to their Constituents--Supplemental Proclamation of General A.
R. Wright.
"Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless
to occupy it: but the utter destruction of its roads,
houses and people will cripple, their military resources.
By attempting to hold the roads we will
lose a thousand men monthly, and will gain no
result. I can make the march and make Georgia
howl. * * * * * Hood may turn into Tennessee
and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to
follow me. Instead of being on the defensive I would
be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at what he
means, he would have to guess at my plans. The
difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I
can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of
the Chattahoochee. I prefer to march through
Georgia, smashing things to the sea."
So wrote Major General Sherman, from Atlanta, to
Lieutenant General Grant. That officer having
sanctioned the proposed movement, and indicated a
preference for Savannah as the objective point of the
campaign, General Sherman, about the middle of
November, 1864, put his columns in motion for their
march of spoliation and devastation through the heart of
Georgia. The "smashing" operation of this modern
Alaric was fairly inaugurated by the wanton and
merciless destruction of the cities of Atlanta and Rome.
For the purposes of the predatory incursion, the
Federal army was divided into two wings; the right--
commanded by Major General O. O. Howard--
comprising the Fifteenth Corps under Major General P.
I. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth Corps under Major
General Frank P. Blair jr., and the left, under Major
General H. W. Slocum, consisting of the Fourteenth
Corps, brevet Major General J. C. Davis, and the
Twentieth Corps, Brigadier General A. S. Williams.
This infantry force of sixty thousand men was
accompanied by a cavalry division numbering fifty-five
hundred sabres, commanded by Brigadier General
Judson Kilpatrick. There was an allowance of about one
field piece to every thousand men, aggregating
between sixty-five and seventy guns, fully manned and
thoroughly equipped. A pontoon train was assigned to
each wing of the army, and an efficient pioneer battalion
organized for each corps. The entire command was
amply provided with good wagon trains, loaded with
ammunition, and carrying supplies approximating forty
days' rations of bread, sugar and coffee, a double
allowance of salt for the same period, and grain forage
for three days. Beef cattle, sufficient for forty days'
subsistence, attended the army. No equipment was
lacking which could in any wise enhance the comfort,
power, and efficiency of this formidable expedition.
Acquainted with the character of the country through
which his route lay, and aware of the fact that he would
meet with an abundance of provisions and forage
everywhere, General Sherman anticipated little difficulty
in subsisting his troops. At this season of the year
plantation barns were filled with the newly gathered
harvest. Corn, peas, fodder, sweet-potatoes, syrup, hogs,
cattle, mules and horses were to be expected without
stint. The recent movement of General Hood, ,ill-advised
and pregnant with naught save disaster, left the state of
Georgia fairly open to a Federal advance. She was
destitute of the means of offering any substantial
resistance. Few troops remained within her confines to
dispute Sherman's passage
to the coast. Such was the physical conformation of the
country, that there existed only occasional and partial
obstacles to a rapid and successful march; none which
could not be readily overcome by the pontoon trains and
pioneer corps with which the Federal army was supplied.
For his rear Sherman entertained no reasonable fears,
because the forces of General Thomas were an over-match
for General Hood's advancing columns. Under no
possible circumstances could Sherman have then been
overtaken by Hood, had the latter abandoned his plans
and started in pursuit. Nor was there any likelihood of his
encountering serious opposition from the Confederates in
his front. They were far too weak to do more than
skirmish in a desultory manner with this powerful army
of invasion. Enveloped by an ample guard of cavalry,
and presenting a front, varying from thirty to sixty miles
in extent, during their sweeping march toward the
Atlantic, the Federal general readily perceived that his
columns could speedily overcome any local interruptions
and partial hindrances which might be attempted by
newly organized and feeble bodies of citizen soldiery
hastily assembled for the defense of their immediate
homes. At best there were in the interior of the state
only old men and boys to shoulder their fowling pieces
and dispute the passage of swamps. General Lee, sore-pressed
in Virginia, could not spare from his depleted ranks a
single battle-scarred brigade for the emergency. A
reënforcement of seventy-five thousand men would not
have placed him in condition to have coped, man for
man, with the ever multiplying hosts marshalled under
the bloody banners of Grant. Such was the posture of
affairs at Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and
elsewhere, that no disposable troops could be found with
which to form even a tolerable army of observation.
General Hood, as we have already intimated, was now
so far removed from the scene of action that no change
in his plans would necessitate a postponement of the
purposed advance. The once puissant armies of the
Confederacy were sadly reduced by sickness, and
poverty and wounds and death. Tens of thousands of her
bravest sons had been gathered to their patriot graves,
and there were none to stand in their places. Her
treasures and supplies of every kind were well nigh
exhausted, and no helping hand was outstretched in the
hour of supreme need. Whole departments did not
comprise within their limits troops requisite for the
successful defense of a sub-district. Isolated in position
and cut off from all avenues of succor, each drop of
shed blood flowed from her single arm, every feather
which warmed and sheltered her Offspring was plucked
from her own breast.
Lieut. General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the
Trans-Mississippi Department, was capable of no
demonstrations which would compel the recall of the
formidable reënforcements which were hastening to the
support of General Thomas. Such was the scarcity of
troops in Alabama and Mississippi, that Lieut. General
Dick Taylor could detach but a handful in aid of Generals
Cobb and Smith, who, with the Georgia state forces, were
concentrated in the vicinity of Griffin. Lieut. General
Hardee could muster forces barely sufficient to constitute
respectable garrisons for the fixed batteries on the coasts
of Georgia and South Carolina. General Beauregard
looked in vain throughout the length and breadth of his
extensive military division of the west for the means of
effectual resistance, and was disappointed in the amount
of assistance which he hoped to realize from the Militia,
Home Guards, and Reserves of the respective states
embraced within the geographical limits of his command.
By carefully concealing his objective, and, with the
heavy masses at command by well conceived feints
cloaking his real design, General Sherman readily
conjectured that the small army of observation which the
Confederates might bring into the field would be so
divided in the effort to defend various and important
points, widely removed the one from the other, that unity
of action would
become quite difficult. For the same reason the chances
of his encountering anything like formidable resistance,
were well nigh dissipated.
At the outset, the cavalry corps of Major General
Joseph Wheeler, and the Georgia state forces, under the
command of Major Generals Howell Cobb and
Gustavus W. Smith, constituted almost the only
opposing forces on the Confederate side.
The season of the year selected for the movement
was most propitious; just the period of invigorating airs
and delightful autumnal suns, of clear skies and bracing
frosty mornings, of firm roads, and abounding health.
The stock upon the plantations, now in fine condition,
could be relied on to supply any lack of transportation.
As, more than three hundred years before, the
Spanish Adelantado in his quest of treasure compelled
the aid of the Red men of this region to bear the burdens
of his command while despoiling the homes and graves
of the sons of the forest, in like manner did it enter into
the calculation of these modern expeditionists to utilize
the negroes found on the plantations adjacent to the lines
of march by compelling them to accompany the columns
and assist in transporting the booty which was to be
ruthlessly collected on every side at the hands of
unprotected women, fatherless children, and decrepit old
men.
In all fairness, therefore, this vaunted undertaking of
General Sherman might well have been characterized, in
advance, as a holiday excursion, on a gigantic military
scale, and not as a martial enterprise involving
exposures, dangers, and uncertainties.
Having on the. 14th of November, 1864, completed his
preliminary arrangements, General Sherman put his right
wing, accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry, in motion in
the direction of Jonesboro and McDonough, with orders
to make a strong feint on Macon, cross the Ocmulgee
about Planter's Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood
of Gordon in seven days exclusive of the day of march.
The same day General Slocum moved with the
Twentieth Corps by Decatur and Stone Mountain, with
instructions to tear up the rail road from Social Circle to
Madison, burn the rail road bridge across the Oconee
east of Madison, and, turning south, reach Milledgeville
on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march.
General Sherman in person left Atlanta on the 16th in
company with the Fourteenth Corps, brevet Major
General Jeff C. Davis, moving by way of Lithonia,
Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville.
By the 23d General Slocum was occupying
Milledgeville and the bridge across the Oconee, and
Generals Howard and Kilpatrick had concentrated
in and around Gordon. The fact of Sherman's advance
was, by Major General Wheeler, promptly
communicated to General Beauregard then commanding
the military division of the west. His action in the
emergency is indicated by the following orders and
communications.
Reports of Genl.
Wheeler indicate that Sherman is about to
move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta or Macon. In
that event you will repair to points threatened with the
available forces you can spare from your department, and
assume command of all troops in Georgia operating against
Sherman. You will cut and block up all dirt roads in advance of
him, and remove or destroy supplies of all kinds in his front.
Wheeler's Cavalry will harass his flanks and rear. You will call
on Governors Brown and Bonham, and Genl. Hardee for
assistance. I will join you should it become necessary. When
you leave your department, turn over the command to Genl.
Wheeler. 1
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
1. Copies of this dispatch
were sent to Col. G. W. Raines, Augusta,
Ga., Gov. Jos. E. Brown, Milledgeville, Ga., Gov. M. L. Bonham,
Columbia, S. C., and Lt. Genl. W. J. Hardee, Charleston, S. C.
Tuscumbia, Ala., Nov. 16, 1864.
3 o'clock P. M.
Genl. S. Cooper,
A. & I. General, Richmond, Va.:
Reports of Genl. Wheeler indicate that Sherman is about to
move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta or Macon;
thence probably, to Charleston or Savannah, where a junction
may be formed with the enemy's fleet.
The threatened attack on Wilmington, in that event, must
be intended for Charleston.
I would advise that all available forces which can be spared
from North and South Carolina, be held ready to move to
defense of Augusta, or crossing of Savannah river, in
conjunction with forces in state of Georgia. Should Sherman
take Charleston, or reach Atlantic coast, he then might
reinforce Grant.
Genl. Taylor has been ordered to move with his
available forces into Georgia, and assume command of
all troops operating against Sherman, should he move
as reported.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
Cherokee, Ala., Nov. 17, 1864.
3:30 P. M.
Maj. Genl. Howell Cobb,
Macon or Griffin, Ga.:
Have ordered Genl. Taylor to send at once all troops he can
possibly spare, and Genl. Hood to send immediately one
brigade of Jackson's Cavalry Division, or the whole division if
it can possibly be spared at this juncture. A victory in
Tennessee will relieve Georgia.
Call on every available white man and slave to destroy and
block up roads in Sherman's front, flanks,
and rear.
G. T.
BEAUREGARD,
General.
[Confidential.]
Iuka, Miss., Nov. 17th, 1864,
6:30 P. M.
Genl. R. Taylor, Selma, Ala. " H. Cobb, Macon or Griffin, Ga. " G. W. Smith, Macon or Griffin, Ga.
Adopt Fabian system. Don't run risk of losing your active
forces and guns, available for the field, to hold any one place
or position, but harass at all points. Hannibal held the heart of
Italy for sixteen years, and then was defeated. Be cool and
confident, and all will yet be right. I will join you soon as
possible.
G. T.
BEAUREGARD.
H'd. Qrs. Mil. Div. of the West,
Tuscumbia, Nov. 17th, 1864.
Genl. J. B. Hood,
Commd'g, &c., General:
Genl. Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will
take the offensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal
the enemy rapid and vigorous blows; striking him whilst thus
dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance into
Georgia. * * * * *
Corinth, Nov. 18, 1864.
Via Selma.
To the people of Georgia:
Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally
around your patriotic governor, and gallant soldiers.
Obstruct and destroy all roads in Sherman's front,
flank and rear, and his army will soon starve in your
midst. Be confident and resolute. Trust in our over-ruling
Providence, and success will crown your efforts.
I hasten to join you in defense of your homes and
firesides.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
West Point, Miss., Nov. 20th, 1864.
10 A. M.
Lt. Genl. Taylor, & Maj. Genl. J. Wheeler & Maj. Genl. H. Cobb:
Genl. Hardee will, for the present, give orders for the
defense of Georgia, East (South) Chattanooga. My
views are that positions should be defended only so
long as not to risk safety of troops and material required
for active operations in the field. Meanwhile,
remove to safe locality all government property on line
of enemy's march, and consume or destroy all supplies
within his reach.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
The Legislature of Georgia being in session at
Milledgeville, then the capital of the state, in prompt
acknowledgment of the danger, and in earnest effort to
provide to the utmost for the protection
of the Commonwealth, on the 18th November,
passed the following Act.
AN ACT to Authorize a levy en masse of the
population of
Georgia for the protection of its liberty and independence.
Whereas the Senate and House of Representatives of the
State of Georgia, in General Assembly convened, have learned
from a communication from his Excellency the Governor, that a
large hostile force of the foe, whose presence has so long
desecrated the soil of Georgia, has left Atlanta under the
leadership of a general whose past history is but a recital of
every violation of civilized warfare, and a repetition of every
outrage which links barbarism with the coarsest instincts of
brutal nature, with the apparent intention of penetrating the
heart of our noble old Commonwealth; and whereas in such an
emergency it becomes a people who are determined to die freemen
rather than to live slaves, to rise en masse and offer on the altar of a
common country all the resources in men and money which God in His
benevolence and wisdom has placed at their disposal for the
vindication of their rights, their liberties and their honor;
therefore, finding in the history of the past nothing to appall
us, but on the contrary every incentive to stimulate and press
us forward to the achievement of a glorious independence by
sundering the ties which once bound us to a near friendship to
our vindictive foe:
Section I. Be it enacted, That the Governor be, and he is
hereby authorized, during the emergency now arising out of
the present invasion of the interior of
our State by the armies of our barbaric foes, to summon to
arms in the field the entire white male population of the State
now residing or domiciled in the State, physically capable of
bearing arms, between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five: and
to compel their attendance for the protection of our soil and
the defense of our liberties.
Section II. Be it further enacted, That the Governor be
authorized to accept volunteers in such numbers, and such
organizations, and for such time as in his discretion he may
deem wise and prudent, during the
present emergency, conforming as closely as circumstances
will permit to the existing militia organization of the State.
Section III. * . . .* . . .*
Section IV. * . . .* . . .*
Section V. * . . .* . . .*
Section VI. And be it further enacted, That the powers
conferred upon his Excellency the Governor by this Act,
shall continue in force for the period of forty days and no
longer, from and after the forces are called out under it.
Section VII. Be it further enacted, That whereas the
Constitution has defined the coördinate branches of the
Government, to wit, the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative, and
the powers of each; and whereas one branch of the
Government should not be subject to the control of the others;
therefore it is provided that the enlistment of those engaged in
the Legislative and Judicial Departments of the Government
shall not be compulsory, but voluntary.
In order to call public attention at once to the scope
and effect of this extraordinary legislation, the Governor,
on the day following the passage of the Act, issued this
spirited proclamation.
State of Georgia, Executive Department,
Milledgeville, Nov. 19, 1864.
The whole people understand how imminent is the danger
that threatens the state. Our cities are being burned, our fields
laid waste, and our wives and children mercilessly driven from
their homes by a powerful enemy. We must strike like men for
freedom, or we must submit to subjugation.
Death is to be preferred to loss of liberty. All must rally to
the field for the present emergency, or the state is overrun.
I, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
statute of this state, hereby order a levy en masse of the whole
free white male population residing or domiciled in this state
between sixteen (16) and fifty-five (55) years of age, except
such as are physically unable to bear arms, which physical
defect must be plain and indisputable, or they must be sent to
camp for examination, and except those engaged in the
legislative or judicial departments of the government, which
are by the recent act of the legislature declared exempt from
compulsory service.
All others are absolutely required, and members of the
legislature, and judges are invited to report immediately to
Major General G. W. Smith, at Macon, or
wherever else in Georgia his camp may be, for forty (40) days'
service, under arms, unless the emergency is sooner passed.
The statute declares that all persons hereby called out shall
be subject, after this call, to all the rules and articles of war of
the Confederate states, and on failure to report shall be subject
to the pains and penalties of the crime of desertion.
Volunteer organizations formed into companies, battalions,
regiments, brigades or divisions, will be accepted for forty
(40) days if they even approximate to the numbers in each
organization which is required by the militia laws of this state
which were in force prior to the late Act.
All police companies formed in counties for home defense
will report, leaving at home for the time only those over
fifty-five (55) years of age, and all persons having Confederate
details or exemptions who, by the late decision of the Supreme
Court of this state, are held to be liable to state militia service
and bound to obey the call of the governor.
All such, refusing to report, will be arrested by the police
force or by any aid de camp or other officer of this state, and
carried immediately to the front. The necessary employées of
rail-roads, now actively engaged, and the necessary agents of
the express company, and telegraph operators are, from the
necessity for their services in their present position, excused.
All ordained ministers of religion in charge of a church or
synagogue, are also excused.
All rail-road companies in this state will transport
all persons applying for transportation to the front, and in
case any one refuses, its president, superintendent, agents
and employées will be immediately sent to the front.
All aides de camp and other state officers are required to be
active and vigilant in the execution of the orders contained in
this proclamation, and all Confederate officers are respectfully
invited to aid state officers in their vicinity in sending forward
all persons hereby ordered to the front.
The enemy has penetrated almost to the center of your
state. If every Georgian able to bear arms would rally around
him, he could never escape.
JOSEPH E. BROWN,
Governor.
The same day the representatives from Georgia, in
Confederate congress assembled at Richmond,
addressed this circular to their constituents.
Richmond, Nov. 19, 1864.
To the People of Georgia.
We have had a special conference with President Davis and
the secretary of war, and are able to assure you that they have
done and are still doing all that can be done to meet the
emergency that presses upon you. Let every man fly to arms.
Remove your negroes, horses, cattle and provisions away from
Sherman's army, and burn what you cannot carry. Burn all bridges,
and block up the roads in his route. Assail the invader in
front, flank, and rear. By day and by night let him have no rest.
JULIAN HARTRIDGE,
W. E. SMITH,
MARK BLANDFORD,
JOHN T. SHEWMAKE,
J. H. ECHOLS,
JAMES M. SMITH,
GEO. N. LESTER,
H. P. BELL.
Both Governor Brown and Major General G. W.
Smith having, by the rapid intervention of the enemy,
been cut off from direct communication with that portion
of the state lying east of the Oconee river, obedience to
the proclamation of the 19th of November, so far as the
eastern and southern portions of the state were
concerned, became physically impossible. In order to
dispel existing doubt, avoid delay, prevent confusion, and
assist in concentrating at the earliest moment the
manhood of the state, General A. R. Wright who, by
virtue of his office as president of the senate, became,
during the temporary territorial disability of the governor,
the de facto commander in chief
of that part of Georgia for the time being beyond the
influence of the executive, issued the following
supplemental proclamation.
Augusta, Georgia, Nov. 21st, 1864.
I. His Excellency Gov. Joseph E. Brown, governor and
commander in chief of the militia of the state, being cut off
from communication with that portion of the state east of the
Oconee river by the interposition of a hostile army, it becomes
my duty as president of the senate and ex officio governor
during the disability of the governor, to assume command of
all that part of the state thus left without the jurisdiction of the
governor; and, as the prompt and faithful execution of the
recent Act of the legislature providing for a levy en masse of
the arms bearing people of the state is of vital importance, I do
therefore issue this order revoking so much of the governor's
proclamation as provides for the reporting of all the troops
raised under it to Major General G. W. Smith, and do order that
the men in all the counties east of the Oconee river (except
such as may have already reported to Major General Wayne)
report immediately to me at this place, where arms and
equipments will be issued by the proper officers.
II. The aides de camp in the districts east of the Oconee
river will proceed at once to send on to this place all men
liable to service under the aforesaid act.
III. A medical board will be established at this place for the
examination of all men whose fitness for service may be
considered by the aides de camp as doubtful.
IV. The emergency is such, that a delay even of a single day
will in no case be permitted. All must be sent forward at once.
A. R. WRIGHT,
President of the Senate,
and ex officio Governor
during the disability of Governor Brown.
Operations of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith in the Vicinity of
Atlanta--He Retires upon Griffin, and falls back to Macon--
Movements of the Confederate Cavalry under Maj. Gen. Wheeler--
Macon Defenses, their Armament and Garrison--Federal
Demonstration against Macon--Battle of Griswoldville--Report
of Brig. Gen. Phillips.
In obedience to a telegram from General Hood,
received at Macon on the 12th of October, 1864, Major
General Gustavus W. Smith concentrated, as rapidly as
possible, all the available forces in that vicinity with a
view to an early demonstration against Atlanta, then in
possession of the Federals. In the execution of these
orders he, in a short time, assembled at Lovejoy's station
about twenty-eight hundred infantry, three batteries of
Confederate light artillery, and between two and three
hundred local reserve cavalry. This infantry belonged
principally to the First Division of Georgia militia. His
force being inadequate for a direct assault upon Atlanta,
as it was then garrisoned, General Hood suggested that
General Smith should cross the Chattahoochee and
destroy the line of railroad between that river and the
Etowah. Upon further consideration this movement
being deemed impracticable, General Smith located his
command, as a corps of observation, near Atlanta,
preventing the enemy from foraging, confining the
Federals within their lines, and acting as a support to
Brigadier General Iverson who, with two brigades of
cavalry, was in his immediate front. Major General
Wheeler reached General Smith's headquarters on the
night of the 12th of November, and soon after his
cavalry corps began to arrive from Alabama.
On the afternoon of the 15th the Confederate cavalry,
skirmishing heavily with the advancing columns of the
enemy, fell back from Jonesboro to Lovejoys. The same
day at dark General Smith commenced moving his
command to Griffin where were field fortifications
behind which he hoped to be able to check the Federal
advance. Ascertaining the next day that large bodies of
the enemy had passed through McDonough and were
moving along the direct road from Atlanta to Macon,
General Smith, at dark, began retiring his troops upon
Forsyth. This march of thirty-five miles was
accomplished in twenty-four hours. Information having
there reached him that the Federal army was crossing to
the east bank of the Ocmulgee river, General Smith
retreated upon Macon and there turned over his
command, with the exception of the Georgia militia and
two regiments of the Georgia state line, to Major General
Howell Cobb by whom he was assigned to the
command of a portion of the lines around Macon on the
west bank of the Ocmulgee river.
General Wheeler, commanding the Confederate
cavalry, interrupted, to the extent of his ability, the
advance of the enemy, and was present at Macon when
that city was threatened. The important services
rendered by his cavalry command during Sherman's
march through Georgia will be subsequently considered
when we have the pleasure of presenting his hitherto
unpublished Official Report.
Considerable expense had been incurred, and much
labor bestowed upon the construction of field-works for
the protection of Macon. These fortifications were
commenced by Captain M. B. Grant, but were
subsequently changed under the directions of Major
General M. L. Smith, chief engineer of Hood's army. On
the west bank of the river the defensive line was about
four miles in length; and, on the east side, about three
miles. It consisted of a system of detached works within
supporting distance of each other. The intention was to
connect them by means of a stockade; but, at the time
of Sherman's arrival, these works were incomplete, and
the stockade had been scarcely commenced. About
thirty guns were in position along the line, and were
served by four or five light
artillery companies from Hood's army who had lost their
horses, and by some local artillerists. The Confederate
force in Macon, when the Federals appeared before the
city, consisted of about four thousand infantry, including
the troops brought by General Smith from Lovejoys, the
reserves from Columbus and other points in the state, the
local troops, conscripts in camp, convalescents from the
hospital, and a small battalion of Confederate troops,
some two hundred strong, under the command of Lieut.
Col. Nisbet. To these should be added the artillerists
above mentioned, and General Wheeler's cavalry then
numbering between two and three thousand men.
The Federal demonstration against Macon was very
partial, and was easily repulsed. Sherman's army
crossed the Ocmulgee above Macon, and this
demonstration against the city was made by cavalry, and
against the Confederate lines on the east bank of the
river, where General Cobb had concentrated his forces
in anticipation of an attack. In fact, it was merely a feint,
while the Federal columns were moving upon
Milledgeville and other points to the south. The
casualties were inconsiderable. A few Federal prisoners
were captured.
Lieut. Genl. Hardee reached Macon while Sherman
was crossing the Ocmulgee above the mouth of the
Towaliga. Satisfied that the demonstration
against Macon was a feint, and that no further
attack would be made, he left for Savannah to
urge forward, as rapidly as possible, the defenses
of that city. General Dick Taylor arrived just after the
departure of General Hardee and, having remained only
a day in Macon, joined General Hardee in Savannah.
The enemy having abandoned any serious designs
which may have been entertained against the city of
Macon, and it being deemed not improbable that the city
of Augusta with its valuable powder mill, work shops,
foundry, arsenal, and government stores, would attract
the notice of Sherman, on the morning of the 21st of
November, General Hardee ordered the First brigade,
Georgia militia, to proceed with all dispatch along the line
of the Central rail road and, moving by rail or otherwise
as transportation could be secured, to rendezvous at
Augusta at the earliest practicable moment. On the
afternoon of the same day Major General Smith was
directed to follow with the Second, Third, and Fourth
brigades of Georgia militia, the two regiments of the
Georgia State line, and Anderson's Confederate Light
Battery. The Augusta and Athens battalions of local
troops, under Major Cook, were ordered to the same
point. Genl. Hardee left Macon for Savannah on the
evening of the 21st of November. In his absence,
and upon the arrival of Genl. Dick Taylor, the command
devolved upon him, as the ranking officer. In pursuance
of the foregoing orders Major General Smith, on the
morning of the 22d, put his command in motion in the
direction of Griswoldville, with instructions to halt there
and await further orders. While detained a few hours in
Macon in consummating necessary arrangements for the
transportation of supplies and ammunition for his
command, information was conveyed to General Smith
that large bodies of the enemy were still in the vicinity of
Macon and occupying positions along the proposed line
of his march. An order for the recall of the troops was
imperative, and received the sanction of Lieut. General
Taylor. That order did not reach them, however, until
they were on the eve of an engagement with what was
then supposed to be a small force of the enemy. In the
language of General Smith's report, "notwithstanding my
order to avoid an engagement at that time and place, a
collision occurred, we being the attacking party, and
though the officers and men behaved with great
gallantry, they failed to carry the works of the enemy,
but held a position within one hundred and fifty yards
of their line until after dark, when they were withdrawn
to Macon by my order." The First brigade was not
engaged; having, in execution of orders
given by General Hardee, passed Griswoldville prior to
the appearance of the Federals. The Athens and Augusta battalions
participated in the action. The Confederate loss was a
little over six hundred killed and wounded, being more
than one fourth of the effective muskets in action.
Several of the best field officers of the command were
killed or wounded. On this occasion the State and
Confederate forces were confronted by Wood's
Division of the 15th Army Corps,--General Walcott's
brigade with two pieces of artillery, and a regiment of
cavalry on either flank, being in advance. The Federals
were protected by barricades and temporary works.
Another corps of Sherman's army was marching from
Clinton in rear of the position occupied by the
Confederates, so that their situation was perilous in the
extreme. This engagement, while it reflects great credit
upon the gallantry of the Confederate and State forces
engaged, was unnecessary, unexpected, and utterly
unproductive of any good. The battle of Griswoldville will
be remembered as an unfortunate accident whose
occurrence might have been avoided by the exercise of
proper caution and circumspection. It in no wise crippled
the movements of the enemy, and entailed upon the
Confederates a loss which, under the circumstances,
could be illy sustained.
The following report of Brig. Genl. Phillips furnishes a
detailed account of the engagement.
Head Quarters 2d Brigade Georgia Militia,
December 8th, 1864. Col. Thos. Hardeman,
A. A. G. Colonel:
I have the honor to make the following report of the
operations of the four brigades under my command on the 22d
November last.
The command left East Macon at about 8 A. M. and arrived
without accident at 12 or 1, within about one mile of
Griswoldville, where I found the Athens and Augusta
battalions (under command of Maj. Cook) drawn up in line of
battle. I also met a number of cavalry at and near this point, all
of whom informed me that the enemy was in Griswoldville, and
had been engaged with some of our cavalry. He was
represented to be about 8 or 1200 strong. I formed a line of
battle with Genl. Anderson's brigade on the right, the Athens
and Augusta battalions on his immediate left, and Brig. Genl.
McCoy's brigade on the left of the line. The Second brigade,
under Col. Mann, was formed in the rear as a reserve. The
state line, under Lieut. Col. Evans, was deployed as skirmishers
and advanced on Griswoldville, where the enemy had just burnt
some buildings and retired before we arrived; of which facts I
informed the major general commanding at about 2 o'clock P. M.
Whilst in Griswoldville, Maj. Cook withdrew the Athens and
Augusta battalions from the line, informing
me that he was ordered by Lt. Genl. Hardee to proceed to
Augusta, and proceeded down the Central rail road. I soon
ordered the command to move down the C. R. R., until it
should clear the village, and halt to await further orders from
Maj. Genl. Smith. The rear of the column had not cleared the
village when firing of small arms was heard some half mile in
advance of our column, which was between the advance and
rear guards of Maj. Cook and the enemy. I ordered an advance
of the command, and on arriving, I met Maj. Cook who pointed
out to me the enemy posted on the opposite eminence in line
of battle, behind some temporary entrenchments and
fortifications. Maj. Cook's skirmishers were then engaged with
the enemy on his left. I disposed of the forces represented by
the accompanying diagram, viz: The Athens and Augusta
battalions on our right (owing to the positions they then held)
making rather an obtuse angle with the State line on their left,
and Genl. McCoy's brigade on the left of the State line; Genl.
M's left resting near and south of the rail road. Genl.
Anderson's brigade was formed on the north side of the rail
road, his left resting parallel with the rail road, and Capt.
Anderson's battery of four guns was posted at an eligible site
on the rail road on the north side. The Second brigade, under
Col. Mann, was drawn up in rear of the state line, and Genl.
McCoy's brigade in a secure place to act as reserves. In this
position an advance was ordered. Genl. Anderson with his
brigade was to attack the enemy on his right flank.
Major Cook with his command was to attack him on his left
flank,
whilst Capt. Anderson with his battery, the State line, and
Genl. McCoy's command should attack him in the front. The
State line and Genl. McCoy's brigade moved forward in fine
style, under a heavy and galling fire, until they reached within
some fifty yards of the enemy's works, which position they
maintained during the contest, and from which position they
delivered a telling fire. Col. Mann, deeming that his brigade
could be of more service near the lines, advanced it to near the
same position, where it participated in the general action. From
some misconception of orders, when the general advance was
being made, Genl. Anderson's brigade faced to the right and
swept across the rail road (save a small detachment on his
extreme left that was cutoff by a deep cut in the railroad) and
participated with the State line and Genl. McCoy's brigade in
the direct attack where they, both officers and men, sustained
themselves with decision and gallantry. After the action had
progressed for some hours, Genl. Anderson took the detachment
of his men that had been cut off, and went round to the enemy's
right flank, when a most spirited and desperate fight ensued,
lasting some hour and a half or more; but the enemy was too firmly
established, and the general's force too small to dislodge him.
The order to Major Cook (from some cause of which I am
not aware) to turn the enemy's left, was never carried out, yet
his command participated fully in the action, deported
themselves gallantly, and I regret to say, suffered much from
wounds and deaths. Captain Anderson with his battery did
good and valuable service,
soon silencing the enemy's battery, and forced upon
him many telling shots. He is a skilful, brave, and meritorious
officer. The officers and men deported themselves well during
the entire action, which lasted from 3 P. M., until dark, held
their positions, and retired in good order to Griswoldville
where I had intended to encamp, and bring off those of our
wounded and dead that had not been removed from the battle
field; but, on my reaching Griswoldville, I received an order
from the major general commanding ordering me to fall back
to the trenches at Macon, where I arrived about 2 o'clock A. M.
I can but believe if the flank movement had been carried out
with all the forces assigned to that duty, that it would have
resulted in dislodging and probably routing the enemy,
notwithstanding he was, I am satisfied, fully equal if not
superior to our forces. Whilst we have to regret the loss of
many gallant officers and men, yet we cannot but hope that
they died not in vain.
Accompanying please find a diagram of the field and
position of the forces, and the reports of all the officers that I
have been able to procure.
I am, with high regard,
Your obedient servant,
P. J. PHILLIPS,
Brig. Genl. Commanding Div. Ga. Militia.
The Federals occupy Milledgeville--Maj. Genl. Smith moves his
Command from Macon, by way of Thomasville, to
Savannah--Ordered by Lieut. Genl. Hardee at once to Grahamville,
S. C.--Admirable Conduct of the Georgia State Forces--Battle of
Honey-Hill--Signal Defeat of the Federal Expedition from Boyd's
Neck, under the Command of Brig. Genl. Hatch--Complimentary
Resolutions adopted by the Georgia Legislature.
The Federal columns having withdrawn from the
vicinity of Macon, and the line of the Central rail road
being in their possession, the destination of Genl. Smith's
command was changed from Augusta to Savannah. On
the 25th of November it was ordered to move by rail to
Albany, thence to march across the country to
Thomasville, and there take the cars of the Atlantic and
Gulf rail road to Savannah.
"We arrived," says Genl. Smith, "in Thomasville by
noon, Monday [the 28th], having marched from Albany,
a distance between fifty-five and sixty miles, in fifty-four
hours. At Thomasville, instead of finding five trains, the
number I had requested to be sent, there were but two,
and these could not be started until after dark, and did
not arrive here [Savannah] until two o'clock Wednesday
morning, occupying twice the time necessary between
Thomasville and Savannah, and leaving the 2d, 3d, and 4th
brigades at the former place." Upon his arrival in
Savannah, and before he had left the cars, General Smith
received a peremptory order from General Hardee
requiring him immediately to proceed with his command
to Grahamville, South Carolina, to repel an advance of
the Federals who, moving up from Broad river, were
seeking to cut the line of the Charleston and Savannah
rail road. It was absolutely necessary that this
communication should be preserved. Upon its security
depended the further occupation of Savannah. Over this
road must the garrison retreat in the event that it became
expedient to evacuate the city. By this route also, were
reënforcements expected. General Hardee had no troops
which could be detailed for this important service, except
two regular Confederate regiments from Charleston, and
it was feared that they would arrive too late. Not a
moment could be lost, and it was urged upon General
Smith that if he would move at once and hold the enemy
in check until two o'clock P. M. several thousand troops,
en route from North and South Carolina for the
reënforcement of the garrison at Savannah, would arrive
and ensure the effectual repulse of the Federals.
Although the statute organizing the State forces confined
their service and operations to the limits
of Georgia; although, strictly speaking, there rested
upon these troops no legal obligation to move
beyond the confines of their own state whose territory
they were instructed to defend; although General Smith had
a qualified authority from Governor Brown to withdraw
the Georgia State forces under his command from Confederate service
in case they were ordered beyond the limits of the
state, and although both commander and command
were "almost broken down by fatigue and want
of rest," realizing that the battle for the salvation
of the metropolis of Georgia was on the instant to
be fought on Carolina soil, and, after a full conference
with the lieutenant general becoming perfectly satisfied
that it was right and proper the movement
should be made, General Smith issued the requisite
orders and, about eight o'clock on Wednesday
morning, the 30th of November, arrived at Grahamville,
South Carolina, with his leading brigade. The conduct of
General Smith and the Georgia State troops in this trying
emergency will be always remembered with peculiar
pride and in especial honor.
On Tuesday, the 29th of November, a Federal force,
under the immediate command of Brigadier General
John P. Hatch, consisting of five thousand men of all
arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up
Broad river to Boyd's Neck,
where it landed with the intention of taking possession of
and occupying the Charleston and Savannah rail road at
Grahamville. This involved a march of only some seven
miles. This expedition was conceived in aid of General
Sherman who was known to be seeking the coast at
some convenient point. By thus severing the
communication between Savannah and Charleston, the
former city would be completely isolated and Sherman
enabled at pleasure, and without hazard, to cross the
Savannah river at almost any point below Augusta, and
establish communications with Port Royal, then the
principal Federal depot on the south Atlantic coast.
When General Hatch effected a landing at Boyd's
Neck the only Confederate force on duty at Grahamville
was a part of a squadron of the Third South Carolina
Cavalry. All available troops in the district had been sent
into the interior to oppose General Sherman's advance.
Colonel C. J. Colcock, the district commander, was fifty
miles away, superintending the erection of field works at
the principal crossings of the Savannah river. The
Federals having effected a landing at Boyd's Neck at
eight o'clock on the morning of the 29th of November, at
a remove of only seven miles from the rail road, and
there being at the time no Confederate forces in the
neighborhood to
dispute their advance, had they moved promptly upon
Grahamville, the Charleston and Savannah rail road
would have passed into their possession without a
struggle. During the whole of the 29th they were
engaged, however, in intrenching themselves at a point
distant half a mile from where they landed, and thus the
golden opportunity was suffered to pass unimproved.
Colonel Colcock arrived at Grahamville about seven
o'clock on the morning of the 30th, and an hour
afterwards Major General G. W. Smith, with his leading
brigade, was on the ground. Advices were received that
the Federal column, marching up the Honey-Hill road, had
passed Bolan's church and was then only five miles from
Grahamville. The line of breastworks, previously
constructed for the use of infantry and field-artillery,
being equidistant between Grahamville and the church, it
became all important that the advance of the enemy
should be retarded in order that the Confederates might
occupy those works. With this view Colonel Colcock
pushed rapidly forward with a 12 pounder Napoleon gun
of Kanapaux's Light Battery, under command of
Lieutenant Zealy, and company K, of the Third South
Carolina Cavalry, Captain Peeples. He encountered the
head of the Federal column on a causeway a mile and a
half in front of the breastworks. It was a most favorable
position for impeding the enemy's progress. On the
left was an impenetrable swamp, and on the right an
extensive old field intersected by numerous canals and
ditches. Lieut. Zealy's 12 pounder Napoleon was planted
so as to command the causeway, and Captain Peeples's
company was dismounted and deployed as skirmishers
across the old field. The first shell from the Napoleon
gun is said to have killed and wounded nine men of the
enemy. Upon its discharge the column halted, and, after
considerable delay, left the road, marching across the
field with a view to flanking the Confederate position. In
order to counteract this movement Colonel Colcock
ordered his men to set fire to the broom-sedge which
was dry, and covered the entire field. A strong wind at
the time prevailing and blowing in the direction of the
enemy, carried down upon them, with surprising rapidity,
a fierce line of flame and smoke before which they
precipitately retreated, in their flight abandoning blankets,
haversacks, and knapsacks. Reforming in the road, the
Federals advanced, Colonel Colcock retiring with his
little command and disputing their progress from time to
time as opportunity occurred.
Meanwhile General Smith had fully occupied the
breast works, and completed his dispositions. To Colonel
Colcock, the district commander, was
assigned the immediate executive command of the main
line.
The engagement commenced about ten o'clock in the
morning, and from that time until nearly dark the enemy
made continuous but fruitless efforts to carry the
Confederate position. The Confederates brought into
action five pieces of field artillery and about fourteen
hundred effective muskets. There were also three
companies and two detachments of the Third South
Carolina Regiment of Cavalry, under Major Jenkins. 1
The Confederate line of battle extended from the
Honey-Hill road, on which its right rested, in a
semicircular form, through an open pine barren, to the
Coosawhatchie road.
At a remove of some hundred and fifty yards, directly
in front of the Confederate line, and extending almost its
entire length, was a low, swampy ground, about twenty
yards wide. Upon its appearance about one hundred and
twenty yards in front of the field works occupied by the
Confederates, and in a curve in the Honey-Hill road, the
infantry and artillery immediately opened a murderous
fire upon the head of the Federal column, before which
it melted away. Thus commenced
1. The following organizations were present on this memorable
occasion, and constituted the little Confederate army charged
with driving back a Federal force more than three times as numerous.
INFANTRY.
The 1st Brigade Georgia Militia: Col. Willis.
The State Line Brigade. [Georgia] Col. Wilson.
The 17th Georgia, Confederate Regiment, Lt. Col. Edwards.
Companies B and E, and detachments from Company C and
the Rebel Troop, all belonging to the 3d Regiment South
Carolina Cavalry, under command of Major Jenkins.
ARTILLERY.
A section of the Beaufort Artillery, Capt. Stuart.
the engagement. The Federals were advancing in
apparent ignorance of this line of field works, and of the
serious opposition which they were destined to
encounter. Staggered by this unexpected and destructive
fire, the enemy recoiled; and some time elapsed before
they deployed in line of battle to the right and left of the
Honey-Hill road in front of the Confederate line and just
across the swampy ground to which allusion has already
been made. This low ground was wooded to an extent
sufficient to conceal the movements
of the enemy, but not to protect them from the heavy
fire of infantry and artillery which crashed through their
ranks, causing great destruction and demoralization. So
soon as the Federals had formed their line of battle,
efforts were made to force the centre of the
Confederate line and also to turn its flanks. These
attempts were renewed from time to time, but on each
occasion resulted in defeat and heavy loss. The
Confederate troops in position bravely held their ground,
and the gallant Thirty Second Georgia Regiment, which
constituted a movable reserve, rendered efficient service
in repulsing these attacks, appearing always at the
proper point at the most opportune time.
Wearied with and disheartened by these repeated
repulses, and perceiving their inability to force our
position, the Federals, about four o'clock in the afternoon,
slackened their fire, massed their artillery on their left
and in the Honey-Hill road to cover their retreat, and
commenced retiring. The Confederate left wing was
advanced, but his men being greatly exhausted and
having been for many hours without food, Genl. Smith
did not deem it best to pursue. The retreat of the enemy
was effected during the evening and night of the 30th,
and the next morning found the remnant of General
Hatch's army behind its breastworks near Boyd's
landing, covered by the protecting batteries of the
Federal gun boats.
The Confederate losses amounted only to four killed
and forty wounded. Those of the enemy are stated by
General Grant, in his official report, as seven hundred
and forty-six in killed, wounded and missing. The
Confederate artillery was admirably handled and did
great execution. In General Hatch's command were
several negro regiments. They suffered severely; and it
appeared, upon a subsequent inspection of the field, that
they were forced to occupy the most exposed positions.
Some Confederate officers, who examined many of
their dead bodies, noticed wounds in the back which
suggested the impression that some of them at least had
been forced into action at the point of the bayonet.
"I have never seen or known of a battle field," says
General Smith in his official report, "upon which there
was so little confusion, and where every order was so
cheerfully and promptly obeyed, and where a small
number of men for so long a time successfully resisted
the determined and oft repeated efforts of largely
superior attacking forces."
The enemy having been thoroughly beaten back on
the 30th, and Confederate forces having,
during the afternoon of that day and the morning
of the 1st of December, concentrated at Grahamville
in numbers sufficient to confirm the fruits of the
victory and repel any new attack, General Smith
regarded the necessity as no longer existing
for detaining the Georgia state troops "beyond
their legal jurisdiction." Accordingly, having
asked and obtained permission from Lieut. General
Hardee to lead his exhausted command back to
Georgia, General Smith arrived in Savannah with
his troops at ten o'clock on the night of the 1st of
December. From this time until the evacuation
of the city, this officer and the State forces were
posted on the right of the western lines of the city
of Savannah, where they rendered efficient service
and sustained an honorable part prior to and during
the progress of the siege.
This victory at Honey-Hill relieved the city of
Savannah from an impending danger which, had it not
been thus averted, would have necessitated its
immediate evacuation under the most perilous
circumstances, maintained the only line of
communication by which reënforcements were
expected for the relief of the commercial metropolis of
Georgia, and finally afforded an avenue of convenient
retreat when, three weeks afterwards, the garrison,
unable longer to cope with the enveloping legions of
Sherman, evacuated the city. In acknowledgment of the
gallantry, patriotism, and distinguished services of
General Smith and his
command in this brilliant affair, the Legislature of
Georgia on the 9th of March, 1865, passed the following
resolutions:
Resolved, by
the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Assembly met, That the thanks of the State
are due and are hereby tendered to Genl. G. W. Smith
and to the officers and men composing the
First Division of Georgia Militia, and to the officers and
men of the Georgia State Line, for their conspicuous
gallantry at Griswoldville in this State; and especially
for their unselfish patriotism in leaving their State and
meeting the enemy in the memorable and well fought
battle field at Honey-Hill in South Carolina.
The State with pride
records this gallant conduct of
her militia, and feels assured that when an emergency
again arises, State lines will be forgotten by her militia,
and a patriotism exhibited which knows nothing but our
whole
country.
Resolved, That
his Excellency the Governor be
requested to transmit a copy of these Resolutions to
General G. W. Smith, with a request that they be read
to all the troops under his command.
Adjutant General Wayne occupies Gordon--Retreats to Oconee
Bridge--Major Hartridge's Report of Confederate Operations at
that Point--Wayne's Command retires to Millen--Confederate
Movements at Number 4 1/2 and Number 2, Central Rail Road--
Col. Fizer disputes Osterhaus's Crossing at the Cannouchee--Maj.
Gen. Wheeler's Report of the Operations of the Confederate
Cavalry.
No resistance was offered to General Slocum when
he occupied Milledgeville on the 23d of November. The
Legislature hastily adjourned upon the approach of his
column. The supreme court also adjourned, and the
Governor left the capital. The capture of military stores
at Milledgeville were unimportant. The State Library
suffered severely, and the town was largely pillaged. On the
19th of November, Adjutant General Henry C. Wayne
with the corps of Cadets, Pruden's Battery of Light
Artillery, Talbott's company of Cavalry, Williams's Militia
company, the Factory and Penitentiary Guards and the
Roberts's Guards (convicts), aggregating about five
hundred men, and under the immediate command of Maj.
F. W. Capers, superintendent of the Georgia Military
Institute, evacuated Milledgeville and fell back upon
Gordon. On the afternoon of the next day
this force retreated along the line of the Central
rail road and took post at the Oconee bridge, "as
the most important point on the Central rail road to be
defended." Upon arrival, Adjutant General Wayne
found at the bridge a guard of 186 men,
consisting of Heyward's company of South Carolina
Cavalry, a section of Maxwell's Light Battery,
Lieutenant Huger, and a detail from the 27th Georgia
Battalion, all under the command of Major Alfred L.
Hartridge who had been ordered by Major General
Lafayette McLaws, commanding the district of
Georgia, to defend this crossing to the last extremity.
Major Hartridge thus details the services rendered in
obedience to these instructions.
Savannah, March 17, '67.
Col. C. C. Jones,
Dear Colonel:
On the night of the 18th November, '64, while at
Rosedew Battery, I received orders from Genl. McLaws,
then commanding the district of Georgia, to proceed
to the Central rail road bridge on the Oconee river,
and to hold said bridge against what was then supposed
to be a raiding party from Sherman's army. For this
purpose I was given a section of artillery (Lt. Huger, two
12 pounder Napoleons), a company of cavalry (the
Ashley Dragoons, Capt. Heyward), and 100 infantry
selected from the 27th Georgia Battalion.
I arrived at the rail road bridge with my command on
the evening of the 19th November, and immediately
proceeded to make what arrangements I could for its defense.
The river, at this point, has a large belt of swamp on both
sides; the bridge over the stream being approached by trestle
work on the Savannah side of 3/4 of a mile, and on the Macon
side of over a mile in length, so that I at once saw that I had a
difficult task to perform in defending not only the bridge
proper but the long line of trestle, against a superior force,
particularly as my artillery would be of little service from the
nature of the ground.
On the morning of the 20th, hearing that Gen. Wayne was at
Gordon with a force of State troops, I took an engine and paid
him a visit.
Arriving at Gordon about 2 o'clock P. M., I found him there
with about 450 men, a battery of 6 pieces of artillery, a
company of cavalry, several companies of Georgia militia, and
the Georgia State Cadets under Major Capers. Soon after my
arrival his pickets were driven in by the advance of the enemy
who were reported to be approaching in force. Gen. Wayne,
thinking Gordon a position of no value, decided to fall back to
the Oconee bridge without giving battle. Most of the guns and
baggage being already on the train, he moved off at 4 o'clock P. M.,
bringing off everything safely, and arrived at the bridge
the same afternoon.
He, as superior in rank, took command, but requested me to
keep command of the post, and, under his direction, to make
what disposition of the troops I thought best.
I knew that the enemy could flank us by crossing at
Milledgeville, so I had all the bridges on Buffalo creek
destroyed, and placed guards at each. The nearest crossing
below was Ball's ferry, 8 miles off. At this point I placed as
strong a force as I could spare, using the cavalry to picket
the river above and below, and Buffalo creek. I had rifle pits
dug on both sides of the bridge, and my two Napoleons were
placed in position at the nearest point of high ground. Scouts
were thrown across the river to watch the movements of the
enemy.
On Tuesday, the 22d November, the enemy appeared in our
front in large force. Gen. Wayne, in consultation with his
principal officer, determined to abandon the bridge, deeming
the force under his command inadequate for its defense; he
having telegraphed to Gen. McLaws for reënforcements and
receiving an answer that there were none to send. As my
orders from Gen. McLaws were positive to hold the bridge to
the last extremity, I refused to move my troops with those of
Gen. Wayne, stating to him that I was determined to hold the
position as long as possible. I at the same time telegraphed
Gen. McLaws the state of affairs; he replying that I must obey
his instructions to hold the bridge and not to consider myself
under Gen. Wayne's orders. Upon submitting this reply to
Gen. Wayne, he decided not to evacuate, but to stay and
share my fate.
On the 23d the enemy appeared at Ball's ferry, and driving
back my guard, took possession of the flat and boats, and
commenced crossing. Taking Heyward's and Talbott's
companies of cavalry, Huger's section
of artillery, and about 80 men of the 27th Battalion of Georgia
Volunteers, I proceeded immediately to the ferry with the
intention of driving the enemy back if possible. Hastening
ahead of my command with Heyward's cavalry, I arrived at the
high land (the swamp extending for about one mile from the
river at this point) nearest the ferry, at about 3 o'clock P. M., and
learned from a countryman living near that the enemy were
still crossing, and that from 4 to 500 were already on our side
and were bringing their horses over. I ordered Capt. Heyward
to advance dismounted, and feel their strength. At the same
time I sent back orders to my command to hasten up. After a
sharp skirmish Capt. Heyward was driven back, and reported
the enemy advancing.
The balance of my force having arrived, I placed my artillery
so as to command the road leading out of the swamp, and
dismounting the cavalry, I made the best breastwork I could
with fence rails, and awaited the approach of the enemy.
But they not making their appearance, and feeling satisfied
that if I remained inactive in my present position they would
cross a large force, I determined to make the attack. So,
throwing out Heyward's company (dismounted) as
skirmishers, and forming the infantry and Talbott's cavalry into
line of battle (leaving the artillery in my fortified position as a
reserve) I advanced on the ferry and, after a fight of about one
hour and a half, I forced the enemy to recross the river (except
a few on horseback who escaped into the swamp or were
captured). Their loss was 36 killed, and an unknown
number wounded. My loss was 2 killed and 7
wounded.
Leaving Capt. Talbott to hold the ferry, I hastened back to
the bridge and arrived there late that night. During that day
there had been some active skirmishing between our forces
and a brigade of Kilpatrick's mounted infantry. During the
night a courier arrived from Genl. Wheeler and stated that he
(Wheeler) was crossing at Blackshear's ferry a few miles
below Ball's. Later in the night we were joined by a regiment of
Wheeler's cavalry.
We learned from our prisoners that the troops I
encountered at Ball's ferry were an advance of the 15th Army
Corps, and that those in front of us were portions of
Kilpatrick's command, the main body of Sherman's army
being at Milledgeville.
All of the 24th was occupied in defending the rail road
bridge against vigorous attacks. With Hayward's company
dismounted and acting as riflemen, the 27th Battalion Ga.
Volunteers, and the hearty coöperation of Maj. Capers with
the State Cadets, and Capt. Pruden with a piece of artillery
mounted on a platform car, we managed to keep them at bay.
That night Col. Gaines, with 4 or 500 men, joined us from
Wheeler.
On the morning of the 25th Lt. Genl. Hardee arrived and
visited me at my position in front of the bridge. At that time
the enemy had succeeded in setting fire to the trestle very
near the bridge, but they dared not approach it as my sharp
shooters commanded it. They had also brought a piece of
artillery into play and were doing all they could to drive us
from our
position, but without effect. After ordering me to hold my
position, Genl. Hardee returned to No. 13, the enemy having
crossed at Milledgeville and moved in that direction. During
the afternoon the enemy withdrew from our front and, during
the night, we received orders from Genl. Hardee to fall back to
No. 13.
We were then ordered to fall back to the Ogeechee rail road
bridge; Huger with his two Napoleons, and Heyward
with his company, being ordered to report to Genl. Wheeler.
We arrived at No. 10 about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the
26th, and the next day received orders to fall back to Millen
and fortify.
On the 29th I received orders from Genl. Hardee to proceed
to Savannah with the 27th Battalion, and arriving there on the
30th, was ordered to take command of the line at Monteith,
extending from the Charleston and Savannah rail road bridge
to Harrison's place.
Three important roads crossed my line, the Augusta road,
the Middle-ground, and the road through Harrison's place.
The swamp in front of my line had been reported impracticable
by the engineer in charge, Capt. Grant, but upon careful
examination I found I could ride through it in many places. I
reported this fact to Maj. Black of Genl. Hardee's staff next
day, and convinced him of the weakness of the position, as
the engineer had erected earth works only at the intersections
of the three roads mentioned. But, as I received orders to
hold the line as long as possible, I made the best of it. I had
about 800 troops under my
command consisting of the 27th Battalion Georgia
Volunteers 250 strong, a North Carolina battalion of about 350
men, Howard's local battalion of about 150 men, and Capt.
Abel's battery of 2 Napoleons and 2 howitzers. I placed the
27th battalion, with Abel's 2 Napoleons, to defend the
Augusta road, thinking it the most important, the North
Carolina battalion on the right, 4 miles off at Harrison's place,
and Howard's battalion in the center, each with a howitzer.
About this time Capt. Geo. S. Owens, and a Mr. McLeod,
rendered me much assistance, with a force of negroes, in
obstructing the roads and destroying the bridges in my front.
"On the 5th December, scouts reported the enemy
advancing on the Augusta road, and at the same time I
learned that Gen. Baker of North Carolina, commanding on my
left, was attacked. The next day my advanced guard on the
Augusta road was driven in, the enemy capturing the
lieutenant in command and five men.
The next day I was joined by Major Black, and at my
suggestion he agreed to take charge of my left, leaving me
with the right. About ten o'clock that morning the enemy's
skirmishers opened on my line, and soon afterwards they
commenced a rapid fire from a small Parrott gun. Capt. Abel
with his two Napoleons succeeded in silencing this piece
after an exchange of about 14 shots, but they kept up a
scattering fire of musketry until about 2 o'clock, when they
made a charge along my whole line. On the left, where Major
Black had charge, they forced back the North
Carolina battalion, and also caused Howard to fall back, as he
feared being flanked. Maj. Black continued to retreat until he
reached the rail road at Montieth Station and there formed
another line, the enemy having stopped at Genl. Harrison's
house. In the mean time I was pressed hard, but managed to
hold my position on the Augusta road.
About 4 o'clock I received orders from Genl. Hardee to fall
back to the Charleston and Savannah rail road bridge over the
Savannah river, where he would have boats to convey my
troops to the city. But as this necessitated the abandonment of
the section of artillery with me (which had by the gallant
conduct of its commander and men enabled me to hold my
position) I telegraphed the general asking permission to hold
my present position until after night fall, when I felt that I
could withdraw without serious loss. I would here remark that
during the time I was in front of the Federals in Georgia, and
afterwards in the two Carolinas, I never knew them to make an
attack, or inaugurate an offensive movement during the night
time.
My request being granted, I held my position until 8
o'clock, when I withdrew to the station, joining Maj. Black
with the balance of the command. Here I received orders to
hold the rail road until a train which was to convey Genl.
Beauregard to Charleston should pass. At 10 o'clock I was
instructed to fall back to the inner line of defenses 4 miles from
Savannah. The next day I was placed under Genl. Gustavus
Smith's command on the right of the line, where I remained for
several days.
The day after the fall of Fort McAllister Genl. Hardee
ordered me to take command of the line of the Little
Ogeechee, extending from the Rosedew Batteries to the
Atlantic and Gulf rail road bridge over the Little Ogeechee.
The troops under my command were the garrison at Rosedew
(two companies of Cobb Guards), three companies of the 1st
Georgia Regulars, under Capt. Twiggs, three sections of
Wheeler's horse artillery, and a company of Wheeler's
cavalry. The batteries at Rosedew consisted of three 10 inch
Columbiads, one rifled 18 pounder, one smooth bore 32
pounder, and one 10 inch mortar.
I placed Capt. Twiggs, with the regulars and a
section of horse artillery, at Coffee bluff, so that they could
defend the bluff and, in case of necessity, act as a reserve to
the batteries at Rosedew, or the points above the bluff. I
placed another section of artillery at Johnson's landing, and
the third at the rail road bridge, using the cavalry as pickets
along the line.
No decided demonstration was made on this line.
On the 17th, a faint attack was made on the bridge.
On the morning of the 19th, the enemy attacked
Beaulieu battery, just opposite, with one gun boat and
a mortar boat. To divert their attention I opened on
them with my mortar, they returning shot for shot,
but I cannot say much damage was done on either
side. That night I received information that Savannah
was to be evacuated on the night following, (20th
December), and, my orders were to move into the city by 8
o'clock P. M., of the 20th.
On the afternoon of the evacuation I destroyed all
my powder by throwing it into the river, cut up and damaged,
as far as I could, my gun carriages, spiked the guns, and did
everything I could to destroy the batteries, etc., without
making any noise or resorting to fire. At 5 o'clock P. M., I
withdrew from the line as ordered, and arrived in Savannah
between 8 and 9 o'clock.
Yours, very truly,
ALFRED L. HARTRIDGE.
On Saturday, the 26th of November, the forces
concentrated for the defense of the Oconee bridge were
withdrawn, and the same day reached number 13 on the
line of the Central rail road, where Huger's section of
Maxwell's Light Battery was turned over to Maj.
General Wheeler. General Wayne having received
orders from General Hardee to occupy the rail road
bridge across the Ogeechee, started at once with his
command for that point, which was reached at one
o'clock P. M. the same day.
The enemy having cut the Waynesboro road on the
morning of the 27th, General Wayne was directed to fall
back upon Millen and fortify that position. While at
Millen, in the execution of these orders, he was notified
that Kilpatrick's command, some four thousand strong,
was moving upon that point. He therefore fell back with
his
command to number 4 1/2, behind the Little Ogeechee rail
road bridge.
On the third of December, at day-break, he was
joined by the State line and the First Brigade of Georgia
Militia of General Smith's Division, under the command
of General Robert Toombs, at the time acting as
inspector general of the First Division. At eleven o'clock
the same day General Baker arrived with his brigade of
North Carolinians. Being advised that the 15th Army
Corps, on the other side of the Ogeechee, was moving
upon station number 2, Central rail road, and heavy
columns of the enemy being in front on the rail road and
on the right of the Confederate position, it was deemed
best by Genl. Wayne to return at once to number 2.
Upon arrival there he was met by Major Black of
General Hardee's staff, with instructions to return at
once to number 4 1/2 where he would be reënforced. This
order was promptly obeyed.
Early in the morning of December 4th, Anderson's
and Phillips's brigades of the Georgia militia reported for
duty at number 4 1/2. Line of battle was formed behind
the Little Ogeechee, with a force of four thousand
infantry and three pieces of artillery. General Baker was
assigned as executive officer in command of the line. At
1:35 P. M. the advance guard of the 17th Corps appeared
on the left, and skirmishing began there and in front of
the bridge on the rail road. At 4 P. M. Major General
McLaws arrived from Savannah with instructions from
General Hardee to assume the command. Having
reconnoitered the position and being convinced of the
utter inutility of offering resistance at this point, at half
past five o'clock General McLaws ordered a withdrawal
of the forces, which was done during the night, the
troops falling back quietly to number 1 1/2. At 7 P. M. the
enemy ceased skirmishing and began entrenching. The
next day the State forces and Baker's command
resumed their positions in the western lines for the
defense of Savannah.
The passage of the Cannouchee by General
Osterhaus's column had been vigorously but vainly
disputed by Colonel John C. Fizer and his command.
In advance of the Federal approach the prisoners at
Andersonville and Millen had been safely removed--
much to the chagrin of the invading forces. The
Confederate line at Monteith being found impracticable,
was evacuated, as has already been indicated in the
intelligent communication of Major Hartridge, the officer
in command.
As most of the fighting in retardation of Sherman's
advance was done by the Confederate cavalry, under
Major General Wheeler, we have purposely refrained
from alluding to the services
rendered by this arm of the service in order that we
might avail ourselves of the connected narrative
contained in the following report.
Head Quarters Cavalry Corps, near Savannah, Ga., Dec. 24th, 1864.
Lt. Coln. T. B. Roy, A. A. Genl.,
Hd. Qs. Dept., etc.
Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of
the operations of my command from Nov. 19th, 1864, the date
Genl. Hardee assumed command.
For several days previous to that date I had been resisting
the enemy's advance from Atlanta towards Macon, reporting
daily to Genls. Bragg, Hood, Hardee, and Taylor, and also to
Gov. Brown almost the exact movements and intentions of the
enemy. Anderson's brigade had been ordered to report to Maj.
Genl. Howell Cobb at Macon, in order that he might place him
in position to observe the enemy approaching Macon on the
east side of the Ocmulgee river. This brigade was placed in
position by General Cobb on the Clinton road.
On the 19th I sent Crews' Georgia brigade with orders also
to report to Genl. Cobb. This brigade Coln. Crews reports was
placed in position on the Milledgeville road with instructions
(as I afterwards learned), to follow and engage any raiding
party of the enemy which might move towards the rail road.
Towards evening on the 19th, I ascertained from my scouts
that the main forces of the enemy had crossed
the Ocmulgee river above the mouth of the Towaliga, which
induced me to move to Macon in person, directing all my
command, except Ferguson's and Breckinridge's brigades, to
follow me. On arriving at Macon about 11 P. M., I found Lt.
Genl. Hardee who had assumed command of the department.
He directed me to move at daylight with all my available force,
except Crews' brigade, out on the Clinton road and ascertain
the enemy's force and location. In obeying this order, and
before marching towards Clinton, both my flanks were
menaced by small parties of the enemy which I was obliged to
drive off, causing some delay. I then moved on rapidly with my
advanced guard to Clinton, and found Osterhaus' corps moving
through the town. This was not observed until very near the
column, owing to a dense fog. Six men dashed into the town
and captured Genl. Osterhaus' servant (an enlisted man),
within twenty feet of Genl. Osterbaus' Head Quarters. A
regiment of the enemy's cavalry charged us, making the
retreat of my small escort necessary. A squad of the enemy's
cavalry had pressed in upon my line of retreat, between my
position and the body of my command. These, however, were
soon cleared away by the approach of two of my regiments
which came up rapidly to my assistance. I immediately
charged the advancing column of the enemy and drove it back
upon their infantry. They then rallied and charged me again.
We met this charge, checked and returned it with success,
driving them back towards Clinton.
considerable force were pressing down the road towards
Griswoldville. I started promptly with a portion of my command
in that direction, and soon met a courier from Col. Crews with a
note from him stating that the enemy's cavalry had moved
towards the rail road, and that pursuant to Gen. Hardee's
orders he was going in pursuit. This left the Milledgeville road
open; and, fearing some difficulty, I moved rapidly to that
point. On arriving I found our artillery engaging the enemy's
advance, and our infantry in the redoubts ready to receive an
attack. The enemy had already charged up the road, and four
of them had attempted to capture a gun but had been driven
back leaving an officer (whose horse was killed) in the hands
of our infantry. Finding large unprotected intervals between
redoubts, I placed Harrison's and Hagan's brigades in line,
making the connection complete. After slight skirmishing the
enemy retreated a short distance. Pursuant to orders from
Genl. Hardee, I moved out during the night, and the next day
drove the enemy from Griswoldville, capturing a few prisoners.
The next morning I again attacked and drove the enemy for
some distance, capturing sixty prisoners, besides killing and
wounding a large number.
It now being evident that the enemy were not intending to
make any further demonstration upon Macon, I moved on
towards the Oconee, which river I reached on the 24th
November, and completed crossing the next day by swimming.
A brigade under Lt. Col. Gaines was immediately sent to hold
in check a portion of the enemy who were menacing the river
near Ball's ferry, and with the remainder of my command I
moved during the night to station No. 13, on the Central rail
road. Scouts and pickets were sent upon all roads by which the
enemy could reach the rail road, or march in an easterly
direction. The following day, pursuant to Genl. Hardee's orders,
I moved to Sandersville. The 14th and 20th corps of the enemy
had marched from Milledgeville, crossed Buffalo creek, and
were marching upon the town, preceded by cavalry which had
dispersed the local troops who had attempted to oppose them.
I moved out on the lower road and sent a force out on the
upper road. After moving three miles, we were charged by the
enemy whom we met and checked, and then in turn charged
and drove them back for a mile, capturing, killing, and wounding
about thirty of the enemy, besides capturing several
horses, mules, and one loaded wagon. I immediately sent word
to the citizens of Sandersville that the enemy would enter the
town the next morning; and I advised them to send off all
movable property of value. At dark we established our pickets
close to the enemy, and next morning were slowly driven back
towards, and finally through the town.
At evening I was informed by my pickets near Ogeechee
shoals that Genl. Kilpatrick, with a large force of cavalry, had
crossed the river on his way to Augusta. Leaving Genl.
Iverson to observe the enemy, I started immediately with my
command, overtaking him about midnight. I immediately
attacked and captured his picket, and pushed on to his camp
and drove him back from the main Augusta road and out of his
camps, capturing one stand of colors, some prisoners, some
fifty horses, clothing, blankets, camp equipage,
etc., in considerable quantities. The enemy immediately
started towards Augusta on the lower Augusta road. On
reaching the house where Genl. Kilpatrick had staid, I learned
that he and his officers had been overheard talking a great
deal in private about Augusta. It was the opinion of citizens
that this move was intended as a raid upon that place. Being
mindful of the great damage that could be done by the enemy's
burning the valuable mills and property which were
not protected by fortifications, including the factories in the
vicinity, the large portion of the city outside of the
fortifications, the arsenal and Sand Hills, I hoped
by pressing him hard he might be turned from his purpose. I
also learned that the night previous he had
sent a party of some five hundred (500) men to Waynesboro
to destroy the rail road bridge, which convinced me that
Augusta and not Waynesboro was Kilpatrick's destination, as
had the latter place been the point he designed striking, he
would not have sent a small party there on the preceding day.
Notwithstanding the jaded condition of my command, I
therefore pushed on rapidly, engaging and defeating his rear
guards whom I found fortified at every favorable point,
frequently separated by but two or three hundred yards.
Horses, arms, arid prisoners were captured in nearly every
engagement.
On reaching Brier creek swamp we pressed the enemy so
warmly that he turned off towards Waynesboro. During the
chase the enemy set fire to all corn
cribs, cotton gins, and large numbers of barns and houses.
We succeded in driving him off in nearly half the instances in
time to extinguish the flames, and frequently pressed him so
rapidly as to prevent his firing a number of houses, thus
saving a large amount of property.
I entered the town of Waynesboro' with my staff just after
dark, and just as the enemy were leaving it. The town was in
flames, but with the assistance of my staff and escort we
succeeded in staying the flames and in extinguishing the fire in
all but one dwelling which was so far burned that it was
impossible to save it. I immediately moved on and attacked the
enemy who were engaged in tearing up the rail road. The
attack had the effect to stop their work upon the rail road, and
to keep them in line of battle all night.
About 3 A. M., I sent Humes's division to gain the enemy's
rear by turning his left flank, and sent a regiment to gain his
rear by moving around his right. Unfortunately the commands
failed to get into position. At daylight the enemy withdrew for
a short distance, unobserved, in consequence of a dense fog.
As we advanced upon them they charged our line, which
charge we met and easily repulsed. I charged the enemy's flank
with Humes and Anderson's commands, and attacked the front
with the balance of my command, driving the enemy from his
fortified position, capturing a number of prisoners, arms and
horses, and killing a great many who refused to surrender, and
who were shot in the pursuit which ensued. The rout was
complete, and Genl. Kilpatrick was himself very nearly
captured. We continued the charge until reaching a
swamp where the enemy had so constructed barricades
as to make a very strong resistance. The enemy was
soon driven from this position by a flank movement,
after which I again charged and routed their entire
force, capturing, killing and wounding nearly two
hundred, and completely stampeding the whole force.
His destruction was only prevented by an intervening
swamp at Buckhead creek, which made it almost
impossible to approach, and by the failure of the 4th
Tenn. regiment to gain the enemy's rear, for which
purpose it had been detached some two hours previous.
The bridge over Buckhead creek had been carefully
prepared for burning by Kilpatrick's advance guard,
and, on our reaching it, the torch had been applied and
the bridge was in flames, while a terrific fire from the
enemy on the other side prevented me from immediately
extinguishing the flames. I dismounted the
advance brigade and advanced it through the creek
bottom to the bank, and finally drove the enemy
sufficiently far from the opposite bank to enable a few brave
men to work their way across and drive the enemy
beyond range. By great energy and hard labor on the
part of my men the fire was soon extinguished, and in
little more than an hour the bridge was reconstructed
and our troops passing over. The passage, however,
was very slow on account of the rude and frail
construction of the bridge. After advancing a mile,
I discovered the enemy's position, and ordered Genl. Dibrell
to turn their right flank by moving through a wood
which screened the movement. As night was fast
approaching it became important to strike the enemy
immediately, although only about twelve hundred (1200) of my
command had crossed the creek. I moved upon the enemy and
drove in his pickets. On discovering his line, I observed that
Genl. Dibrell in attempting to turn his flank (although he had
moved nearly a mile to our left), had nevertheless encountered
the enemy's line of battle which extended still beyond his
position. Having parts of Harrison's and Ashby's brigades
with me, the former being in advance, I placed the 3d Arkansas
Regiment in line, and the 8th and 11th Texas Regiments in
column, and charged the enemy's position. Nothing could
have succeeded the gallantry with which these troops
responded to the bugle's call, and hurled themselves upon the
enemy, driving his cavalry in confusion, and finally
encountering the breast works. This so terrified the enemy as
to cause him to fly in uncontrollable confusion. Unfortunately
the open ground did not continue, and we finally encountered
a line so positioned that it could not be approached by
cavalry. I ordered Ashby's brigade to turn the enemy's left
flank and take possession of the Louisville road upon which
the enemy was retreating. Owing to approaching dusk Col.
Ashby, by accident, got on a road to the left of the one
indicated by my order, and notified me that he held possession
of the Louisville road. This error enabled the enemy to move off
by scattering through fields and wood without order or
organization.
During the night Kilpatrick sought the protection of his
infantry which he did not venture to forsake
again during the campaign, no doubt, being too much
demoralized to again meet our cavalry.
Fearing the enemy might make another attempt to raid or
march upon Augusta, I placed pickets at all the crossings of
Brier creek, and located my main force at Rocky Spring
church.
On the morning of December 2d, the 14th Army Corps and
Kilpatrick's cavalry marched upon Waynesboro, by the
Louisville road. I met and checked them at Rocky creek. After
a warm engagement they moved off to my left, and crossed a
short distance below on a temporarily constructed bridge,
and, by moving through the fields, turned off towards
Thomas's station. This necessitated my falling back. The
following day I moved down and attacked the enemy, driving
in their pickets and stopping their destruction of the rail road.
Perceiving, after night fall, that they had recommenced their
work, I again attacked them about midnight,
shelling their camp with good effect. At daylight the enemy in
strong force marched upon Waynesboro. Most of my command had
necessarily been sent some three miles after forage.
We quickly concentrated and hastily threw up barricades, while a
single regiment held the entire column in check. This rough
screen was hardly completed when a general charge was made
upon our lines, which was repulsed with considerable loss
to the enemy. A second, third and fourth charge were made by
the enemy, each of which was repulsed, or met and driven back
by counter charges. Finally their long lines of infantry advanced,
and, after warm fighting, their cavalry having turned
our flanks, we were compelled to fall back, which was done by
taking successive positions till we reached the town of
Waynesboro. Here we were so warmly pressed that it was
with difficulty we succeeded in withdrawing from our
position. The moment our lines left our works I directed the
8th Texas, Coln. Cook, and the 9th Tennessee, Capt. Brumley,
to charge the enemy, which was gallantly done, meeting and
driving back a charge of the enemy and so staggering him that
no further demonstration was made upon us until we were
prepared to receive the enemy at our new position north of the
town. During all the enemy's charges the loss of men and
horses must have been severe. According to his own account,
his loss in men numbered fifty (50) killed and one hundred and
forty-seven (147) wounded. The enemy remained in town
about three hours, and then moved down the Savannah road.
During all the engagements the enemy's cavalry were at least
double my own numbers, and were besides reënforced by one
or more divisions of infantry.
Having been notified by the Lieut. Genl. commanding that
the roads towards Savannah had been blockaded by his order,
and having sent Lewis's brigade (reëinforced by the 4th
Tennessee Regiment) to fall back before the enemy, I, with the
remainder of my command, remained to protect Augusta and
to strike his flanks and rear.
On the first day I attacked his rear several times,
driving him from his several positions, killing and
wounding a great number, and capturing about one
hundred (100) prisoners. During his movement towards
Savannah, so warmly was he pressed, that he
blockaded the roads in his rear, frequently building
fortifications two or three miles in length, and destroyed all
bridges on his line of march. He occasionally attacked us by
charging with his cavalry, which was invariably met by
counter charges and driven back in confusion, with heavy
loss. In every fight we captured horses, arms and prisoners.
On the night of Dec. 8th, we shelled the camp of the 14th
Corps with good effect, throwing the corps into confusion and
causing it to leave camp at midnight, abandoning clothing,
arms, etc. By breaking up the camp during the extreme
darkness, a great many negroes were left in our hands whom
we sent back to their owners. We also captured three wagons
and teams, and caused the enemy to burn several more
wagons. The whole number of negroes captured from the
enemy during the movement was nearly two thousand.
On the 8th we captured a dispatch--see appendix A--from
Genl. Slocum to Genl. Davis, giving the proposed location of
Sherman's army before Savannah; which afterwards proved to
be correct. This paper was forwarded to Genl. Hardee. On
reaching a point within ten miles of the city, and finding it
impossible to do any further harm to the enemy in that
position, I moved back and crossed the Savannah river,
leaving Genl. Iverson's command to watch the enemy should
he move in the direction of Augusta or Western Georgia.
and was placed by Lt. Genl. Hardee in command of the
defenses of New river and adjacent landings, and charged
with the duty of holding the line of communication from
Huger's landing to Hardeeville. This we succeeded in doing,
although the enemy held the South Carolina side of the river
with a division of infantry.
After the evacuation of the city, Dec. 20th, I
removed all the guns and ammunition from Tunbridge
and Mongin's landings, and New river bridge, also the heavy
guns, weighing 9000 pounds each, from Red Bluff, together
with the ammunition. I omitted to state that during the entire
movement of the enemy through Georgia I kept all my
superiors fully informed of the strength and of all the
movements of the enemy. At the same time I kept my cavalry
in his front, rear, and on both flanks, preventing his cavalry
from spreading over the country, retarding the enemy by
fighting him on all sides, and felling trees in his advance. This
duty was fully done, and I thank my officers and men for their
devotion, gallantry, and the self-sacrificing spirit they have
ever exhibited. Every engagement was a success, and the utter
defeat and discomfiture of the enemy's cavalry was most
signal and complete, notwithstanding his force of cavalry was
always superior to mine.
My force never exceeded thirty-five hundred (3500) men,
and was so distributed in front, rear and on both flanks that I
seldom had more than two thousand (2000) under my
immediate command, which two thousand frequently charged
and routed more than double their numbers. The enemy had
been falsely informed by
their officers that we took no prisoners, which caused him to
fight with desperation and to run very dangerous gauntlets to
escape capture, which frequently accounts for the large
proportion of killed.
In every rout of their cavalry, and in the many fights which
ensued, they continued to fly, refusing to surrender
notwithstanding the demands of my men in close pursuit.
Consequently, no alternative was left but to shoot or sabre
them to prevent escape.
During the trip, I had parties to move a day or more in
advance of the enemy, informing citizens where to run their
negroes and stock in order to ensure the safety of their
property, offering them every assistance in so doing. But
generally, the citizens were so frightened as to be perfectly
helpless. On the enemy's approach, pursuant to orders, I
drove off such horses and mules as were exposed to the
enemy's view, and have since taken every pains to restore
said stock to its owners, generally with success. My
command captured about five hundred horses, many of which
had been taken from citizens by the enemy, and have been
returned to their owners when it was possible to do so.
I desire to tender my thanks for the devoted gallantry of my
division and brigade commanders. Those whose conduct
came especially under my notice, were Generals Allen, Humes,
Anderson, and Dibrell, and Colonels Ashby, Hagan, Crews,
and Lt. Col. Anderson. Genl. Allen was slightly wounded and
had two horses shot under him at Waynesboro. Genls. Humes
and Dibrell also had their horses shot whilst gallantly
engaging the enemy. I also tender my thanks to Genl.
Robertson who, while acting as my chief of staff in the
temporary absence of his command, was severely wounded
while gallantly charging the enemy. Captain S. W. Steele and
Lieut. M. G. Hudson, A. D. C. of my staff, were highly
distinguished for gallantry and zeal. Lieuts. R. B. Ryan, J. M.
Stewart, and Henry Chapman, acting upon my staff, were
gallant and efficient.
In closing this report I will state that during the last five
months my command has been without wagons or cooking
utensils, with orders to subsist upon the country. Its food has
been limited to bread baked upon boards and stones, and meat
broiled upon sticks. It has not been paid in twelve months,
and has not had the regular issues of clothing which have
been made to the infantry. During this time it has averaged in
direct marching sixteen (16) miles a day; and, being without
wagons, has been obliged to pack all the forage and rations to
camp on horseback, which, together with scouting and other
duties, would make the average traveling of each soldier at
least twenty (20) miles each day. During these five months my
troops have been continuously in the immediate presence of
the enemy, fighting nearly every day, and with brilliant
success, except in a few instances when small detachments
sent off from my command met vastly superior forces. During
these five months my command has captured, killed and
wounded more than its own effective strength. It has captured
from the enemy in action and carried off the field four (4)
pieces of artillery, with caissons and battery wagons--twelve
hundred mules, over two hundred wagons, two thousand head
of beef cattle, three thousand cavalry horses with equipments,
and over four thousand stand of arms. It has also captured a
great number of the enemy's posts, with large amounts of
stores, and has destroyed more rail road used by the enemy--
stopping his communications for a longer time and with less
loss--than any other cavalry command, although expeditions
double its strength have been sent out on that duty. It has
also captured and destroyed over a dozen trains of cars,
generally loaded with supplies. As we were continually
fighting the enemy, our camps could not be designated before
night-fall. Details had then to be sent out to procure forage
and rations, frequently making it midnight before supper could
be prepared for my men, and then they were often compelled
to be in the saddle before daylight. No men in the Confederate
states have marched more, fought more, suffered more, or had
so little opportunities for discipline; yet they are to-day as
orderly and as well disciplined as any cavalry in the
Confederate service.
On our line of march officers and men were met who, in their
anxiety to increase their commands, used every exertion to
induce my men to desert, frequently offering them promotion
and furloughs as a reward for dishonor. Notwithstanding this,
my command is today stronger and more efficient than it was
at the beginning of a continuous campaign of eight
months' hard, constant, and successful fighting.
I must particularly commend my Tennessee and Kentucky
troops, whom, though they saw their homes
thrown open by the advance of General Hood's army, I
brought from the Coosa river to Savannah without a single
desertion. Afterwards I had the mortification to see a body
desert who had been informed they were to be punished
without trial for crimes they had never committed.
Respy. Col.,
Your Obt. Servt.
J. WHEELER,
Maj. Genl.
APPENDIX A.
Army of Georgia, Head Qrs., Left Wing, Springfield, Dec. 8, 1864, 7 A. M.
Genl.,
Genl. Sherman has information that the line of defense
around Savannah is about four miles from the city. He desires
to take the road extending from Cherokee hill through Silk
Hope to Litchfield, as our first position. Your corps should be
at or near Cherokee hill. The 20th will be to the left of Pooler,
17th on right of 20th, and 15th near Litchfield. The 20th Corps
will be at Monteith to night.
Yours very respectfully,
H. W. SLOCUM, M. G.
Official Copy.
H. C.
This dispatch was directed on the envelop to Genl.
Jeff. C. Davis.
The Siege of Savannah--Concentration of Confederate Forces for the
Defense of the City--Investment by the United States Forces--
Federal attempts to Communicate with the Fleet--Confederate Line at
Monteith--Obstruction of Roads leading into Savannah--Western
Line for the Protection of the City, its Location, Principal Batteries,
and Armament--Enumeration of Light Artillery Companies
Concentrated for its Support--Inundation of the Low Grounds in
front of this Western Line--the Western Line, how Subdivided,
Commanded, and Garrisoned--Supply of Ordnance,
Quarter-Master, and Commissary Stores--Statement of Rations
Issued.
Although every effort had been made to concentrate
a large force for the defense of Savannah, such was the
pressure upon the Confederacy and so great the paucity
of troops, that at the inception and during the progress of
the siege there were not more than ten thousand men fit
for duty within the Confederate lines around that city.
Nearly one half of these consisted of reserves and
militia, and considerable details were employed in
garrisoning the forts and fixed batteries in the Savannah
river and along the line of the water approaches. No
lack of patriotism existed on the part of the citizens, who
responded freely to the following spirited address of their
honored mayor.
Mayor's Office, Savannah, November 28th, 1864.
Fellow Citizens,
The time has come when every male who can
shoulder a musket can make himself useful in
defending our hearths and homes. Our city is well fortified, and
the old can fight in the trenches as well as the young; and a
determined and brave force can, behind entrenchments,
successfully repel the assaults of treble their number.
The general commanding this division has issued a call for
all men of every age, not absolutely incapacitated from
disease, to report at once to Captn. C. W. Howard, at the
Oglethorpe barracks, for the purpose of organizing into
companies for home defense. I call upon every man not already
enrolled in a local corps to come forward at once and report to
Captain Howard. Organization is everything. Let us emulate
the noble examples of our sister cities of Macon and Augusta
where the whole male population is in arms. By manning the
fortifications we will leave free the younger men to act in the
field. By prompt action a large local force can be organized
from our citizens above the military age, and from those who
have been exempted from field service.
No time is to be lost. The man who will not comprehend and
respond to the emergency of the times, is forsworn to his duty
and to his country.
By the evening of the 9th of December, all the
Confederate forces which could be concentrated were
in position along the newly constructed western lines
extending from the Savannah river on the right, at
Williamson's plantation, to the Atlantic and Gulf railway
bridge across the Little Ogeechee, on the left. Care had
been taken to remove all serviceable rolling stock
belonging to the Central rail road and banking company,
the Atlantic and Gulf rail road company, and the
Charleston and Savannah rail road company.
On the 10th of December, 1864, Sherman's army
closed in upon the Confederate works covering the land
approaches to the city of Savannah. With this date the
history of the siege properly commences.
In coming into position in front of Savannah the
Federal corps were distributed as follows: General
Williams's 20th Corps held the left of the Union line
resting upon the Savannah river near Williamson's
plantation, in advance of Pipe-makers creek, its right
extending across the Charleston and Savannah rail road
to the Central rail road where it joined the left of Genl.
Jeff C. Davis's 14th Army Corps.
This 14th Army Corps, constituting the right of the left
wing, extended from the Central rail road on the left to
the 17th Army Corps, whose left
rested beyond the Savannah and Ogeechee canal, near
Lawton's plantation.
Shortly after this development of the left wing, the
right, under Major General Howard, came into the
following position. The 17th Corps, commanded by
General Frank P. Blair jr., lay next beyond and to the
right of the 14th Army Corps, while General Osterhaus's
15th Corps, with its right resting on the Atlantic and Gulf
rail road near station number one, formed the extreme
right of the Federal investment.
After crossing Ebenezer creek on the 8th of
December, Kilpatrick concentrated his cavalry on the
Monteith road, ten miles south of Springfield; and, until
the 13th, moved in rear of the 17th Army Corps, with
detachments covering the rear of the other army corps.
King's bridge having been burnt by the Confederates,
Kilpatrick crossed the Great Ogeechee on a pontoon bridge,
on the afternoon of the 13th, and moved in heavy
force through the counties of Bryan and Liberty, seeking
to communicate with the Federal fleet by way of
Kilkenny bluff and Sunbury. Returning on the 16th, he
went into camp in the vicinity of King's bridge, picketing
and plundering the country south of the Ogeechee.
The attempt of Coln. Atkins, with two thousand
cavalry supported by a division of infantry under
General Mower, to destroy the railway bridge over the
Alatamaha river, failed.
Upon the first appearance of the enemy the
Confederate cavalry, stationed at detached points along
the coast south of the Great Ogeechee, hastily retreated
beyond the Alatamaha, leaving the region lately occupied
by them an open prey to the daily incursions of small
bodies of Federal cavalry who wantonly insulted and
robbed defenseless women, children, and old men, and
perpetrated repeated acts of violence, lawlessness, and
horrid depravity. During the entire march from Atlanta,
the conduct of Kilpatrick's cavalry was characterized by
constant acts of brutality, theft, and insult.
The Federal artillery was distributed at convenient
intervals and at suitable locations all along the line, but
was chiefly massed opposite the Confederate redoubts
on our right, in front of Daly's farm, the battery on
Lawton's plantation, and the work at Salt creek bridge.
The work last mentioned, known as Battery Jones, was
subjected to an incessant and severe fire during the
continuance of the siege.
The advanced line, selected by the engineers for the
defense of Savannah, included the protection of the
Charleston and Savannah rail road and its bridge across
the Savannah river. Extending thence along, and having
Monteith swamp in its
front, its left rested upon the Great Ogeechee river.
Detached field works had been hastily prepared at
important points, and some light artillery and infantry put
in position. The principal roads leading to Savannah and
the main avenues of approach had been blocked up by
felling timber across them, and it was hoped that these
obstructions would induce the Federal general to turn
aside and seek some objective on the coast other than
Savannah.
The paucity of the Confederate forces, the overwhelming
strength of the enemy, the length and
insecurity of the line, later and more careful surveys
proving localities to be practicable which
were deemed impassable, the Federal ability by
means of well appointed pioneer corps in a short
time to remove all hindrances to an advance, and
the facility with which detached earth works,
constituting the principal defenses, could be flanked,
induced the evacuation of this line shortly after a
serious demonstration was made against it by the
enemy.
The second line, and that persistently held by the
Confederates during the siege, commenced at
Williamson's plantation on the Savannah river, having the
rice field in its front; thence, extending along the high
ground, and still keeping the swamp in front, it crossed
the Central
rail road, followed the crest of Daly's farm, passed
through Lawton's plantation, confronted the rice fields of
Silk Hope plantation, and, following the left shore of Salt
creek marshes and the Little Ogeechee, rested upon the
Atlantic and Gulf rail way bridge across the Little
Ogeechee river. This line was well located, and was
rendered formidable by the succession of low lands and
impracticable swamps in its front. In order to increase
these physical obstructions and add to the impracticability
of these low lands, the river dam at Williamson's
plantation was cut so as to allow the water at high tide to
flow freely into and submerge the rice fields. This
supply, when fully obtained, was there held. The
Savannah and Ogeechee canal in advance of the line
being higher than the swamp through which it passed,
was cut. Its lock, about eight miles from the city, was
opened, and thus the water from Gould's swamp was
drawn down and made to contribute to the overflow. The
Augusta, the Louisville, the Central rail road, and all
other causeways interrupting the ready flow of the
water, were cut. From the left bank of the canal at
Shaw's to Silk Hope plantation is a continuous line of
swamp draining into Salt creek at Silk Hope. Between
the Confederate line and Shaw's settlement the canal
was cut in one or two places, and the
swamps were filled from it and from the reserves on
Shaw's and Lawton's plantations. The rice fields on Silk
Hope plantation were flooded from the Silk Hope back
water, and Salt creek was dammed up at the bridge on
the old Savannah and Darien road, to keep in the water
in case the enemy should cut the banks. Shaw's back-water
dam was also cut, and every means resorted to
which could contribute to swell the inundation. Thus the
entire front of the Confederate line, from the Savannah
river to Salt creek bridge, was submerged to a depth
varying from three to six feet. Below Salt creek bridge,
Salt creek and the marshes of the Little Ogeechee
afforded substantial protection. So much for the natural
advantages of the line.
The artificial defenses consisted of detached works,
located at prominent points, commanding the established
avenues of approach to the city, crowning causeways
and private crossings over these low-lands, and offering
resistance wherever the swamps were practicable.
The principal
batteries were situated as follows:
In front of the extreme right of the Confederate line,
and across the flooded rice field on Williamson's
plantation, was an advanced work, the left of which
rested upon Williamson's canal just beyond the grave-yard,
which was converted into a redan,
and the right upon the Savannah river this side of the
negro quarters. This was the most elaborate fortification
on the line. Its armament consisted of ten guns, mostly of
light calibre, and it was garrisoned by two hundred
infantry of the Georgia militia, Pruden's artillery company,
and the Georgia cadets, Major Capers, all under the
command of Colonel Hill of the Georgia State forces.
This work was open in its rear toward the Savannah river
upon which it rested. The lunette, which constituted its
prominent feature, was approached by a covered way,
and in it was located an ample bomb-proof made by
cutting a deep ditch from the salient to the bastion line.
This ditch was crossed at right angles by another of
similar dimensions, commencing and terminating at the
flank angles respectively. These ditches were then
roofed with timber and covered with the earth removed
in making the excavations. Thus was constructed not
only a commodious bomb proof, but also an excellent
magazine. Semi-lunar in outline, the enclosed lunette
constituted its center, with a redan on the left and a
semicircular work on the right. The infantry line and
curtains connecting these were substantial in character
and showed a double front. The interior front
commanded the terre-plein in case the enemy should
attack from Hutchinson's island. Sand bags were
used instead of head logs, and they were so arranged as
to permit the garrison, while firing, to be entirely under
cover. The exterior front was protected by a double
frieze of stakes and fence-rails planted firmly in the
ground and interlaced with iron wire. Such was Fort
Hardeman, planned by and constructed under the
supervision of Lieut. Coln. B. W. Frobel of the
engineers. The labor was performed by the Georgia
militia and a detail of negroes. On the 9th and 10th of
December the enemy attempted to carry this work, but
the assaults were feeble and easily repulsed.
The right of the Confederate line developed into a well
traversed field work, mounting three 32-pounder guns,
resting upon the Savannah river and designed to cover
Williamson's river dam and its approaches. The
preservation of this dam was essential to the retention of
the water by means of which the overflow, to which we
have alluded, was in a considerable degree
accomplished. Between this battery and the Augusta
road several pieces of artillery were posted in lunettes.
At the crossing of the Augusta road a substantial
earth work was constructed, mounting three heavy guns,
with field pieces on the flanks.
Battery McBeth, located at the intersection of the
Louisville turnpike and the Central rail road with the
Confederate line, was armed with three
32-pounder guns on barbette carriages, and two
24-pounder Blakely rifle guns on siege carriages.
In supporting distance, and about halfway between the
Louisville road and the Savannah and Ogeechee canal,
were posted a 12-pounder Napoleon gun and a 6-pounder
bronze field piece. Along the right bank of the
canal, and in support of the line running through the
woods between the canal and the high-ground on Daly's
farm, were distributed a 12-pounder field piece, a
12-pounder howitzer, and five 6-pounder guns. The line in
front of Daly's farm was armed with one 8-inch siege
howitzer, a 20-pounder Parrott gun, two 12-pounder
Napoleon guns, one 12-pounder howitzer, and one 3-inch
rifle gun.
Following the line in the direction of the left, a
12-pounder Napoleon gun was put in position at the head of
Shaw's dam. Three 12-pounder howitzers at Battery
Acee commanded Shaw's rice field, and one 12-pounder
howitzer and two 6-pounder guns were stationed on the
Habersham old road. Between Battery Acee and the
Habersham road was a 12-pounder gun.
In rear of Lawton's barn, and at the head of the
causeway crossing his rice fields, stood Battery Barnes
with two 32-pounder guns, two 12-pounder Napoleons,
and one 12-pounder howitzer. Six hundred yards to the
right of this battery was a
6-pounder gun commanding another causeway, and
some five hundred yards beyond and in the direction of
the Habersham road, was posted a 6-pounder
gun covering the approach by still another crossing.
At Pine-Point battery, opposite the rice fields of the
Hon. George S. Owens's Silk Hope plantation, six field
guns were embrasured; and Battery Jones, on the old
Savannah and Darien road where it crosses Salt creek,
was armed with two 32-pounder garrison guns, one
32-pounder carronade, one 20-pounder Parrott, and four
12-pounder Napoleons.
On Barclay's plantation, at the extreme left of the line,
several field guns were posted for the protection of the
Atlantic and Gulf rail road bridge over the Little Ogeechee
river.
In addition to the guns enumerated, field pieces were
distributed at other advantageous points along the line,
and ramps were constructed at irregular intervals for the
guns of the light batteries which were acting as a
movable support.
The following light batteries had been concentrated
for the defense of Savannah.
11. Mayor Hamilton's battalion of light artillery, ... 2 10-pdr Parrotts.
8 3 and 3 1/2-inch rifles.
Total . . . . .48 guns.
Wherever the ground was practicable, these batteries
and field works were connected by a continuous line of
infantry breastworks which the troops in position
industriously strengthened from day to day as opportunity
was afforded. Most of the guns in position on this
western line had been, for this purpose, withdrawn from
the eastern lines constructed by Brigadier General
Mercer during the years 1862 and 1863.
This western line for the protection of Savannah
against the advance of Sherman was subdivided and
commanded as follows. The right, extending from the
Savannah river at Williamson's plantation to within about
one hundred feet of the Central
rail road crossing, garrisoned by the Georgia militia and
the State line troops, was under the command of Major
General Gustavus W. Smith. Twenty guns were in
position on his front.
The command of Major General Lafayette McLaws
embraced the batteries at the Central rail road and
Louisville road crossings, and extended from that point to
the head of Shaw's dam. On his front twenty-nine pieces
of artillery were posted.
Major General A. R. Wright commanded the left,
extending from Shaw's dam all the way round to the
Atlantic and Gulf railway bridge over the Little
Ogeechee river. Thirty-two pieces of artillery were in
position on his front.
Lieutenant General William J. Hardee was in general
command, with his head-quarters in the city of
Savannah. For holding this long line less than ten
thousand infantry, dismounted cavalry, and artillerists
were assembled; and, for the space of ten days, this little
more than a thin skirmish line confronted, at close
quarters, Sherman's investing army over sixty thousand
strong.
The light artillery companies were distributed as the
necessities of the line demanded, and were either
actively engaged in handling the guns in position, or were
posted at such convenient distances in the rear that they
could move immediately to any designated point in their
respective
fronts. Only two of them were held in reserve park.
Four guns, namely, two 18-pounder garrison guns, one
8-inch siege howitzer, and a 42-pounder carronade, were
placed in battery near the Central rail road depot.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Jones jr., was chief of
artillery.
On Major General Smith's front, Captain R. W.
Anderson acted as chief of artillery for that division.
Captain J. A. Maxwell was detailed as chief of artillery
on Major General McLaws' front, and Captain John W.
Brooks acted in a similar capacity in Major General
Wright's division.
By assignment of the general commanding, Major
Black of his staff was designated as inspector on Major
General Smith's front; Colonel George A. Gordon,
volunteer aid, inspector on Major General McLaws'
front; and Lieut. Colonel S. B. Paul, of the lieutenant
general's staff, inspector on Major General Wright's
front.
In anticipation of the siege, every effort had been
made by the chief of artillery, and the ordnance officer
on duty in Savannah, to accumulate a supply of ordnance
stores. Col. Rains, commanding the Augusta arsenal, and
the ordnance officer at Charleston extended what aid
they could, and the consequence was that, apart from
the ammunition
in the artillery chests and in the temporary magazines
along the line, there remained a fair amount in reserve.
During the progress of the siege there was no lack of
ammunition; the troops and batteries being at all times
promptly and sufficiently served. It may be fairly stated,
however, that as a precautionary measure, the
expenditure of ammunition both by the artillery and
infantry was made the subject of a special order from
head quarters, enjoining economy and caution.
That no scarcity of provisions was encountered during
the siege is evidenced by the fact that, after sending from
the supplies in Savannah to Hardeeville, South Carolina,
one week's full rations for all the troops engaged in the
defense of Savannah, there remained on the morning of
the 20th of December unissued and on hand in the
commissary department, 30 bags of corn, 800 tierces and
400 bags of beat rice, 2000 pounds of bacon, 70 barrels
of lard, 150 barrels of molasses, 700 bags of oats, 900
bags of ground peas, 1300 bags of wheat, 125 bags of
grist, 10 boxes of soap, 560 bags of cow peas, 17 bales
of hay, 225 bags of wheat flour, 400 tierces of salt, 36
barrels of whiskey, 1200 casks of unbeaten rice at
Habersham's mill, and a considerable supply of coffee
and sugar. In obedience to the orders of Lieut. Genl.
Hardee, sixteen thousand pounds of coffee were, by
Major George Robertson
jr., chief commissary in Savannah, shipped on the 5th of
December, to Major H. C. Guerin chief commissary at
Charleston, South Carolina.
As an important item showing what may be accepted
as an average issue of rations during the siege, after the
isolation and capture of Fort McAllister, and recording
with considerable accuracy the commands then present
in Savannah and its vicinity, we present the following
statement prepared by the chief commissary of
subsistence.
Military District of Georgia,
Office Issuing Commissary, Savannah, Decr. 16th, 1864.
Lt. Coln. T. B. Roy, A. A. G.
Coln. I respectfully present the above statement for the
information of Lt. Genl. Hardee. * * *
Very Respectfully,
GEO. ROBERTSON, JR., Maj. & C. S.
While this statement shows an aggregate issue
of 16,745 rations, a proper analysis will advise us that
after deducting the troops stationed in the Third district
of Carolina, the artillerists engaged in garrisoning the
forts along the line of the Savannah river and upon the
water approaches to the city, the sick in hospitals, the
provost guards, men on detached services of various
sorts, the naval forces, and the negro laborers, there
scarcely remained ten thousand troops for active duty on
the western line.
Confederate Forces in the 3d Military District of South Carolina,
under Maj. Genl. Sam Jones, guarding the Line of the Charleston
and Savannah Rail Road--Federal Advance from Gregory's Point,
and its Repulse near the Tullifinney Trestle--Original Confederate
Line Conceived for the Protection of the Sea Coast of Georgia--
Advanced Line Controlling the Water Approaches to Savannah--
Line of Defense for the Immediate Protection of the Eastern and
Southern Exposures of the City--Location and Armament of the
Savannah River Batteries, and of the Forts and Earth-works
Erected to guard the Water Approaches to the City--Relative
Bearings and Distances of these Fortifications from Oglethorpe
Barracks--Genl. Beauregard's Instructions for the Defense of
Savannah.
Although severely repulsed at Honey Hill on the 30th
of November, the Federals within a short time set on foot
new expeditions with a view to obtaining possession of
the Charleston and Savannah rail road. As the protection
of this important line of communication was essential to
the safety of the garrison at Savannah, General Hardee
ordered Major General Samuel Jones, commanding at
Charleston, to establish his head quarters at or near
Pocotaligo and carefully watch the movements of the
enemy. These instructions were given on the 4th of
December. The troops in that vicinity, under General
Jones's command, consisted
of the 5th and 47th Georgia Regiments, a battalion of the
32d Georgia Regiment, a portion of the 3d Regiment
South Carolina cavalry, Kirk's squadron of cavalry, some
South Carolina reserves and militia, some Georgia
reserves, and several batteries of light artillery. These
forces were distributed at various points extending from
Pocotaligo to the Savannah river, and along the left bank
of that river to Sisters ferry, and above. Those
concentrated at and near Grahamville were under the
immediate command of Brigadier General Chesnut, and
those stationed at and near Coosawhatchie were
commanded by Brigadier General Gartrell. The reserves
were poorly organized and imperfectly drilled. The militia
was to a great extent undisciplined, and lacked arms.
On the morning of the 6th of December the enemy
effected a landing at Gregory's Point on the Tullifinny
river. A battalion of the 5th Georgia Regiment, sent
forward by General Gartrell to contest the advance of
the enemy, encountered the Federals on the Gregory's
point road about a mile from its junction with the State
road, and at first drove them back a short distance. Soon
perceiving however, that the opposing force "was
scarcely a twentieth part of their own numbers," the
Federals pressed forward and nearly enveloped the 5th
Georgia, forcing it back. The Georgia reserves
and a section of light artillery, ordered by General
Gartrell to support the 5th Georgia, fell back in confusion
after having partially destroyed the bridge within range
of the Confederate works at Coosawhatchie. Having
obtained a foothold at the junction of the Gregory's Point
road and the State road, the Federals immediately
commenced intrenching.
During the night of the 6th, Major General Jones
concentrated on the Charleston and Savannah rail road,
near the Tullifinny trestle, the 47th Georgia Regiment, a
battalion of the 32d Georgia, a company of the 1st South
Carolina Artillery, Major White's battalion of cadets, a
battalion of North Carolina Reserves which had just
arrived, and Bachman's battery of light artillery, and
ordered Colonel Edwards, the senior colonel, to attack
the enemy with this force at daylight in the morning.
Brigadier General Gartrell was directed to make a
spirited demonstration from Coosawhatchie so soon as
he should hear Colonel Edwards's guns: and, if Colonel
Edwards's movement proved successful, to press
forward with the attack. Both attacks failed of their
object; and General Jones, believing that he had not a
sufficient number of reliable troops to justify him in
renewing the assault, endeavored by defensive works to
hold the rail road. Meanwhile, the enemy was busily
occupied in strengthening
their position. On the night of the 8th, Brigadier General
B. H. Robertson was assigned to the immediate
command of the troops between Pocotaligo and
Coosawhatchie. On the morning of the 9th, the Federals,
in endeavoring to gain possession of the rail road,
vigorously assailed the Confederate left near Tullifinny,
and were handsomely repulsed. Later in the day, having
massed their forces on their left, they attacked the
Confederate line near Coosawhatchie, and were again
repulsed. Failing in these attacks they never renewed
them, but contented themselves with strengthening their
position within less than a mile of the Charleston and
Savannah rail road, where they established several
batteries with which they endeavored, but
unsuccessfully, to prevent the Confederates from using
the road. Although these batteries were located within
easy range of the road, and although the enemy used
their artillery freely, the Confederate forces held the
road continuously, and the passage of trains was never
interrupted for an entire day until the road was
abandoned after the evacuation of Savannah, and the
withdrawal of troops and materials had been fully
accomplished. Only one locomotive and a box-car were
damaged, and two rails broken by the enemy's continued
fire.
While these operations were in progress near
Coosawhatchie, Brigadier General Chesnut held
the rail road from Bee's creek to Hardeeville, and
Colonel Colcock guarded the Savannah river to
Hudson's ferry, until the arrival of Major General
Wheeler and Brigadier General Young with their
respective commands.
We make no apology for referring to these
movements and alluding to these dispositions of troops,
because they had an important bearing upon and
constituted no mean part of the plan of the defense of
Savannah.
Prior to the inception of Sherman's march through
Georgia, the attention of the military commanders at
Savannah had been mainly directed to the construction
of fortifications for the protection of the city against
water attacks and expeditions advancing directly from
the coast. The likelihood of any demonstration from the
rear had, up to this time, been deemed so remote, and
the probability of an attack from the coast so imminent
on more than one occasion, that most of the available
labor had been expended in the erection and arming of
batteries to control the water approaches to the city, and
in the construction of substantial earth works covering
the eastern and southern exposures of Savannah. A
brief allusion to these lines of defense will not, we trust,
be deemed irrelevant.
of the sea-coast of Georgia contemplated the erection of
earth-works, to be armed with 32-pounder guns, at
every ship-channel entrance from Tybee island to
Fernandina. Thus, on the north point of Great Tybee
island was a small sand battery as an outpost to Fort
Pulaski, and an earth-work on Warsaw island as an
advanced fortification to the Skidaway island batteries.
In the vicinity of Ossabaw sound no defensive work
existed exterior to the battery on Green island. Then
came Fort McAllister near the mouth of the Great
Ogeechee river. On the north point of St. Catharine island
was a small battery; and so the purpose was to pursue this
system of fortifications as far as the southern extremity
of Cumberland island.
Such isolated works, feeble in themselves and
far removed from a convenient base of supplies,
were essentially inadequate for the purpose for
which they were intended, were incapable of
resisting anything like a determined attack, and, at
the commencement of the Confederate struggle for
independence when the art of war was but partially
understood and it was deemed an imperative duty
to protect every foot of Confederate soil, were
mainly designed to quiet the fears of the planters
on the coast who, apprehensive of the approach of
armed vessels and marauding parties commissioned
to annoy exposed localities and disorganize the
labor upon their estates, were clamorous for some
protection of this sort. These outer batteries were held
only a short time. Several of them, although planned, and
partially completed with the aid of slave labor from
neighboring plantations, were never finished.
On the 18th day of February, 1862, the batteries on St.
Simons and Jekyl islands, designed for the protection of
Brunswick, were abandoned, and their armaments
transferred to more important points. From this time
onward, during the continuance of the war, the heavy
guns on the Georgia coast were charged solely with
guarding the water approaches to the city of Savannah
and its vicinity. The advanced line for the control of these
water approaches was represented by a battery at Red
Bluff, Fort Pulaski, detached works on Wilmington,
Skidaway, and Green islands, and by Fort McAllister.
There was also an interior line of forts and water
batteries which, commencing with Fort Jackson and the
Savannah river batteries, included Fort Bartow, works at
Causton's bluff and on Whitmarsh island, batteries at
Greenwich, Thunderbolt, the Isle of Hope, and at
Beaulieu, and rested its right on the Rose Dew batteries.
Fort Pulaski was isolated on the 22d of February, 1862,
and passed into the hands of the Federals on the 11th of
April following. In
March of the same year the battery on Skidaway island
was abandoned, and its guns were employed in
strengthening Thunderbolt battery. About the same time
the fort on Green island was dismantled, and its
armament transferred to the battery at Beaulieu.
In addition to these defenses, a line of formidable field
works, within easy range of each other, and in many
places connected by curtains, armed with siege and field
guns, was thrown up for the immediate defense of
Savannah. Commencing at Fort Boggs on the Savannah
river, and thence extending south and west in a semi-circular
form, enveloping the city at distances varying
from one to two and a quarter miles, it terminated at the
Springfield plantation swamp. The principal works in this
line were Fort Boggs, mounting fourteen guns, some of
them quite heavy and commanding Savannah river, Fort
Brown, near the Catholic cemetery, armed with eleven
guns, and Fort Mercer having a battery of nine guns.
Between Springfield plantation swamp where the right of
the line rested just beyond Laurel Grove cemetery, and
Fort Mercer, were eighteen lunettes, mounting in the
aggregate twenty guns. Connecting Fort Mercer with
Fort Brown was a cremeilliere line with nine salients,
mounting in the aggregate eight guns. Between Fort
Brown and Fort
Boggs were seven lunettes, mounting in the aggregate
eight guns. These works were well supplied
with magazines. It will be noted that the armament
of these city lines consisted of seventy pieces of artillery
of various calibres, among which 32, 24, 18,
12 and 6-pounder guns predominated. A considerable
supply of ammunition was kept on hand in
the magazines. Such was the condition of this
city line in the month of October, 1864. When,
however, it became necessary, the month following,
to arm the western line for the defense of the
city against Sherman's army, many guns were
withdrawn from the city line and placed in battery
on the western defenses. In fact, the principal
supply of guns and ammunition was hence derived.
The first assignment of guns on the western line
was made by the writer on the 20th of November.
Major General Lafayette McLaws was then in
command of the district of Georgia; Major John
McCrady was acting as chief engineer, and Captain
L. Jacqueline Smith as ordnance officer. When Lieut.
General Hardee arrived and assumed command, Colonel
J. J. Clarke discharged the duties of chief engineer, and
Lieut. Col. J. R. Waddy was announced as chief
ordnance officer.
As Federal vessels of war, in anticipation of the
approach of Sherman's army, had been multiplied along
the coast, and as a demonstration in aid of
his movement was deemed entirely probable, it was
manifestly necessary that the forts and batteries
commanding the water approaches to the city of
Savannah should be kept amply garrisoned and properly
supplied with ammunition. Consequently, during the
continuance of the siege, the cannoneers were kept at
their posts and a strict watch was maintained. As but
slight changes were made during the siege in the
armament of these fixed batteries, the following
statement of guns in position along the water front of the
Savannah defenses may be accepted as substantially
correct.
We begin with Red Bluff battery on the Carolina
shore, which constituted the left of the line.
This enclosed work was armed with six guns, as
follows: two 24-pounder rifle guns, one 8-inch columbiad,
one 24 and two 12-pounder howitzers.
At the extremity of the bay, in the city of Savannah,
was located a 32-pounder gun.
On Hutchinson's island was an earth work mounting
three 32-pounder guns.
The armament of Fort Jackson consisted of two
8-inch columbiads, two 32-pounder rifle guns, and three
32-pounder naval guns.
The other batteries for the defense of the Savannah
river proper (aside from Fort Boggs whose location and
armament have already been mentioned) were Cheves,
Lawton, and Lee.
Three 32-pounder guns and two 10-inch columbiads
constituted the armament of Battery Cheves.
That of Battery Lawton was stronger, consisting of
one 32-pounder rifle gun, one 42-pounder smooth bore,
two 8-inch and two 10-inch columbiad guns.
The most powerful work in the Savannah river was
Battery Lee, which mounted two 10-inch mortars, two
10-inch and three 8-inch columbiads, one 42, and one
32-pounder gun, and two 24-pounder howitzers.
Fort Bartow, commanding St. Augustine creek not
far from its confluence with Savannah river, was a
substantially constructed, enclosed earth work, mounting
sixteen guns, to wit: one 10-inch columbiad, two 8-inch
naval shell guns, two 8-inch columbiads, two 24-pounder
rifle guns, one 12-pounder rifle gun, two 8-pounder and
two 6-pounder smooth bore guns, three 3-inch rifle guns,
and one boat howitzer. The water battery at Causton's bluff,
in advance of Fort Bartow, was armed with two 32-pounder
smooth bore guns.
For the protection of the approaches by way of
Whitemarsh island, a battery was located at Turner's
point mounting three 10-inch columbiads, one 20-pounder
Parrott gun, and two 12-pounder howitzers; and another
at Gibson's point which was armed with two 8-inch siege
howitzers and two 32-pounder guns. Across the island
was thrown up
a substantial line of field works mounting seven
32-pounder guns, one 4.62-inch, and one 3-inch rifle gun.
Near the head of the causeway leading to Causton's
bluff were located some lunettes and angles for field
pieces.
At Greenwich was a battery of three 32-pounder
guns.
At Thunderbolt was a succession of well traversed
earth works, mounting one 10-inch columbiad, two
8-inch columbiads, two 8-inch shell guns, one 42-pounder
rifle, one 42-pounder smooth bore, and six 32-pounder
guns. The batteries on the Isle of Hope were distributed
as follows : at Grimball's point a small work armed with
one 32-pounder; at Grimball's house another, mounting
two guns of like calibre; and at the Church lot a more
formidable work mounting two 8-inch columbiads and
two 32-pounder guns. Near Skidaway bridge was a
tête du pont, prepared for the reception of siege pieces or
light artillery.
The point at Beaulieu being an important one, was
strongly fortified and provided with one 8-inch and two
10-inch columbiads, two 42 and three 32-pounder guns.
A light battery was also stationed within supporting
distance.
Rose Dew battery was armed with three 10-inch
columbiads, one 10-inch mortar, and one 32 and one
18-pounder rifle gun.
Colonel Edward C. Anderson was, during the siege,
assigned to the general command of these fixed
batteries. The guns in these positions were supplied with
an average of rather more than one hundred rounds of
ammunition to the piece. As additional obstructions to an
ascent of the Savannah river by the enemy, cribs, filled
with brick and stone, had been sunk in the channel below
the forts and under cover of their guns. Below the
Thunderbolt battery the river was impeded by quantities
of live-oak logs.
We conclude this allusion to the water defenses of
Savannah by an enumeration of the guns in position at
Fort McAllister near the mouth of the Great Ogeechee
river.
Constituting the right of the exterior line designed and
held for the protection of Savannah, and situated at
Genesis point on the right bank of the Great Ogeechee
river, it effectually commanded the channel of that river,
shielded the important rail road bridge across the
Ogeechee near Way's station on the Atlantic and Gulf
rail road, and preserved the important and numerous
rice-plantations in its neighborhood from molestation and
demoralization. From the day of its construction, which
was coëval with the earliest Confederate defenses on
the Georgia coast, to the hour of its capture on the 13th
of December, 1864, it
subserved purposes most conducive to the general
welfare, and on various occasions gallantly repulsed well
sustained naval attacks from the enemy.
Although the mantle of decay is spread above
its deserted magazines and rank weeds are choking
its vacant gun-chambers, the heroic memories
which it has bequeathed and the noble part it
sustained in the Confederate struggle for independence
will not be forgotten in the lapse of years
or lightly esteemed in the record of truth and
valor. No name is more proudly remembered on
the Georgia coast than that of this now almost
obliterated earth-work near the mouth of the Great
Ogeechee. Seven times did it successfully withstand
the attacks of Federal gun-boats and iron-clads
attempting its demolition. During its bombardment
of the 27th of January, 1863, for the
first time in the history of naval warfare were
15-inch guns used in the effort to reduce a shore
battery; and here was demonstrated the ability of
sand-parapets to resist the disintegrating effect of
guns of the heaviest calibre. After the attack of
the 3d of March, 1863, in which its bermuda
covered parapets for seven long hours were rained
upon by four monitors, three 13-inch mortar
schooners, and five gun boats, the enemy never
renewed their efforts for its reduction, and the
Confederate flag floated proudly from its parade
until that hour when it went down amid the smoke and
carnage of General Hazen's assault.
The mission of this work was the defense of the
Great Ogeechee river, and to that end were its guns
disposed. The rear of the fort, however, was protected
by a suitable infantry line, strengthened at intervals by
ramps for field artillery, not with a view to offering any
protracted defense against a serious investment from the
land side, but for the purpose of repulsing any attempt to
carry the fort by assault by expeditions landed for that
purpose. Torpedoes planted in the river, under the guns
of this battery, materially aided in its defense, and late in
the fall of 1864 sub-terra shells were located in rear of
the fort.
The armament of Fort McAllister in the fall of 1864,
was as follows: One 10-inch mortar, one 8-inch and two
10-inch columbiads, one 42-pounder gun, one 32-pounder
rifle and one 32-pounder smooth bore gun, one 24-pounder
howitzer, two 12-pounder mountain howitzers,
and six 6-pounder field guns. In the magazines was a
supply of rather more than one hundred and fifty rounds
of ammunition to the piece. Captain Clinch's light battery
was stationed in the neighborhood to act as a support,
and to occupy, as the emergency arose, some light field
works which had been thrown up at advantageous points
along the banks
of the river between the fort and the rail road crossing.
In anticipation of the early isolation of Fort McAllister,
and in recognition of the fact that so soon as General
Sherman's army should have fully enveloped the western
lines of Savannah no communication could be had with
nor relief offered to this post, on the morning of the 8th of
December 1000 pounds of bacon, 2250 pounds of hard
bread, and other supplies amounting in all to thirty-two
days' rations for two hundred men, were issued from
Savannah and safely conveyed to the fort. Extra issues
of 40 gallons of whiskey, 40 gallons of molasses, 50
pounds of candles, and some soap and salt were issued
and received at the same time.
The following day fifteen days' rations were added to
the above, so that the fort was amply provisioned.
Major George W. Anderson was in command, and
the garrison numbered about one hundred and fifty men.
In consequence of the withdrawal of the small
infantry force which, under Coln. Fizer, had been
disputing the advance of Osterhaus's column on the right
bank of the Great Ogeechee river, and by the retreat of
the Confederate cavalry, under Coln. Hood, in the
direction of Liberty county, Fort McAllister was, on the
morning of the 11th of
December, left in an absolutely isolated condition,
without any reasonable hope of support or relief from
any quarter.
That the garrison was not recalled in time within the
lines of Savannah and the post seasonably evacuated,
can be explained only on the supposition that the
Confederate commander hoped and believed by a bold
retention of this outpost and as strong a display of
resistance as practicable, Sherman, even at that late day,
might be induced to avoid Savannah and seek some
other and more facile point on the coast for
communicating with the Federal fleet. And yet, in view
of the overwhelming strength of the Union army and its
manifest determination toward Savannah, such an idea
could scarcely have been reasonably entertained. The
abandonment of Fort McAllister, with its feeble garrison,
to its own resources, can hardly be justified.
The following dispatches from General Beauregard to
Lieut. General Hardee indicate the general instructions
furnished for the tenure and defense of Savannah.
Montgomery, Ala., Dec. 3d, 1864.
7 A. M.
To Lieut. Genl. W. J. Hardee,
Savannah, Ga.,
Via Tallahassee, Fla.:
I leave to-day for Augusta, and Savannah. Construct
loop-holes and embrasures on defenses of latter city.
Works along overflows around city are essential.
Obstruct all roads from Millen to Port Royal, Ossabaw
Sound, and Brunswick.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
Charleston, S. C., December 8th, 1864.
Lieut. Genl. Hardee,
Savannah, Ga.:
Having no army of relief to look to, and your forces
being essential to the defense of Georgia and South
Carolina, whenever you shall have to select between
their safety and that of Savannah, sacrifice the latter and
form a junction with Genl. Jones, holding the left bank of
the Savannah river and the rail road to this place as long
as possible.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
Savannah, Ga., Dec. 9, 1864. Lt. Genl. W. J. Hardee,
Commdg., etc.
General:
It is my desire, after the consultation that has taken
place, that you should hold this city so long as in your
judgment it may be advisable to do so, bearing in mind
About four hundred and fifty men will be sent you to-day
with instructions to Genl. Jones to divert them, if necessary, to
defenses of New river and those east Screven's ferry causeway.
These reënforcements are the last you and Jones, who is subject
to your orders, can hope for. Keep yourself well advised, through
staff-officers and otherwise, of his ability to hold your communication;
for Savannah must be held only so long as is consistent with the safety of its garrison.
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.
Charleston, S. C., Dec. 15, 1864.
11:30 A. M.
Lt. Genl. Hardee.
Savannah, Ga.:
Under no circumstances must you be cut off from junction
of your forces with those of Genl. Jones. The safety of Georgia and
South Carolina depends upon the result.
Distribution of Confederate Forces along the Western
Line--Federal Timidity and Hesitation--Capture of the Dispatch Boat
Ida--Affair at Shaw's Dam--Repulse of the Assault upon Fort
Hardeman--The Tender Resolute captured by the
Enemy--Federal Movement against Fort
McAllister--Assault upon and Capture of
that Work by Hazen's Division--Reports of Major
Anderson and of Brig. Genl. Hazen--Gallant
Conduct of the Garrison.
The western lines, about which the chief interest
concentres, have already been sufficiently described.
They were begun so soon as it was ascertained that
Sherman had commenced his movement from Atlanta,
and were constructed as rapidly as available labor and
means would permit. The credit of their location is due to
Major John McCrady, then chief engineer of the district,
under the directions of Major General Lafayette
McLaws. On the 20th of November the first assignment
of guns was made for their armament, and others were
hastened into position as rapidly as they could be
withdrawn from the city lines and other localities from
which they could be spared.
Troops for the occupation of these lines commenced
taking their posts on the 7th of December, and at once
entered, with much activity, upon the
task of strengthening them and extending the infantry
cover.
Major General Gustavus W. Smith's troops, numbering
about 2000 muskets, were disposed on the right, from the
Savannah river almost to the crossing of the Central rail
road--a front of about two miles and a half. His right
was commanded by Brig. Genl. Anderson, and his left by
Brig. Genl. Carswell. The two regiments of the State line
were posted near the Louisville road, and the
First brigade of militia near the Augusta road. The
intermediate line was occupied by the battalion of
Cadets. The Second and Third brigades of Georgia
militia held the line from the Augusta road to the bank of
the Savannah river; and Fort Hardeman, the advanced
work across Williamson's rice field, was occupied by
Colonel Hill with a detachment from the Third Georgia
brigade, a detachment of Cadets, and Pruden's militia
battery. A portion of Anderson's Confederate light
battery, and a part of Major Hamilton's battalion of light
artillery were conveniently posted in support.
Major General Lafayette McLaws' front, forming the
center of the line, commenced about one hundred feet to
the right of the Central rail road crossing, and terminated
at the swamp to the left of the Daly farm. Measured
along the entrenchments, its length was about three miles
and three
quarters. His right was commanded by Brig Genl. Baker,
and his left by Brig. Genl. Lewis. Genl. Baker's forces
consisted of North Carolina troops and Georgia and
South Carolina artillerists. Those under Genl. Lewis
consisted of Worthen's North Carolina battalion,
detachments of the 4th Tennessee and the 12th South
Carolina Cavalry, the 2d, 4th, and 9th, Kentucky
Mounted Infantry, the 3d battalion Georgia Reserves,
Major Cook's Athens battalion, the 5th regiment Georgia
Reserves, and the 1st regiment Georgia Regulars.
Daniell's light battery, Abell's light battery, and
sections of the light batteries of Captains Barnwell and
Wagner supported this portion of the line. The troops on
General McLaws' front numbered about 3750 men.
Major General A. R. Wright, on the 11th of
December, was assigned to the command of the
left of the western lines extending from the Daly
farm, or Telfair swamp, to the Atlantic and Gulf
rail road bridge over the Little Ogeechee river--a
distance of some seven miles. He had under him
Brig. General Hugh W. Mercer, commanding his
right from the Telfair swamp to a point east of
Lawton's house, and Brig. Genl. John K. Jackson,
commanding his left from Lawton's house to the
Atlantic and Gulf rail road crossing over the Little
Ogeechee river. This front of Major Genl. Wright
was irregular, being interrupted by dense woods and
impracticable swamps. It was held by about 2700 men;
twelve hundred under Brig. Genl. Mercer, and the rest
under Brig. Genl. Jackson. Genl. Mercer's command
consisted of Coln. Browne's local brigade (composed of
Major Jackson's Augusta battalion, Major Adams's
Athens battalion, and a regiment of local troops under
Colonel Nisbet), Brooks foreign battalion, a detachment
of the 55th Georgia regiment, and Capt. Barnes's
company of artillerists from Augusta. This force was
disposed as follows: Lt. Coln. R. B. Nisbet, with
Adams's Athens battalion, a portion of the 1st Regiment
of Augusta local infantry, and Clemon's battalion
Augusta local infantry, occupied the line from Battery
Richardson to Battery Barnwell. Griffin's
detachment of the 55th Georgia regiment supported
batteries Wheeler and Simpkins, and Jackson's Augusta
battalion of local infantry occupied the line from the last
named work to Battery Barnes, which was held by the
Augusta artillerists under Captain George Barnes.
Brooks's foreign battalion was posted near the left of
Battery Barnes.
Brig. Genl. Jackson's command was composed of
Coln. Von Zinken's local troops, drawn from the
Confederate arsenals and work-shops of Columbus and
elsewhere in the state of Georgia,
detachments from Genl. Ferguson's brigade of cavalry,
dismounted, and local reserves from Savannah. Brooks's
light battery was stationed at Battery Jones, at the
crossing of the old Savannah and Darien stage road over
Salt creek, and Capt. Guerard's light battery, sections of
Maxwell's and Barnwell's light batteries, and a
detachment of Major Hamilton's artillery battalion
supported this line of Genl. Wright, being disposed at
important points.
Every effort was made, by the erection of batteries
and infantry entrenchments, by digging rifle pits and
constructing substantial covers, by felling trees in its
front and by flooding all approaches, to render this
western line as formidable as the labor and materials at
command would permit. Its efficiency, in conjunction
with the artificial overflow in its front, will be conceded
when it is remembered that for ten days it kept
Sherman's formidable army at bay. And yet, thirteen
miles long as it was, and held by scarcely more than a
skirmish line strengthened at intervals, it must be
admitted that if the Federals had massed their forces for
a determined assault, they could, any day during the
continuance of the siege, have carried it. With an army
more than six times that of the Confederates, and this
Confederate force composed in great majority of
detailed men, reserves, militia
and boys unusued to action, it seems marvellous that
Genl. Sherman should have contented himself with sitting
down before our lines, erecting counter batteries,
engaging in artillery duels and sharp-shooting, feeling for
weak points day after day, after the capture of Fort
McAllister making arrangements for the transportation
of heavy guns with which to shell Savannah at great
distances and over the heads of her defenders, and
finally suffering the garrison to withdraw by pontoon
bridges and canal banks to the Carolina shore.
Had he indicated that activity and energy demanded by
the situation, the probabilities are that he could have
captured the entire Confederate army. That he did not do
so, reflects severely upon him as a soldier and a
commander. The evacuation of Savannah and the
subsequent seizure of many thousand bales of private
cotton afforded the Federal general an opportunity for a
festive interchange of dispatches with the President of
the United States, in which his famous "Christmas
present" figures largely; but he pillaged a nest from
which the eagle had flown, and all the balderdash which
has been written and spoken about this vaunted "march
to the sea" can never, in the clear light of history, cover
up or excuse the lack of dash and the want of ordinary
military skill and precaution betrayed by General
Sherman, with the
formidable force at his command, in permitting the
Confederate garrison to retire unmolested by a route so
precarious in its character, and by a flank movement
which could have been easily frustrated by a single
division.
December 10th. The enemy destroyed two miles of
the Charleston and Savannah rail road and appeared at
all points along our western line, driving in our pickets.
Captain Gildersleeve, of the 150th New York regiment,
captured the Confederate dispatch steam boat Ida,
taking thirteen prisoners, among whom was Coln. J. H.
M. Clinch, volunteer aid to Lieut. Genl. Hardee, who
was at the time proceeding up the Savannah river with
orders from Lieut. Genl. Hardee to the naval officer in
command of the Confederate gun boats lying above. The
Ida was burned.
Our artillery opened freely upon the Federal forces as
they showed themselves in coming into position. The
Confederate troops were busily engaged in strengthening
our works and in throwing up strong infantry defenses.
Toward evening an attempt was made to force the dam
across Shaw's rice field. This effort was handsomely
repulsed. Our line was felt almost along its entire length,
and at some points quite vigorously.
December 11th. The enemy renewed the contest for
the possession of Shaw's dam, opening fire from
a battery which had been advantageously posted during
the night of the 10th. This struggle was continued at
intervals during the day, and was met by the infantry
command of Lieut. Coln. Nisbet and the field guns of
Lieutenants Elliott and Acee. The Federal battery was
silenced, and before dark the enemy withdrew under
cover of the woods. In this affair the Confederates
sustained a loss of two killed, nine wounded, and two
missing.
Heavy artillery firing
occurred at the Salt creek 1 and
Pine point batteries, along the line at Daly's farm, and at
the crossings of the Louisville, Central, and Augusta
roads. In the afternoon an attempt was made to carry
Fort Hardeman, the advanced work in front of the right
of our line, but the assaulting column was easily driven
back. During
1. It is worthy of remark that this Salt creek battery, during the
progress of the siege, encountered a continuous and violent artillery
and infantry fire from the enemy, who erected counter batteries to
the right and left of the old Darien road on the plantations of the
Hon. George S. Owens and Coln. Edward C. Anderson, and within
easy range. The artillery fire at this point was more constant and
heavier than at any other on the Confederate line. The Confederate
practice was admirable, the enemy's guns on more than one occasion
having been completely silenced. Especial credit is due to Captain
John W. Brooks, and his excellent company, the Terrell artillery, for
the skill and bravery with which the guns in this battery were
handled.
the night two companies of the 3d Wisconsin crossed
the Savannah river to Argyle island, and were there
reënforced the next morning by six additional companies
from the same regiment.
December 12th. Our artillery was engaged along the
line, and considerable sharp shooting occurred on both
sides. At Daly's farm the muzzle of a 12-pounder gun
was shot away by a 3-inch rifle gun, and the carriage of
another 12-pounder gun was cut down by a cannon shot.
A 32-pounder gun at Battery Jones, on Salt creek, was
disabled in a similar way.
Two Confederate gun boats, in attempting to descend
the river, were driven back by Winnegar's battery which
had been placed in position at Tweedside plantation so
as to command the channel between Argyle island and
the Georgia shore. The tender Resolute ran aground and
was taken possession of by Coln. Hawley of the 3d
Wisconsin. This boat was unarmed, and at the time of
her capture had on board five naval officers and a crew
of nineteen men, who were all made prisoners.
During the day the enemy, with a section of De
Grase's light battery stationed near Dr. Cheves's rice
mill on the left bank of the Great Ogeechee, opened fire
at long range upon Fort McAllister. The fort responded,
but little if any damage occurred on either side.
December 13th. The country around Savannah being
thinly populated and yielding supplies less generous than
those which had been encountered during the march
through Upper and Middle Georgia, and General
Sherman's army having well nigh consumed the
provisions transported in the wagons, and being largely
restrained from foraging in the rear by Confederate cavalry,
the Federal troops when massed before the western lines
were forced to rely for subsistence mainly upon the
rice found upon the neighboring plantations. It was
evident that so many men could not long be
maintained in their present situation. Rice--straw and
moss were the only provender which could be
obtained for the animals. Under this pressure
the anxiety of the Federal general to establish early
communication with the fleet was greatly increased. He
endeavored, through his cavalry sent to prominent points
along the shores of Bryan and Liberty counties, and more
particularly by means of a signal station at Dr. Cheves's
rice mill, to attract the notice of the Federal vessels
which he was persuaded were hovering about the coast
in anticipation of his arrival. About midday on the 13th
of December, the signal officers at Cheves's rice mill
succeeded in engaging the attention of a steamer
near the mouth of the Great Ogeechee river, which
subsequently proved to be a tug sent by Genl.
Foster and Admiral Dahlgren to observe the coast for
signals from Sherman's army.
Hemmed in by Confederate cavalry and light artillery
guarding the left bank of the Savannah river, General
Sherman hesitated to attempt the passage of that stream
and to inaugurate a movement to the coast of South
Carolina across the rice fields opposite Savannah. The
less hazardous method of effecting a convenient
lodgment where United States vessels could easily
approach and minister to the wants of his army was by
taking possession of the Great Ogeechee river. In order
to do this, the capture of Fort McAllister, now wholly
isolated, became necessary.
King's bridge across the Great Ogeechee river, on the
line of the old Savannah and Darien stage road, had been
burnt by the Confederates upon their withdrawal within
the lines around Savannah. It was however,
reconstructed in a substantial manner by the 58th
Indiana, under the supervision of Captain Reese of the
engineer corps, and was, by the night of the 12th, ready
for the passage of troops.
The second division of the 15th Army Corps, consisting
of seventeen regiments under the command of Brig.
Genl. Hazen, was, on the morning of the 13th, put in
motion for the capture of Fort McAllister. Crossing the
Great Ogeechee at Kings
bridge and, as soon as the high ground had been attained,
marching along the main road which runs parallel with
the river, this force arrived in the vicinity of the fort
about one o'clock in the afternoon. Deploying his division
so as to completely invest the work, with both flanks of
his command resting upon the Great Ogeechee, and with
sharp shooters and skirmishers posted behind the trunks
of trees whose branches had been used by the
Confederates for the construction of abattis around the
land approaches to the fort, for four hours the Federal
commander harrassed the garrison and watched his
opportunity for making the purposed assault.
About five o'clock P. M. General Sherman who, from
Cheves's rice mill had been narrowly observing these
operations, signalled Genl. Hazen it was important he
should carry the fort that afternoon. Accordingly General
Hazen advanced at once to the assault, moving with his
whole force against the fort, sweeping over the abattis
and rear defenses, and in a short time effecting its
capture with a loss to his command of one hundred and
thirty-four officers and men killed and wounded.
For the following account of this assault upon and
capture of Fort McAllister we are indebted to Major
George W. Anderson, the officer in command, whose
name and services had been long and
honorably associated with the defense of this
memorable earth work.
Hearing incidentally that the Confederate forces on
Cannouchee had evacuated that position and retired across
the Great Ogeechee, and learning that a large column of the
enemy was approaching in the direction of Fort McAllister, I
immediately detached a scouting party under command of
Second Lieutenant T. O'Neal, of Clinch's light battery, to watch
them and acquaint me with their movements. This was
absolutely necessary, as the cavalry previously stationed in
Bryan county had been withdrawn, and I was thus thrown
upon my own resources for all information relating to the
strength and designs of the enemy. On the morning of the 12th
of December, 1864, I accompanied Lieutenant O'Neal on a
scout, and found the enemy advancing in force from King's
bridge. We were hotly pursued by their cavalry, and had barely
time to burn the barns of Messrs. Thomas C. Arnold and William
Patterson, which were filled with rice. The steam tug Columbus, lying
about three miles above the fort, was also burned. Early the
next morning one of my pickets, stationed at the head of the
causeway west of the fort, was captured by the enemy, to
whom he imparted the fact that the causeway was studded
with torpedoes in time to prevent their explosion. He also
acquainted them with the strength of the garrison, and the
armament of the fort, and the best approaches to it.
About eight o'clock, A. M. desultory firing commenced
between the skirmishers of the enemy and my sharpshooters.
At ten o'clock the fight became general, the opposing forces
extending from the river entirely around to the marsh on the
east. The day before, the enemy had established a battery of
Parrott guns on the opposite side of the river, distant from the
fort mile and a half, which fired upon us at regular intervals
during that day and the ensuing night. 1
Receiving
from head quarters neither orders nor responses to my
telegraphic dispatches, I determined under the
circumstances, and notwithstanding the great disparity
of numbers between the garrison and the attacking
forces, to defend the fort to the last extremity. The
guns being en barbette, the detachments serving them
were greatly exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharp
shooters. To such an extent was this the case, that
in one instance, out of a detachment of eight men
three were killed and three more wounded. The
Federal skirmish line was very heavy, and the fire so
close and rapid that it was at times impossible to work
our guns. My sharp shooters did all in their power,
but were entirely too few to suppress this galling fire
upon the artillerists. In view of the large force of the
enemy, consisting of nine regiments whose aggregate
strength was estimated between 3,500 and 4,000
muskets, and possessing the ability to increase it at
any time should it become necessary, and recollecting
1. The light artillery here alluded to consisted of a section of
De Grase's battery, posted near the rice mill on Dr. Cheves's
plantation.
the feebleness of the garrison of the fort, numbering only 150
effective men, it was evident, cut off from all support, and with
no possible hope of reënforcements from any quarter, that
holding the fort was simply a question of time. There was but
one alternative, death or captivity. Captain Thomas S. White,
the engineer in charge, had previously felled the trees in the
vicinity of the fort and demolished the mortar magazine which
commanded the fort to a very considerable extent. For lack of
necessary force and time, however, the felled timber and the
ruins of the adjacent houses which had been pulled down had
not been entirely removed. Protected by this cover, the
enemy's sharp shooters were enabled to approach quite near,
to the great annoyance and injury of the cannoneers. One line
of abattis had been constructed by the engineer, and three
lines would have been completed around the fort but for the
want of time and material.
Late in the afternoon the full force of the enemy made a
rapid and vigorous charge upon the works, and, succeeding in
forcing their way through the abattis, rushed over the parapet
of the fort, carrying it by storm, and, by virtue of superior
numbers, overpowered the garrison fighting gallantly to the
last. In many instances the Confederates were disarmed by
main force. The fort was never surrendered. It was captured
by overwhelming numbers. So soon as the enemy opened fire
upon the fort from the opposite side of the river, it was
evident that two of the magazines were seriously endangered,
and it became necessary to protect them from that fire by the
erection of suitable traverses.
The labor expended in their construction, in the mounting of
guns on the rear of the work, and in removing the debris above
referred to, occupied the garrison constantly night and day for
nearly forty-eight hours immediately preceding the attack.
Consequently, at the time of the assault, the men were greatly
fatigued and in bad plight, physically considered, for the
contest. I think it not improper to state here, that a short time
before the approach of the enemy a member of the torpedo
department had, in obedience to orders, placed in front of the
fort and along the direct approaches, a considerable number of
sub-terra shells, whose explosions killed quite a number of the
enemy while passing over them.
After the capture of the fort, General Sherman in person
ordered my engineer, with a detail of sixteen men from the
garrison, then prisoners of war, to remove all the torpedoes
which had not exploded. This hazardous duty was performed
without injury to any one; but it appearing to me to be an
unwarrantable and improper treatment of prisoners of war, I
have thought it right to refer to it in this report.
I am pleased to state that in my endeavors to hold the fort I
was nobly seconded by the great majority of officers and men
under my command. Many of them had never been under fire
before, and quite a number were very young, in fact mere boys.
Where so many acted gallantly, it would be invidious to
discriminate; but I cannot avoid mentioning those who came
more particularly under my notice. I would therefore most
respectfully call the attention of the
general commanding to the gallant conduct of Captain Clinch,
who, when summoned to surrender by a Federal captain,
responded by dealing him a severe blow on the head with his
sabre. (Captain Clinch had previously received two gun shot
wounds in the arm). Immediately a hand to hand fight ensued.
Federal privates came to the assistance of their officer, but the
fearless Clinch continued the unequal contest until he fell
bleeding from eleven wounds (three sabre wounds, six
bayonet wounds, and two gun shot wounds), from which,
after severe and protracted suffering, he has barely
recovered. His conduct was so conspicuous, and his cool
bravery so much admired, as to elicit the praise of the enemy
and even of General Sherman himself.
First Lieutenant William Schirm fought his guns until the
enemy entered the fort, and, notwithstanding a wound in
the head, gallantly remained at his post, discharging his duties
with a coolness and efficiency worthy of all commendation.
Lieutenant O'Neal whom I placed in command of the
scouting party before mentioned, while in the discharge of
that duty and in his subsequent conduct during the attack,
merited the honor due to a faithful and gallant officer.
Among those who nobly fell, was the gallant Hazzard,
whose zeal and activity were worthy of all praise. He died as a
true soldier--at his post facing overwhelming odds.
The garrison consisted of
The Emmett Rifles, Captain George A. Nicoll commanding,
numbering for duty, 25 men.
Clinch's light battery, Captain N. B. Clinch commanding,
numbering for duty, 50 men.
Company D, 1st Regiment Georgia Reserves, Captain
Henry commanding, numbering for duty, 28 men.
Company E, 1st Regiment Georgia Reserves, Captain
Morrison commanding, numbering for duty, 47
men.
Total, 150 men.
Casualties.
Commissioned--Captain N. B. Clinch. Eleven wounds.
Captain Morrison. Shot through both legs.
First Lieut. Schirm. Shot in the head.
Killed, Second Lieut. Hazzard.
Privates and non-commissioned--Killed, 16; wounded, 28.
Total killed and wounded, 48.
General Hazen in his official report thus
commemorates the services of his command during the
investment and assault.
"At daybreak, the thirteenth, the troops were put in
motion, reaching the vicinity of McAllister at about
eleven A. M. About one mile from the fort a picket was
captured, revealing the whereabouts of a line of
torpedoes across the road. Some time was lost in safely
removing them, when, leaving eight regiments at that
point, nine were carried forward to about six hundred
yards from the fort,
and deployed, with a line of skirmishers thrown
sufficiently near the fort to keep the gunners from
working their guns with any effect: those firing to the
rear being in barbette.
"The grounds to the right of the fort being marshy, cut
through by deep streams, rendered the deployment of
that part of the line slow and difficult, and was not
completely effected till forty-five minutes past 4 P. M., at
which time every officer and man of the nine regiments
being instructed what to do, the bugle sounded the
forward, and at precisely five o'clock the fort was
carried.
"The troops were deployed in our line as thin as
possible, the result being that no man in the assault was
struck till they came to close quarters. Here the fighting
became desperate and deadly. Just outside the works a
line of torpedoes had been placed, many of which were
exploded by the tread of the troops, blowing many men
to atoms; but the line moved on without checking, over,
under, and through abattis, ditches, palisading, and parapet,
fighting the garrison through the fort to their bomb-proofs,
from which they still fought, and only succumbed as each
man was individually overpowered. Our losses were
twenty-four officers and men killed, and one hundred and
ten officers and men wounded."
Among the golden deeds wrought by Confederates
in their gigantic struggle for right, property, home,
and national independence, the defense of Fort
McAllister against seven naval attacks and this final
assault will be proudly reckoned. The heroic memories of
this earth-work will be cherished long after its parapets
and deserted gun-chambers shall have been wasted into
nothingness by the winds and rains of the changing
seasons. Utterly isolated, cut off from all possible relief--
capture or death the only alternative--the conduct of this
little garrison, in the face of such tremendous odds, was
gallant in the extreme.
How quickly beats the Confederate pulse, how strong
the heart-throb of every true Georgian as he garners
these among the brave memories of his land and people,
recollections which neither the lapse of time nor the
political fortunes of the hour can impair.
No higher tribute can be paid to the valor with which
this fort was defended than that contained in the Federal
report to which we have just alluded: "We fought the
garrison through the fort to their bomb-proofs, from
which they still fought, and only succumbed as each
man was individually over-powered."
Federal Communication established with the Fleet--Evacuation
of Savannah rendered Imperative--Line of Retreat
considered and determined upon--Location and Construction
of Pontoon Bridges across Savannah River--Progress
of the Siege--Heavy Skirmishing between Confederate Cavalry
and the Enemy on the Left Bank of the Savannah--Desertions
from Brooks's Foreign Battalion--Sherman's Demand
for the Surrender of Savannah, its Garrison, and Dependent
Forts--Lieut. Genl. Hardee's Refusal--Maj. Genl. Sherman
prepares to Bombard the City.
Upon the fall of Fort Pulaski every hinderance to the
full command of the great Ogeechee river was removed,
and General Sherman was able to communicate freely
with the Federal fleet and establish a convenient base of
supplies for his army. Reënforcements could now be had
and heavy guns procured with which to prosecute the
siege of Savannah. The retention of that city by the
Confederate forces became from this moment a matter
of impossibility, and its evacuation an early necessity.
Neither the number and character of the troops
concentrated for its defense, nor the condition of the
commissary, quarter-master and ordnance stores
warranted the hope that its retention could be
successfully maintained beyond a few days. The only
line of retreat now open to the Confederates
was by boats to Screven's ferry landing, and thence into
South Carolina. So limited, however, were the means of
transportation, that the idea of retiring the garrison by
boats was abandoned as soon as it was seriously
discussed. The construction of pontoon bridges
connecting the city of Savannah with the Carolina shore
was recognized as a pressing necessity.
Having communicated with the officer in command of
the U. S. tug Dandelion, General Sherman returned to
fort McAllister and there passed the night of the 13th.
Before day-break he was advised by Major Strong, of
General Foster's staff, that General Foster had arrived in
Great Ogeechee river and desired to confer with him.
The ensuing day was spent by General Sherman in
explaining the situation of affairs both to General Foster
and to Admiral Dahlgren, and in ascertaining upon what
coöperation and assistance he could rely from the navy
and from the Federal forces in South Carolina. It was
agreed that the Admiral should engage the batteries at
Turner's point, Rose-Dew and Beaulieu, and that
General Foster should send from Hilton Head siege guns
for the reduction of Savannah, and vessels suitable for
the navigation of the Great Ogeechee, and also press his
advance against the Charleston and Savannah rail road
in the neighborhood of Coosawhatchie.
December 14th. The evacuation of Savannah having
been resolved upon, and it being impracticable by means
of the few steam boats and river craft at command to
cross the garrison, artillery, and requisite stores with
convenience and safety to Screven's ferry, orders were
issued for the immediate construction of suitable pontoon
bridges. The line of retreat selected by the engineers and
adopted upon the evacuation of the city, involved the
location of a pontoon bridge extending from the foot of
West Broad street to Hutchinson's island, a distance of
about a thousand feet, a road way across that island in
the direction of Pennyworth island, a second pontoon
bridge across the middle river, another road way across
Pennyworth island, and a third pontoon bridge across
Back river, the further end of which rested upon the rice
field on the Carolina shore. The route then followed the
most substantial and direct rice dam running north, a
canal being on one side and an impracticable rice field
on the other. This dam was just wide enough to permit
the careful movement of field artillery and army wagons.
The plantation bridges along the line of march were
strengthened to bear the passage of these heavy
conveyances.
Lieut. Coln. Frobel was placed in charge of the work,
and executed the difficult trust confided to him with
marked energy and ability. All
available rice-field flats were collected. These--being
between seventy-five and eighty feet in length and
possessing sufficient width for the purpose--were swung
into position with the tide, lashed end to end by means of
ropes and stringers running from boat to boat
continuously the entire length of the bridge, and were
kept in their places by car-wheels--the only anchors
which could be procured. 1 Above the stringers was a
flooring of plank obtained from the city wharves. At
eight o'clock on the evening of the 17th the first
pontoon bridge, spanning the Savannah river from the
foot of West Broad street to Hutchinson's island, was
completed, and by half past eight o'clock P. M., on
Monday the 19th, the remaining bridges were finished
and the route in readiness for the retreat of the
Confederate garrison. Thirty-one rice flats were used in
the construction of these bridges.
Heavy fogs, and difficulties encountered in finding and
concentrating the requisite number of flats caused some
delay in the execution of this important work: but, in
view of the peculiar character of the labor and materials
at command, it was consummated with unusual rapidity
and in a very substantial manner.
1. The scarcity of flats compelled the engineer in charge to lash them
end to end, and not side to side as is usual in the construction of
pontoon bridges of this description.
Most of the work upon these bridges was performed
by a detail of sailors from the Confederate navy and a
detachment of fifty men from the Georgia militia. Steam
boats were used in collecting the flats and towing them
into proper position. Just after the Confederate army
crossed, these bridges were cut loose from their
moorings and the flats turned adrift. The enemy was
thus prevented from pursuing, had any such idea been
entertained.
Major General Wheeler arrived in Savannah today and
reported that he had transferred most of his command to
the left bank of the Savannah river where he was
engaged in holding the enemy in check and keeping open
our line of retreat. General Iverson, with some six
hundred men and a section of artillery, had been
detached to operate on the right and rear of Sherman's
army.
Artillery firing and sharp-shooting continued during
the day without any marked results.
December 15th. The enemy was busily engaged in
strengthening his positions in front of our works, erecting
new and more formidable batteries, developing additional
lines of artillery fire, and rendering his communications
with his right flank more facile.
To-day Beaulieu battery was shelled by two mortar
boats and two gun-boats, and from a rifle gun posted on
the point of Greene island. This
bombardment continued at intervals for several days, but
proved entirely innocuous.
Two regiments of Gen. Geary's division occupied the
upper end of Hutchinson's island, and Carman's brigade
was pushed forward to Argyle island.
Our artillery fire to-day was unusually effective,
several batteries of the enemy being either silenced or
materially injured.
Several of our guns were disabled; but, during the
night, were again put in working order.
Sand-bags were freely distributed at important points
along the line, and materially contributed to the
protection of our artillerists.
Relief associations had been formed among such of
the citizens of Savannah as were incapable of taking
their places in the trenches, and they ministered carefully
to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Of the latter,
thirty-three were now lying in general hospital in
Savannah.
December 16th. This day was marked by an increase
of artillery and infantry fire, which had now become
incessant. On the part of the Confederates, however, as
a matter of economy, it was maintained with deliberation.
General Ferguson's brigade of dismounted cavalry
arrived and was assigned a position on the line.
Heavy skirmishing occurred between General P. M.
B. Young's command and the Federals on
Argyle island. In the effort to advance in the direction of
the Confederate line of communication with the Carolina
shore, the enemy was repulsed with considerable loss.
The fighting along the rice dams was obstinate and
bloody. As the retention of this route was essential to the
safety of the troops engaged in the defense of Savannah,
all General Wheeler's available forces, assisted by
Young's troops and such of the South Carolina light
batteries as could be spared from points along the
Charleston and Savannah rail road, were concentrated
for its protection. By these troops all attempts of the
enemy to move upon our line were stubbornly and
successfully resisted. 1
On the night of the 16th a sergeant and fifteen men of
Brooks's foreign battalion, constituting a part of Gen.
Mercer's command of Major General Wright's division,
having forced the pickets on the causeway in front of
Battery Simkins, deserted to the enemy with their arms
and accoutrements. Two other privates of the same
command were
1 In these skirmishes on the left bank of the Savannah river,
Captain F. E. Eve, of Gen. Young's command, displayed conspicuous
gallantry, and the brave Captain Smith was mortally wounded while
leading a charge. Major Puckett of the Phillips's Legion, in
endeavoring with a force of 250 men to dislodge the Federals on
Rose's and Izard's plantations, was severely wounded in the neck.
captured while endeavoring to make their way through
the lines. It having been clearly ascertained the next
day that the members of this battalion had concerted a
plan to desert in a body, having resolved not only to buck
and gag and take their officers with them but also to spike the
guns in batteries Wheeler and Simkins, overpower the infantry
supports and, forcing the pickets, carry them also to the
enemy, their camp was suddenly surrounded by
detachments from the 55th Georgia, and by Jackson's Augusta
battalion, and two field-guns loaded with canister
were brought to bear upon it. The men were deprived of
their arms, and the ringleaders, five in number--orderly
sergeants of companies--were seized. These, and the
two privates apprehended the previous night in the act of
deserting to the enemy, were tried by a drum-head court
martial, on their own confession convicted of mutiny and
intended desertion to the enemy, sentenced, and
executed. The battalion was marched under guard to
Savannah where it was closely watched during the rest
of the siege. The members of the battalion were nearly
all, if not entirely, foreigners, and had been enlisted from
the ranks of Federal prisoners.
December 17th. General Beauregard arrived in
Savannah to-day. After full conference, Lieut.
Genl. Hardee's dispositions were sanctioned, and the
arrangements which were progressing for the evacuation
of the city and the preservation of its garrison were
approved.
Heavy artillery firing continued all along our western
defenses. Against the line at Daly's farm the enemy
made a forcible demonstration which was repulsed.
After a sharp duel of nearly two hours a Federal battery
was silenced by our Salt creek battery.
To-day General Sherman demanded the surrender of
Savannah and its dependent forts. This demand was
conveyed under flag of truce which approached our line
by the Augusta road. General Sherman had returned on
the 15th to his command before Savannah, and was, at
the time, at the head quarters of General Slocum on the
Augusta road.
That demand was couched in the following
language.
Head Quarters Military Division of the Mississippi, in
the Field near Savannah, Ga.,
December 17th, 1864.
General Wm. J. Hardee,
Commanding Confederate Forces in Savannah.
General:
You have doubtless observed from your station at
Rosedew that sea going vessels now come through
Ossabaw sound and up Ogeechee to the rear of my army,
giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and more especially
heavy ordnance necessary to the reduction of Savannah. I
have already received guns that can cast heavy and
destructive shot as far as the heart of your city, also I have for
some days held and controlled every avenue by which the
people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am
therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city of
Savannah and its dependent forts, and shall await a reasonable
time your answer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should
you entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal
terms to the inhabitants and garrison, but should I be forced
to resort to assault, or the slower and surer process of
starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest
measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army
burning to avenge the great national wrong they attach to
Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent
in dragging our country into civil war. I enclose you a copy of
General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of
Resacca, to be used by you for what it is worth.
To this demand General Hardee, on the 18th, returned
the following response:
Head
Quarters Department S. C., Ga. &
Florida, Savannah, Ga., Dec. 17th, 1864.
Major General W. T. Sherman,
Commanding Federal Forces, near Savannah, Ga.
General:
I have to acknowledge receipt of a communication from you,
of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah
and its dependent forts," on the ground that you "have
received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into
the heart of the city;" and for the further reason that you
"have for some days held and controlled every avenue by
which the people and garrison can be supplied." You add, that
should you "be forced to resort to assault or to the slower and
surer process of starvation, you will then feel justified in
resorting to the harshest measures, and will make little effort to
restrain your army, etc., etc."
The position of your forces half a mile beyond the outer
line for the land defense of Savannah, is, at the nearest point,
at least four miles from the heart of the city. That and the
interior line are both intact.
Your statement that you have, for some days, held and
controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can
be supplied, is incorrect. I am in free and constant
communication with my department.
Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its
dependent forts is refused.
With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing
paragraph of your letter of what may be expected in case your
demand is not complied with, I have to say that I have
hitherto conducted the military operations entrusted to my
direction in strict accordance with the rules of civilized
warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course
by you that may force me to deviate from them in future.
I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. J. HARDEE,
Lieutenant General.
Upon receipt of this refusal to surrender, General
Sherman, leaving instructions with General Slocum to
place siege guns in position as rapidly as they arrived and
to prepare for an assault upon the Confederate lines,
passed rapidly to the right of his army and, proceeding to
Port Royal, arranged for the reënforcement of General
Foster whose lodgment on the peninsula between the
Coosawhatchie and Tullifinney rivers has already been
noticed. Busied with plans for cutting the only line of
retreat open to the Confederates, he was not present
with his army when Savannah was evacuated, and in his
official report expresses
much disappointment at the escape of General Hardee
and the Savannah garrison.
The truth is, in all these operations there was a want
of energy, a lack of prompt action on the part of the
United States forces, and a hesitancy in the face of
obstacles wholly unjustifiable. Such was the power of
the investing army, and such the strength of the
expedition demonstrating against the Charleston and
Savannah rail road, that with ordinary activity and
persistence the Confederate line of retreat could have
been cut and Savannah wholly isolated and forced to
surrender at discretion. General Hardee appears to have
known his antagonist well, and to have anticipated his
conduct most fully, else he would not have remained
within the lines at Savannah as long as he did.1
The transfer of heavy guns from Port Royal,
1. At the time this demand was made for the surrender of
Savannah, Gen. Sherman had no heavy guns in position with which
to bombard the city. His menace, in that respect, was a brutum
fulmen. His other threat that in case of a refusal to surrender, he
would "make little effort to restrain his army, burning to revenge,"
etc., was nothing new, but was entirely characteristic of the man. His
language was usually extravagant. He sat out, to repeat his own
words, to "make Georgia howl," and it was not to be expected that
the garrison defending Savannah, had it fallen into his hands, would
have been the recipient of humane, magnanimous treatment.
from the fleet, and from Fort McAllister, was
accomplished by means of the great Ogeechee river
and the Savannah and Ogeechee canal. According to the
Federal accounts, during the 18th, 19th and 20th of
December arrangements were being perfected for a
bombardment of the city 1 and a powerful assault upon
the Confederate lines. Strong field works for the heavy
guns were constructed at commanding points, and field-guns
were masked in some instances within one hundred
and fifty yards of our entrenchments. Light bridges and
fascines were accumulated with which to span the
deepest portions of the inundated fields and fill up the
ditches and canals. It is claimed that everything was in
readiness on the evening of the 20th, and that the capture
of the garrison of Savannah was confidently anticipated.
General Sherman had left orders that the assault should
not be undertaken until his return, and he had not yet
made his appearance.
1 To counteract this intention, an order was issued for the transfer
of some ten-inch mortars from the Confederate fixed batteries, and
their location at Williamson's place and at other convenient points
along the western line nearest the city of Savannah. The early
evacuation of the city, however, and the more pressing duties
consequent upon an anticipation of that important movement
effectually prevented the execution of this order. The city was never
bombarded by the Federals.
Progress of the Siege--Maj. Genl. Wheeler's Cavalry Operations on
the Left Bank of the Savannah and in Rear of the Federal Army--
Confidential Circulars from Lieut. Genl. Hardee's Head Quarters
directing the Evacuation of Savannah--Evacuation of the City--
Order in which the Confederate Forces were Withdrawn--Good
Conduct of the Troops--Movement successfully concealed from the
Enemy, until fully Accomplished--Line of Retreat--Heavy Guns
disabled, Ammunition destroyed, and the Naval Vessels in the
River burnt and sunk--Reports of Coln. Anderson commanding
the River and Shore Batteries, and of Lieut. Coln. Jones, Chief of
Artillery--Genl. Beauregard's Orders for the Disposition of the
Confederate Forces after their Retreat from Savannah--Formal
Surrender of the City by the Mayor on the Morning of the 21st of
December, 1864--The Federals occupy Savannah.
December 19th. Three Federal regiments, after a
sharp skirmish with our cavalry, succeeded in securing a
position at and beyond Izard's mill. During the day
constant firing occurred at this point, and the
Confederate cavalry was busily occupied in preventing
the advance of the enemy reënforced during the
afternoon by two more regiments and at night by two
pieces of light artillery. In order the more effectually to
check the Federal advance, the rice fields were flooded
to the depth of some eighteen inches. Movements
therefore, were made by the flanks and along the
dams, and the Confederates stoutly and effectually
resisted all approaches in these directions. We
had also burnt the plantation bridges across the
canals. The line now held by the Federals on the left
bank of the Savannah was about two miles in length,
extending from the Savannah river near Izard's mill to an
inlet near Clysedale creek. During the 20th Colonel
Carman, from the direction of Clysedale creek, made an
effort to strike the Savannah and Hardeeville road, but
was vigorously repulsed and never renewed the attempt.
In order to confine the enemy to the position occupied
by them and preclude any advance in the direction of our
contemplated line of retreat, General Wheeler kept a
strong force of skirmishers behind barricades and
sufficiently near the Federals to maintain a warm and
effective infantry fire. His remaining troops in that vicinity
were occupied in building several successive lines of
works between the skirmish line and the route selected
for retiring the garrison. When these works were
completed, a strong force both of dismounted cavalry and
of light artillery was thrown forward to the positions
previously occupied by our skirmishers. So warmly was
the enemy menaced by our infantry and artillery fire, that the
Federals confined themselves carefully to their fortified
positions and never again endeavored to advance
until after the evacuation of Savannah.
While these operations were in progress on the left
bank of the Savannah river, Major General Wheeler, with
Humes's and Allen's divisions of cavalry, was maintaining
a line extending from Screven's ferry to Hardeeville,
including the sources of New river, Tunbridge and
Mongin's landings. All points were guarded by which the
enemy could threaten the road from Screven's ferry to
Hardeeville. Brig. Genl. Iverson was at Springfield,
commanding a line of observation extending from the
mouth of the Alatamaha river to the great Ogeechee,
across that stream, and in rear of the Federal army to the
Savannah river near the mouth of Ebenezer creek. Lieut.
Coln. Hood with an irregular command, and Brig. Genl.
McCoy of the Georgia militia, reported to Genl. Iverson
and assisted in establishing this line. After the fall of
Savannah this line was perpetuated, its left being
withdrawn to Grahamville. It was maintained--our pickets
being constantly engaged with the enemy's scouting
parties and foragers--until Sherman moved in force from
Savannah upon his march through the Carolinas. In the
immediate protection of the line of retreat across the
Savannah river and along the rice-dams on the Carolina
shore, the commands of Generals P. M. B.
Young and Robert H. Anderson were chiefly engaged.
In holding our position on the left bank of the
Savannah, the naval vessels present in the river rendered
material assistance.
Anticipating the completion of the pontoon bridges at
an earlier hour on the 19th, Lieut. Genl. Hardee
published the following
Confidential Circular.
Head Qrs. Savannah,
Dec. 19, 1864.
1. The troops in and around Savannah will be transferred
to-night to the left bank of the Savannah
river, and will proceed thence to Hardeeville.
2. At dark the light batteries will, under the direction of Lt.
Coln. Jones, chf. of arty., be withdrawn by hand from their
positions in line, with as little noise as possible, and will be
sent over the pontoon bridge to Hardeeville.
3. The troops at Whitemarsh, Fort Jackson, and Bartow, will
be assembled at Fort Jackson by 9 P. M. and thence will
proceed at once, via Screven's ferry, to Hardeeville.
4. The troops at Rosedew, Beaulieu, etc., will leave their
positions at dark, and, marching to Savannah, will cross at
Screven's ferry.
5. Maj. General Wright's division will be withdrawn from the
lines at 8 o'clock P. M. and will pass the river on the pontoons.
6. Maj. General McLaws's division will be drawn from its
position at 11 o'clock P. M. and will cross the river on the
pontoons.
7. Maj. General Smith's Division will be withdrawn at 12
o'clock, and will cross on the pontoons.
8. The lines of skirmishers will be left in position
as follows: Wright's line until 10 1/2 o'clock, McLaws's
line until 11 1/2 o'clock, Smith's line until 2 o'clock.
9. The pontoon bridges are placed in charge of
Colonel Clark, chief of engineers, who will destroy the bridges
after all the troops shall have crossed; and, to enable him to
ascertain this, the skirmishers of each division will be placed
in charge of an intelligent staff-officer who will report to
Colonel Clark at the pontoon bridge when the skirmishers of
their respective commands shall have passed the river.
10. The chief of artillery will take measures to have the
heavy guns in position spiked or otherwise rendered useless
as follows: on Wright's line at 10 o'clock, on McLaws's line at
11 o'clock, on Smith's line at 12 o'clock.
11. The ammunition will be destroyed by throwing it into
the river or otherwise, and not by blowing it up.
12. The guns on the inner line will be spiked or destroyed,
and all powder in the city magazine will be
made useless by having water thrown on it.
13. All wagons will be sent into the city in time to cross the
pontoons at dark.
Heavy fogs having materially retarded the work upon
the pontoon bridges across the middle and back rivers,
and it being apparent that they could not be finished in
season to permit the convenient execution of the
foregoing orders at the time contemplated, they were
countermanded and were on the morning of the 20th
revived by this second circular.
Confidential Circular No. 2.
Head Quarters Savannah,
20th Decr., 1864.
The movement ordered in Confidential Circular from
these Hd. Qrs. dated 19th Decr., 1864, will be executed
to-night at the hours as originally arranged, and not
as subsequently amended; that is,
Wright's division will move at 8 o'clock, McLaws's
division at 10 o'clock, and Smith's division at 11 o'clock,
and Wright's skirmishers will be withdrawn at 10 1/2
o'clock, McLaws's skirmishers at 12 1/2 o'clock,
and Smith's skirmishers at 1 o'clock.
By command of
LT. GENL. HARDEE.
T. B. ROY, A. A. G.
During the 19th and 20th our artillery and infantry fire
was heavier than it had been on any previous days.
Aware of the fact that the hour of evacuation was at
hand, a more liberal expenditure of ammunition was
allowed, and the
fire of our artillery increased at every available point until
the shades of evening on the 20th settled upon the
contending lines. In obedience to orders from artillery
head quarters, the ammunition chests of the light batteries
were thoroughly replenished, and all available animals
were engaged for retiring such of the unattached
guns as could be transported. All field guns of
inferior calibre were exchanged for superior pieces
where they could be secured.
On the evening of the 19th an order was issued
for the evacuation of Whitemarsh island. After spiking
the guns and destroying the carriages and ammunition at
Turner's rocks, Gibson's points and on the line of the
lunettes across the island without attracting the notice of
the enemy, the troops from this locality were dispatched
across the pontoon bridges over the Savannah river to
coöperate with General Wheeler in holding the enemy in
check on the Carolina shore. Upon this retreat all bridges
connecting Whitemarsh island with the main were
destroyed.
The garrisons from the Savannah river batteries, Fort
Bartow, and Thunderbolt, having thoroughly spiked the
guns and destroyed the carriages and ammunition at
those points, concentrated at Fort Jackson at 8 o'clock
on the evening of the 20th, under the command of
Colonel Edward C. Anderson,
were conveyed by steamer to Screven's ferry, and
marched the same night to Hardeeville. The crew of the
Confederate iron clad battery Georgia, under command
of Captain Washington Gwathmey, was also conveyed
across the Savannah river with Colonel Anderson's
artillerists--the vessel having been first scuttled by her
officers.
Having executed the orders for the destruction of the
carriages and ammunition and for spiking the guns, the
garrisons of the Isle of Hope, Beaulieu, and Rosedew
batteries repaired to Savannah and crossed the pontoon
bridges on the night of the 20th. The troops from the Isle
of Hope being dismounted cavalry, reported for duty to
General Wheeler on the Carolina shore, while the
artillerists from Beaulieu and Rosedew marched forward
to Hardeeville.
That the guns in these fixed batteries were as
completely disabled as the nature of the case permitted,
and their ammunition and equipments destroyed, appears
by the following report of Colonel Anderson.
"Charleston, Dec. 31, 1864. Lt. Coln. T. B. Roy, A. A. G.
Colonel:
In reply to your communication of the 30th inst. I have
the honor to state, that all the guns at the heavy batteries
under my command in the District of Georgia,
with the exception of one 32-pounder, on Hutchinson's
island (unfit for service) were thoroughly spiked, the
carriages cut and otherwise rendered useless, the truck
and maneuvering wheels thrown into the river, and the
eccentric axles deranged. All the ammunition, averaging
one hundred and odd rounds per gun, including friction
primers, fuzes and projectiles, as far as practicable, were
also thrown into the river or moats. Handspikes,
rammers, sponges, and other ordnance
stores were broken up and destroyed.
* * * * *
I am Colonel,
Very respectfully,
Your obdt. servt.,
EDWD. C. ANDERSON,
Coln. Comdg.
The troops from the western lines were quietly
withdrawn in the order and at the hours indicated in the
circulars issued by the lieutenant general for the
evacuation of the city. No confusion prevailed, and the
movement was executed silently and in good order. Guns
were spiked, and ammunition destroyed as far as this
could conveniently be done without attracting the notice
of the enemy in our immediate front. To conceal the
movement, occasional firing was kept up until the latest
moment. Forty-nine pieces of artillery, with limbers,
caissons, forges, battery wagons, and baggage wagons,
were safely transported over the pontoon bridges.
A single battery wagon was lost. Through some
negligence of the driver it got off the bridge. The horses
attached to it were saved. No interruption was
encountered at the hand of the enemy, and the
Confederate army rendezvoused the next day at
Hardeeville, South Carolina.
The field return on the morning of the 20th of
December, 1864, showed in the trenches, on detail duty,
and in the fixed batteries along the water approaches to
the city, an aggregate of 9089 men of all arms and of all
sorts, present for duty.
The Ladies Gun-boat, or iron-clad Georgia, was sunk
at her moorings, abreast of Fort Jackson, on the night of
the 20th.
The iron clad Savannah, Captain Brent, being unable
to proceed to sea in consequence of the torpedoes in the
river and a strong gale setting form the north-east, after
having on the morning of the 21st remained for some
time in the neighborhood of Screven's ferry where a
detail was engaged in the removal of some quarter
master and commissary stores, and having returned the
artillery fire of the enemy from the bay, was set on fire,
and sunk nearly opposite Willink's ship yard.
The steamers Isondiga and Fire Fly were burned by
the Confederates in Back river.
Several gun-boats, which were in process of
construction, were burned on the stocks.
The gun-boats Macon, Sampson, and Resolute, had
been dispatched up the river prior to the siege, and the
capture of the Ida, has already been noticed.
The gallant Commodore Tattnall, having in person
superintended the destruction of most of his vessels, led
his sailors and mariners to Hardeeville, marching at their
head although suffering severely from rheumatism.
In order to deaden the sound, rice straw was thickly
strewn over the pontoon bridges. By three o'clock on the
morning of the 21st the rear guard of the Confederate
army had crossed over to Hutchinson's island, and the
evacuation was complete. Engineer troops shortly
afterwards detached the flats, cutting holes in them and
setting them adrift. Lieut. Col. Paul of Gen. Hardee's
staff was ordered by the general, at midnight on the 20th,
to take command of a small force, and, after seeing
that the pontoon bridge from the foot of West Broad
street to Hutchinson's island was destroyed, to collect
such stragglers as he could and cross by way of Screven's
ferry. This command was detailed to preserve order
in the city to the latest moment.
No disturbances occurred, however, during the
night. Just before sunrise he withdrew his pickets,
and, having collected all stragglers who were willing
to accompany him, embarked on board the
steamer Swan for Screven's ferry. As this little boat got
fairly under way, the advance guard of the enemy
appeared on the bay.
The work of destroying the ammunition on the western
lines was not commenced until after the withdrawal of the
infantry, and was performed with great caution by the
artillerists. The guns were not spiked until the last moment,
and, with several rounds of ammunition, were kept ready for
action while the ammunition and equipments were being
rendered useless.
The following is the report made by the chief of artillery.
Head Quarters Department of South Carolina,
Georgia and Florida, Charleston, S. C.
December 30th, 1864.
Lt. Coln. T. B. Roy,
A. A. G., etc., etc.
Colonel:
In response to your communication of this date calling for a
report of the spiking of guns and the destruction of
ammunition on the outer and inner lines of Savannah on the
night of the evacuation, I have the honor to state that all the
guns left in position were spiked and disabled, and their
carriages destroyed as far as practicable. The ammunition on
the lines was also destroyed and rendered perfectly useless,
the greater portion of it having been thrown into water.
Forty-nine field pieces were withdrawn and safely
transported over the pontoon bridges. Others would have
been brought off, but in the removal of the guns mentioned all
available transportation was exhausted.
I am confident that every effort which could be employed
was used in disabling and rendering valueless the guns and
ammunition left upon the lines of the city of Savannah on the
night of the 20th inst.
I have the honor to be, Colonel,
Very respectfully, etc., etc.,
Your obdt. servant,
CHARLES C. JONES, JR.,
Lieut. Coln. & Chief of Artillery
during the siege and evacuation of Savannah.
Upon his arrival at Hardeeville Lieutenant General
Hardee received the following orders, which were issued and
observed in due course.
Hd. Qrs. Mil. Divn. of the West, Pocotaligo, S. C., Dec. 20, 1864. Lieut. Genl. W. J. Hardee, Commdg., etc.,
Hardeeville, S. C.
General:
I am directed by the general commanding to forward to you
the accompanying memorandum of orders which he wishes
you to issue immediately after the evacuation of Savannah.
They are designed to carry out his views as to the best
disposition of troops under your command, for the defense of
Charleston and the
state of South Carolina generally--Savannah being in the
possession of the enemy.
Maj. Genl. G. W. Smith's command (about two thousand
(2000 men) being sent to Augusta, will leave of the
troops coming from Savannah about six thousand five hundred;
which, added to those under the immediate command of Maj.
Genl. Sam Jones on the line of the Savannah and Charleston
rail road--say about five thousand five hundred (5500)
exclusive of those in and around Charleston--make about
twelve thousand (12,000) troops. Of these, he thinks there
should be about two thousand five hundred (2500) to guard
the left bank of the Combahee, with about one thousand in
reserve at a central point between the Combahee and
Ashepoo.
About three thousand five hundred (3500) in the 4th sub
district, with about one thousand of them in reserve at or near
Adams's run and Green pond, and about five thousand (5000)
in the 2d and 3d sub districts in addition to those already
there. The cavalry guarding the left (or coast) flank, and the
front and right flanks, may, of course, be used to support the
troops to which they are nearest.
The orders indicated in the accompanying memorandum will
make a distribution approximating to those numbers as nearly
as circumstances will permit. In carrying them out it will be
necessary that you should send promptly the troops carried to
Hardeeville by Brig. Genl. Taliaferro to rejoin their respective
brigades, and the detached companies or battalions of S. C.
reserves and militia to report to Brig. Genl.
Chesnut at Grahamville, and the companies of the 3d S. C.
cavalry under Col. Colcock to unite with those now ln front of
Grahamville and near Coosawhatchie and Pocotaligo, and
Kirk's squadron, together with the section of horse artillery
attached to the 3d S. C. cavalry.
Endeavor to bring and keep together, as far as practicable,
the troops of the same organization.
Very respectfully,
Your obdt. servt.,
A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.
Hd. Qrs. Mil. Divn., of the West, Pocotaligo, Dec. 20, 1864.
Memorandum of orders to be issued by Lt. Genl. Hardee
immediately after the evacuation of Savannah.
I. Maj. Genl. G. W. Smith will proceed immediately with his
command to Charleston, and thence to Augusta, after being
relieved by other troops as hereinafter directed.
II. Maj. Genl. McLaws's division (the senior brigadier
commdg.), and Coln. Anderson's brigade preceding, will
proceed immediately to Charleston and relieve Maj. Genl. G.
W. Smith's division.
III. Maj. Genl. Wright's division, and Brig. Genl. Chesnut's
command (about 1500 men) consisting of S. C. reserves and
2d, 3d and 4th S. C. militia, to the 4th military sub district; a
reserve of about 300 men being stationed at Green pond, and
another of like number near Adams's run. Brig. Genl. Robertson
will report to Maj. Genl. Wright for temporary duty
to advise as to disposition of troops, and then to be
assigned to duty as circumstances may require.
IV. Coln. Geo. P. Harrison's and Col. A. C. Edwards's
brigades to be stationed on the left bank of the Combahee,
guarding the several passages (about six) across that river to
Barnwell court house. Brig. Genl. Young's command, to be
increased by the 7th Ga. cavalry (dismounted) Coln. E. C.
Anderson jr., commdg. as reserves at or near Blue house
between the Combahee and Ashepoo rivers.
V. The 3d S. C. cavalry and Kirk's squadron will cover the
left (or coast) flank of the retiring troops. After crossing the
Combahee, Maj. Jno. Jenkins with Captn. Seabrook's and
Peeble's companies 3d S. C. cavalry, will take post on John's
island; and Captn. Kirk's squadron will proceed via Charleston
to Christ Church Parish and take post near and north east of
Mount Pleasant.
VI. Maj. Genl. Wheeler's corps (that part of it east of
Savannah river, and the remainder, if it should come up) will
guard crossings of the Savannah and New rivers and the
landings east of Screven's causeway, until forced by the
enemy to retire. He will then guard and defend the country
between the Savannah river and the defensive line of the
Combahee and the right flank of that line, resting at or
near Barnwell court house and extending by the shortest
defensible line to the Savannah river, covering Augusta.
VII. Col. Gonzales will assign the field artillery now in South
Carolina to the most appropriate position for
the defense of the 4th sub district and the line of the
Combahee from Salkehatchie bridge to the coast, taking care
to assign the batteries to the positions with which their
respective commanders are most familiar. He will assign,
subject to Genl. Hardee's approval, the field batteries coming
from Savannah as circumstances may indicate, for the best
defense of the line of the Combahee, the 4th sub district, and
Augusta.
VIII. As soon as the services of Brig. Genl. Taliaferro can
be spared from the duty on which he is now engaged, he will
proceed to James's island and resume his former command,
assigning to their appropriate positions the troops of Maj.
Genl. McLaws's division and Col. Anderson's brigade destined
for that island.
IX. As soon as Maj. Genl. McLaws's division moves from
Hardeeville, he will immediately proceed to Pocotaligo and
relieve Maj. Genl. Sam. Jones, and take the immediate
command of the troops on the line of the Combahee.
X. On being relieved by Maj. Genl. McLaws, Maj. Genl.
Jones will proceed to Charleston and resume his command and
enter on the duties designated by S. O. No.--from Deptmt.
Hd. Qrs.
XI. As the cavalry retires before the enemy it will drive off
all cattle, sheep, and hogs not necessary for its consumption,
and impress and send to Charleston, to be turned over to the
chief engineer, all negroes capable of bearing arms. It will
also destroy all mills, boats, buildings (that may be useful
to the enemy for military purposes), and all rice, corn and
other provisions not necessary for its own subsistence, beyond
such as is absolutely necessary for the consumption of
the owners and their families and slaves.
XII. All teams and wagons (with their drivers) on
plantations about to fall into the hands of the enemy, not
required by their owners, shall be impressed for the use
of the army.
Having seen to the disposition of his troops in
substantial compliance with the foregoing general
instructions, the lieutenant general repaired to Charleston
where he established his head quarters. By reason of the
lack of transportation many of the Confederate sick and
wounded were left in hospital when Savannah was
evacuated.
Although, during the night of the 20th General Geary
reported to General Williams, commanding the 20th army
corps, that the Confederate movement across the
Savannah river was in progress, the only instructions
issued to division commanders were to keep on the alert
and press their pickets closer to the Confederate works.
Our fire, maintained until the moment when our forces
were withdrawn from the western lines, seems at once
to have intimidated the enemy and to have confused
them with regard to our real intentions.
It was not until half past three o'clock on the morning
of the 21st that our evacuation of the western line was
discovered. Orders were at once
issued to advance the pickets on the left of the Federal
lines and to press forward into the city. By six o'clock A. M.,
General Geary's division had entered without
opposition, and the city of Savannah was in the possession
of the Federals. Two regiments were detached to
occupy Fort Jackson and the works below the city.
General Geary was temporarily assigned to the
command of Savannah, and his division encamped
within the city limits. Just outside the city limits,
near the junction of the Louisville and Augusta
roads, and about half past four o'clock in the morning of
the 21st, the Hon. Richard D. Arnold, mayor of
Savannah, and a delegation from the board of aldermen,
bearing a flag of truce, met Brig. Genl. John W. Geary
and through him made formal surrender to the
commanding general, of the city of Savannah now
evacuated by the Confederates. In behalf of the citizens
and their property the may orrequested
suitable
protection at the hands of the Federal commander.
Although the city of Savannah was for some time held as
a military post and in large measure adapted to military
uses, he mayor and council were permitted to exercise their
functions, and the municipal organization, in its important
branches, was preserved.
Extravagant and Unjustifiable Destruction of Property along the Line
of March--Comparison between the Conduct of Confederate and
Federal Invading Armies--Sherman's Violations of the Accepted
Rules of Civilized Warfare--Wanton Insults, Wholesale Plunder, and
Barbarous Treatment of Unarmed Citizens and Defenseless
Women, Children and Negroes, by Federal Soldiery--The Conduct
of the Royalist Prevost in 1779 outheroded in 1864 by that of the
Republican Sherman--The Campaign criticised as a Military
Movement--Its Success entirely attributable to the Weakness of the
Confederacy--Federal and Confederate Losses--Capture of
Savannah in 1778--The Evacuation of the City, under the
Circumstances, a Severe Reflection upon the Activity and Skill of
the Federal Commander, and a marked Achievement on the part of
the Confederates.
After alluding to the almost total demolition of the
Central rail road from Gordon to Savannah, and the
partial destruction of the Macon and Western, the
Augusta and Waynesboro, the Charleston and Savannah,
and the Atlantic and Gulf railways, General Sherman in
his official report says: "We have also consumed the
corn and fodder in the region of country thirty miles on
either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah, as also the
sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs, sheep and poultry, and have
carried away more than ten thousand horses and mules,
as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate
the damage
done to the state of Georgia and its military resources at
one hundred millions of dollars; at least twenty
millions of which have inured to our advantage, and
the remainder is simple waste and destruction.1 This
may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the
sad realities of war home to those who have been
directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its
attendant calamities."
Contrast this official confession with the address of
Major General Early to the citizens of York, when his
invading columns were passing over Pennsylvania soil:
"I have abstained from burning the rail road buildings and
car-shops in your town because, after examination, I am
satisfied that the safety of the town would be
endangered. Acting in the spirit of humanity which has
ever characterized my government and its military
authorities, I do not desire to involve the innocent in the
same punishment with the guilty. Had I applied the torch
without regard to consequences, I would have pursued a
course which would have been fully vindicated as an act
of just retaliation for the unparalleled acts of brutality
perpetrated by your own army on our own soil. But we
do not war upon women and children."
1 The total value, at this time, and upon a specie basis, of the
taxable property in Georgia, including lands and slaves, did not
exceed $650,000,000.
Compare general orders number 72 of the immortal
Lee, redolent, even amid the smoke and carnage of the
hottest warfare, of exalted civilization and generous
humanity, with the atrocious proclamations of General
Butler or the vandal acts of Sheridan, and then listen to
the words of Polybius, spoken when the world was two
thousand years younger than it now is, and uttered not in
the tone of passion and hate so rife in his day, but in
inculcation of the soundest lessons of political and moral
wisdom: "When men proceed to wreak their fury on
senseless objects whose destruction will neither be of
advantage to themselves nor in the slightest degree
disable their opponent from carrying on the war,
especially if they burn the temples of the gods, destroy
their statues, and waste their ornamental furniture, what
else can we say of such proceedings except that they
are the acts of men devoid of all feelings of propriety,
and infected by frenzy? For it is in no way the object of
war, at least among men who have just notions of their
duty, to annihilate and utterly subvert those from whom
they may have received provocation, but to induce them
to amend that in which they have acted amiss, not to
involve the innocent and guilty in one common ruin, but
rather to save them both. We may also observe that it is
the act of a tyrant only, who hates and is hated
by his subjects, to exact by force and terror a reluctant
and unwilling obedience."
While it is admitted that the chief of an army may levy
contributions on the enemy's country in order to compass
the maintenance of his troops, while he may forage for
corn, hay, and provisions when circumstances render it
impossible to proceed in the regular way of taxation, it is
absolutely obligatory upon a commander who is actuated
by sentiments of honor and observes the recognized rules
of civilized warfare, that he take from the enemy "only
what he strictly wants," and that he adopt all possible
means to prevent extortion or personal violence at the
hands of his subordinates. "He is guilty of revolting
cruelty who permits his soldiers to put inhabitants
of a belligerent nation to torture or otherwise
subject them to bad treatment to force them to
disclose the places where their wealth or
provisions are concealed." Nothing may be taken as
personal booty. "Excepting the cases of taxation,
contribution or absolute necessity, international law
commands that all property, personal and real, belonging
to individuals, be scrupulously respected. Any infraction
of that rule must be punished as pillage or marauding.
If the conquered country is condemned to lodging and
feeding the invaders, an equitable stipulation must put
forth what is to be furnished to each
officer and private. It is humane not to deprive the poor
people of their cottages and scanty means of existence.
Whoever exacts more than is stipulated, is an
extortioner."
Tested by these accepted rules of civilized warfare,
the conduct of General Sherman's army, and particularly
of Kilpatrick's cavalry and the numerous detached
parties swarming through the country in advance and on
the flanks of the main columns during the march from
Atlanta to the coast, is reprehensible in the extreme. Not
content with the violent and inordinate destruction of
everything which might be regarded as even remotely
contributing to the military strength and resources of the
country, and the appropriation of such animals and
provisions as were necessary for the efficiency and
maintenance of the army, the Federals on every hand and
at all points indulged in wanton pillage, wasting and
destroying what could not be used. Defenseless
women and children and weak old men were not
infrequently driven from their homes, their dwellings
fired, and these non-combatants subjected to
insult and privation. The inhabitants, white and black,
were often robbed of their personal effects, were
intimidated by threats and temporary confinement, and
occasionally were even hung up to the verge of final
strangulation to compel a revelation of the places
where money, plate and jewelry were buried, or
plantation animals concealed. Private residences along
the line of march were not exempt from rude search.
Articles of value which they contained were carried off
at pleasure, and insults continually offered Corn cribs,
emptied of so much of their contents as sufficed to fill
the commissary wagons, were often either pulled to
pieces or committed to the flames. Cotton houses,
gins, screws, and cotton were universally consumed.
Agricultural implements were broken up or carried
away, and horses, mules, cattle and hogs were either
driven off, or were shot in the fields, or uselessly
butchered in the pens and lots. Such was the
wholesale destruction of this animal life that
the whole region stunk with putrefying carcasses,
and earth and air were filled with innumerable turkey
buzzards battening upon their thickly strewn death
feasts. Even churches did not escape the general wreck,
their wooden benches, doors and sides being used for
camp fires, and their pulpits stripped of their scanty
vesture. Grist, flour, and sugar mills shared in the
common ruin. Labor was sadly disorganized, and the
entire region swept by the Federal columns was left in
poverty, ruin, demoralization and ashes. To repress the
commission of these enormities and prevent this prodigal
and unwarrantable waste, neither effort was used nor
disposition manifested by subordinate officers. Soldiers
often vied with each other in acts of violence, insult,
outrage, pillage, desolation, and murder.
These intolerable violations of the rules of civilized
warfare, are, by the commanding general when, in the
official report to which we have already referred,
commenting upon the conduct of the rank and file of his
army, cavalierly dismissed with the remark, "a little
loose in foraging, they did some things they ought not to
have done, yet, on the whole, they have supplied the
wants of the army with as little violence as could be
expected, and as little loss as I calculated." This general
complacently and boastfully announces to his
government that eighty million dollars worth of the
property destroyed in Georgia by his army while on this
march was "simple waste and destruction," in no wise
contributing to the wants of the invader, but plunging the
unarmed invaded in a sea of sorrow, tribulation and ruin.
The picture is not over-drawn, and this march of
Sherman through the heart of Georgia forms as
memorable and mournful an epoch in the history of this
state as in Roman annals does the passage of the
victorious Goths, encumbered with weighty spoils,
through the southern provinces of Italy, annihilating
whatever opposed, and madly plundering an unresisting
country. The key note to the conduct of the whole
campaign is sounded in the letter to General Grant from
which we quoted at the commencement of this sketch.
General Sherman set out to "make Georgia howl," and
preferred to "march through that state smashing things
to the sea." Unfortuately
for the prosperity of Georgia,
the good order of her plantations, and the peace of her
defenseless women and children, he was able, almost
unmolested, to carry into merciless execution this
intention so ruthlessly formed. That he could thus easily
compass the desolation of this Egypt of the south argued
most plainly the growing weakness of the Confederacy--sore pressed at
every point isolated on every hand,
overwhelmed by numbers and despoiled of her defenders--and gave painful
token that the aspirations which her
sons had cherished in tears, and agony and blood, for
right and liberty and national independence were doomed
to early disappointment.
The student of history searching among the annals of
modern warfare for examples of moderation, humanity,
justice, honor, and a chivalrous recognition of the rights
of an enemy, will turn with regret and disappointment
from the pages containing a true narrative of "Sherman's
march to the sea." He will blush at this new exhibition
of the workings of that boasted utilitarian civilization
which has done so much to impair the manhoop and
lower the moral standard of this country, being from the
first intolerant, aggressive, and cruel.
It really seems as if the Federal general on this
occasion sought to rival the conduct of Prevost
when in 1779 he raided through the richest plantations
of South Carolina. Behold the picture
painted by the historian Bancroft 1 in his concluding
volume. "The British forced their way into
almost every house in a wide extent of country;
sparing in some measure those who professed loyalty to
the king, they rifled all others of their money, rings,
personal ornaments and plate, stripped houses of
furniture and linen, and even broke open tombs in search
of hidden treasure. Objects of value, not transportable by
land or water, were destroyed. Porcelain, mirrors,
windows, were dashed in pieces; gardens carefully
planted with exotics were laid waste. Domestic animals,
which could not be used nor carried off, were wantonly
shot, and in some places not even a chicken was left
alive. * * Fugitive slaves perished of want in the woods,
or of fever in the British camp."
The enormities of 1779 committed by British soldiers
in their effort to perpetuate English rule
1 "History of the United States," vol. x, p. 294, Boston, 1874.
over a colony then in open revolt against the crown
which had planted and nurtured it, were more than
repeated by the United States troops in their attempt in
1864 to subjugate and drive back into the Federal union a
sovereign state which had withdrawn from a political
compact into which she had at first voluntarily entered,
and from which, more than three years before, she had
freed herself because, in her judgment, that
Confederation no longer promoted the ends of justice,
equal rights, general benefit, and mutual protection for
which it was originally formed. If we unhesitatingly
reprobate the merciless rigor, revenge, and cruelty
of the royalist Prevost, by what law, human or
divine, do the raiding, devastating columns of the
republican Sherman stand acquitted of even severer
condemnation? 1
As a military movement this expedition can be
justified only upon the hypothesis that it was planned and
executed with full knowledge of the weakness of the
Confederates. It reached its
1 It has been estimated that not less than 10,000 negro slaves were
seduced from their allegiance by the Federals in their
march through the Georgia plantations. Hundreds of them died of
want, small-pox, and other diseases incident to neglect, privation, and
the lack of suitable shelter and clothing. More than 20,000 bales of
cotton were consumed in gin houses and
sheds, and some 25,000 more were seized in Savannah after that city
was evacuated by the Confederates. In their official returns the
United States officers account for 13,000 head of cattle, 9,500,000
pounds of corn and 10,500,000 pounds of fodder forcibly taken from
the planters without the shadow of acknowledgment and issued to
the troops and animals, but make no mention of horses and mules
stolen ad libitum, or of the stock, cattle, hogs, sheep and poultry
killed on every hand and in the most irregular way to satisfy the
wasteful appetite of prowling bands of bummers and free booters,
and, when that was glutted, uselessly shot in the yards, pens, and
fields of the owners and by the road side to gratify wanton sport,
barbaric cruelty, and ribald hate. Of the consumption of rice, sweet
potatoes, syrup, peas and vegetables, of the merciless destruction of
houses, furniture, fences and agricultural implements, of the quantity
of personal property stolen and carried away, of the thefts
committed, the insults offered, the outrages perpetrated and the
crimes indulged in, no inventory has been taken. And yet the record
remains, and can be authenticated by thousands upon whose homes
the shadows of dire calamity have rested for the past ten years.
Sheridan in the valley of Virginia! Butler in New Orleans! ! Sherman
in Georgia! ! !
objective, as we have clearly shown, because General
Beauregard was unable to concentrate even a tolerable
army of opposition.
Tested by the rules of scientific warfare, this
expedition was erratic in conception and violative of the
accepted military maxims governing the projection and
conduct of a campaign of this character. That it was not
interrupted and totally defeated in its execution,
must be attributed to
accident--the inability of the Confederates to
concentrate an army sufficiently strong to deliver battle
along the line of march.
The Federal losses encountered during the interval
ocupied by Sherman's march from Atlanta to the coast,
including those sustained in the efforts made in South
Carolina to obtain possession of the Charleston and
Savannah rail road, will probably aggregate 2800 men,
killed, wounded and missing. Estimated in the same way,
and for a similar period, the Confederate loss will not
exceed 1500. During the siege casualties on the
Confederate side were comparatively few. This fact is
mainly attributable to the admirable protection afforded
by the earth works along the western line. Prominent
among those who fell in defense of the city was Major
Cook of the Athens battalion. He was shot in the
forehead while holding a portion of the line on Daly's
farm. His gallant conduct had been conspicuous. Few
desertions occurred when the city was evacuated; and
although the garrison was composed in no small degree
of local troops and reserves whose families, homes, and
property were there, the men as a rule, tearfully and yet
bravely marched in silence through the city, turning their
backs upon all the heart holds most dear, in response to
the stern necessities of the occasion and in obedience to the
claims of a country sorely beleaguered but devotedly
loved.
Thus a second time in her history of a little more than
a century and a quarter was the city of Oglethorpe
compelled to pass under the yoke.
Eighty-six years before, approaching from the
south and east, the British regulars under the
active and able leadership of Lieut. Coln. Campbell
quickly overcame the feeble and ill contrived
resistance offered by General Howe, driving his
troops in confusion through the town and accomplishing
an easy capture of the then capital of Georgia. This
disaster entailed upon the vanquished not only serious
loss but intense mortification. Savannah should
then have been successfully defended. Had proper
dispositions been made by the American general,
the troops under his command were sufficient
to have beaten back the advancing column boldly
but imprudently led. On this occasion military skill
and precaution were lacking. The calamity should
have been averted.
In December, 1864, however, it may be fairly claimed
that everything was done which energy, precaution, and
willing hearts on the part of the Confederates could
achieve. Every available resource was expended upon
the construction and armament of the western line. All
troops which
could be procured were summoned and put in position
for its defense. For ten days did the garrison boldly
confront an enemy more than six times stronger than
itself, preserving its line intact until the fall of Fort
McAllister, the growing scarcity of provisions and
ordnance stores, and the almost total isolation of the
Confederate army rendered the evacuation of the city
absolutely necessary.
The destruction of
guns, ammunition, and ordnance
stores in the presence of the enemy without attracting
their notice, the successful withdrawal of the command
across the pontoon bridges over the Savannah river, the
absence of all noise and confusion during the movement
consummated at night, and above all the safe conduct of
such a large body of troops, with artillery and wagons,
along the narrow rice dams and causeways of the
Carolina shore, in a slender column, in close proximity to
a strong Federal force extending from Izard's plantation
for more than a mile parallel or nearly so with the
Confederate line of retreat--and that without loss or
interruption--indicate at once with what skill and care
the Confederate commander had arranged his plans, and
the excellent behavior of his troops in executing them.
The salvation of the garrison under such circumstances,
while reflecting severely upon the Federals,
will be recognized as a marked achievement on
the part of the Confederates.
The day after the
evacuation, Lieut. Genl. Hardee--that accomplished soldier who, as a
corps-commander,
had rendered such brilliant service in the Confederate
struggle for independence--in reviewing the conduct
of the seige and commenting upon the successful retreat
of the garrison, remarked to the writer that while sadly
deploring the loss of the city he was persuaded nothing
had been neglected which could have contributed to the
honor of our arms; and that, under the circumstances, he
regarded the safe withdrawal of his army from the lines
around Savannah as one of the most signal and satisfactory
exploits in his military career.
Address of the representatives from Georgia in Confederate
Congress to their constituents, 17, 18.
Allen, Brig. Genl. W. W., 69, 147.
Anderson, Lt. Coln., 69.
Anderson, Brig. Genl. C. D., 28, 55, 112.
Anderson, Coln. E. C., 104, 118, 151, 152, 161.
Anderson, Coln. E. C. jr., 160.
Anderson, Maj. Geo. W., 107, 123-128.
Anderson, Brig. Genl. R. H., 62, 69, 148.
Anderson, Captn. R. W., 29, 87, 112.
Andersonville, 56.
Argyle island, 119.
Arnold, Hon. R. D., mayor, address of, 74;
makes formal surrender of the city of Savannah, 163.
Atkins, Coln., 76.
Atlanta, Georgia, 2.
Augusta, Georgia, 25, 61.
Bacon, Lieut. Coln., 39.
Baker, Brig. Genl. L. S., 55, 113.
Ball's ferry, affair at, 47-49.
Bancroft, Hon. George, 172.
Barnes, battery, 83.
Barnes, Captn. George, 114.
Barnwell, Captn., 115.
Bartow, fort, 98, 102, 151.
Bay battery, 101.
Beaulieu, battery, 98, 99, 103, 135, 152.
Beauregard, Genl. P. G. T., 6;
his dispatches in anticipation of Sherman's
march through Georgia, 9-12;
instructions in regard to the tenure and
defense of Savannah, 109-110;
arrives in Savannah, 138;
orders distribution of troops
after evacuation of Savannah, 157-162.
Cavalry, Confederate, operations of, 57-72;
force engaged 68; privations endured by, 70-71;
operations of, on left bank of Savannah river, 137, 145-147.
Chapman, Lieut. Henry, 70.
Chesnut, Brig. Genl., 83, 95, 159.
Cheves, battery, 102.
Church-lot battery, 103.
Clark, Coln. J. J., 100, 149.
Clemon, Maj., 114.
Clinch, Coln. J. H. M., 117.
Clinch, Captn. N. B., 106, 127.
Clinton, affair at, 58.
Cobb, Maj. Genl. Howell, 6, 7, 22, 24.
Colcock, Coln. C. J., 35, 36, 37, 96, 159.
Confederacy, the southern, exhausted condition of,
at the time of Sherman's march through Georgia, 4-8.
Cook, Major, 28, 39, 113, 175.
Cook, Coln., 66.
Coosawhatchie, 93, 95.
Crews, Coln. C. C., 57, 69.
Dalhgren, Admiral, 121, 132.
Daly farm, 112, 118, 119.
Daniell, Captn., 113.
Davis, Maj. Genl. Jeff. C., 2, 8, 72, 75.
De Soto, 7.
Dibrell, Brig. Genl., 63, 69.
Early, Maj. Genl. Jubal A., 165.
Edwards, Coln. A. C., 94, 160.
Elliott, Lieut., 118.
Evacuation of Savannah, 151-157.
Evans, Lieut. Coln., 28, 39.
Eve, Captn. F. E., 137.
Federal artillery, how distributed, 77.
Federal army, location of, while investing Savannah, 75-77.
Federal violations of the rules of civilized warfare, 168-174.
Ferguson, Brig. Genl., 58, 115, 136.
Fire-Fly, the steamer, burnt, 154.
Fizer, Coln. Jno. C., 56, 107.
Foster, Brig. Genl., 121, 132.
Frobel, Lieut. Coln. B. W., 82, 133.
Gaines, Coln., 49, 59.
Gartrell, Brig. Genl., 93.
Geary, Brig. Genl. Jno. W., 136. 162-163.
Georgia, the iron-clad battery, sunk, 152.
Georgia, defenceless condition of, during Sherman's march, 4-8;
the legislature of, authorizes a levy en masse, 13, 14;
proclamation of the governor of, 15-17;
address of representatives from, in Confederate Congress, 17, 18;
Supplemental proclamation of Genl. Wright, 19-20;
gallant conduct of the state forces of, at Griswoldville, 26-31;
at Honey hill, 33-42;
Resolutions of the legislature of, complimenting Genl.
Smith and the state forces, 43;
original line for the defense of the sea-coast of, 97;
ruthlessly endamaged by Sherman, 164, 165;
sufferings of her people at the hands of the Federals, 168-174.
Gibson's point battery, 102, 151.
Gildersleeve, Captn., 117.
Gonzales. Coln., 160.
Gordon, Coln. Geo. A., 87.
Grahamville, 33-40.
Grant, Captn. M. B., 23, 50.
Grant, Genl. U. S., 2, 5, 41.
Green island battery, 97, 99.
Greenwich, battery at, 98, 103.
Gregory's point, 93, 95.
Grimball's house battery, 103.
Grimball's point battery, 103.
Griswoldville, battle of, 26-31, 59.
Guerard, Capt Jno. M., 115.
Guerin, Maj. H. C., 89.
Gwathmey, Captn. W., 152.
Page 181
Hagan, Coln., 59, 69.
Hamilton, Major, 112, 115.
Hardee, Lieut. Genl. Wm. J. C., at Macon, 24;
at Savannah, 25; orders state forces to Grahamville, 33, 34,
at Oconee bridge, 49; in command at Savannah, 86;
orders Genl. Sam. Jones to Pocotaligo 92;
dispatches from Genl. Beauregard to,
respecting tenure and defense of Savannah, 109-110, 117;
refuses to surrender Savannah, 141-142;
orders evacuation of Savannah, 148-150;
strength of the army of, on the morning of the evacuation, 154;
retires to Hardeeville, 157;
establishes his head quarters at Charleston, 162;
his estimate of the successful evacuation of Savannah, 178.
Hardeman, fort, 80-82, 112, 118.
Hardeman, Coln. Thos., 28.
Harrison, Coln., 59.
Harrison, Coln. Geo. P. jr., 160.
Hartridge, Maj. Alfred L., 45-59.
Hatch, Brig. Genl. Jno. P., at Boyd's neck, 34;
defeated at Honey hill, 35-41.
Hawley, Coln., 119.
Hazen, Brig. Genl., 121, 122;
captures fort McAllister, 128-129.
Hazzard, Lieut., 127, 128.
Henry, Captn., 128.
Hill, Coln., 81, 112.
Honey hill, battle of, 36-42.
Hood, Coln. A., 107, 147.
Hood, Genl. J. B., 3, 4, 5, 21.
Howard, Captn. C. W., 51, 74.
Howard, Maj. Genl. O. O., 2, 8, 76.
Howe, Brig. Genl. Robt., 176.
Hudson, Lieut. M. G., 70.
Huger, Lieut., 45, 50.
Humes, Brig. Genl. W. Y. C., 62, 69, 147.
Hutchinson island battery, 101.
Ida, capture of the steamer, 117.
Inundation of low-grounds, in front of western line, 79-80.
Isle of Hope, batteries on the, 98, 103, 152.
Isondiga, the steamer, burnt, 154.
Iverson, Brig. Genl. A., 22, 60, 135, 147.
Jackson, fort, 98, 101.
Jackson, Major, 39, 114.
Jackson, Brig. Genl. Jno. K., 113, 114.
Jenkins, Maj. Jno., 39, 160.
Jones, battery, 84, 118, 119.
Jones, Lieut. Coln. Charles C. jr., 87, 148, 156-157.
Jones, Maj. Genl. Saml., 92-94, 158, 161.
Kilpatrick, Brig. Genl. Judson, 2, 8, 60;
almost captured by Genl. Wheeler, 62, 63;
seeks protection of his infantry, 64;
checked at Rocky creek, 65; at Waynesboro, 65;
raids through Liberty and Bryan counties, 76;
lawless conduct of his command, 77.
King's bridge, 121.
Lawton, battery, 102.
Lee, battery, 102.
Lee, Genl. R. E., 4, 166.
Lewis, Brig. Genl. , 66, 113.
Light batteries, present during siege of Savannah, 84-85;
how distributed, 86, 87.
Lines for the defense of Savannah, at Monteith, 77, 78;
western, 78-80; how armed, 80-85;
how garrisoned, 85-86, 111-115;
for the protection of the sea-coast of Georgia, 97-98;
exterior, and interior, covering water, eastern, and
southern approaches, 98-106;
insecurity of western, 115-119.
Macon, defenses of 23, 24; Federal demonstration against, 24.
Page 182
Mann, Coln., 28.
Maxwell, Captn. J. A., 87, 115.
McAllister, fort, 97, 93; its location and memories, 104-108;
its armament, 106; provisioned previous to its isolation, 107;
isolated, 108; fired upon by De Grase's light battery, 119, 124;
captured by Brig. Genl. Hazen, 121-122;
Maj. Anderson's report of the fall of, 123-128;
Brig. Genl. Hazen's report of the capture of, 128-129;
gallant memories of, 130.
Pontoon bridges across Savannah river, 133-135, 153-155.
Prevost, Genl. A., 172.
Provisions, 88, 120.
Pruden, Captn., 44, 49, 81.
Puckett, Maj., 137.
Pulaski, fort, 97, 98.
Rains, Coln., 87.
Rations, statement of, issued to troops in Savannah, 89-91.
Red bluff, 68, 98; battery at, 101.
Reese, Captn., 121.
Relief Associations, 136.
Resolute, the steamer, captured, 119.
Resolutions of the legislature of Georgia complimentary to
Genl. Smith and the state forces, 43.
Robertson, Brig. Genl., 70.
Robertson, Brig. Genl. B. H., 95, 159.
Robertson, Maj. George jr., 88, 91.
Rocky creek, affair at, 65.
Rose-dew batteries, 53, 98, 103, 152.
Ryan, Lieut. R. B., 70.
Sand bags, use of, on western line, 136.
Sandersville, affair at, 60.
Savannah, Georgia, Confederate forces concentrated for the
defense of 73, 86; western lines of, enveloped by
Sherman's army, 75; lines for the defense of,
at Monteith, 77; inner western line, 78-79;
inundation in front of western lines, 79-80;
batteries along these western lines of, how armed, 81-85;
how garrisoned and commanded, 85-86, 112-115;
ordnance stores and provisions in, 87-88;
issue of rations to troops in, 89-91;
Page 183
Savannah, Georgia, continued--advanced line for the
control of the water approaches to, 98;
interior line of forts and water batteries, 98;
fieldworks covering eastern and southern exposures of, 99-100;
armament of forts and batteries around, 101-106;
orders of Genl. Beauregard touching tenure and
defense of, 109-110; insecurity of western
lines around, 115-116; fall of Fort McAllister
necessitated the evacuation of, 131;
pontoon bridges from, to Carolina shore, 133-135;
siege of, 117-163; surrender of, demanded by Genl.
Sherman, 139-140; Genl. Hardee refuses to surrender, 141-142;
Sherman threatens to bombard, 140-141;
Federals prepare to bombard and assault, 144;
orders for evacuation of, 148-150;
garrison of, withdraws, 151-157;
destruction of guns and ammunition in the batteries
and on western lines of, 152-157;
Federals take possession of, 163;
surrendered by Mayor Arnold, 163;
casualties during the siege of, 175;
capture of, in 1779, 176.
Savannah, the iron clad, destroyed, 154.
Schirm, Lieut. Wm., 127, 128.
Shaw's dam, affair at, 117, 118.
Sheridan, Genl., 166, 174.
Sherman, Maj. Genl. Wm. T., proposes to "make Georgia
howl," 1; letter of, to Genl. Grant, 1-2;
composition and equipment of the army of invasion of, 2-3;
march of through Georgia a holiday excursion, 4-8;
moves from Atlanta toward the coast, 8;
demonstrates against Macon, 24;
engages the state troops
Sherman, Maj. Genl., continued--at Griswoldville, 26;
envelops the western lines around Savannah, 75;
manifests a lack of energy and dash in not assaulting the
Confederate lines around Savannah, 115-117;
anxiety of, to open communication with the Federal fleet, 120;
resolves to capture Fort McAllister, 121-126;
communicates with Admiral Dahlgren, 131, 132,
demands the surrender of Savannah, 139-140;
threatens to bombard that city, 140-142;
prepares to bombard and assault, 144;
reports waste and destruction caused by his army, 164-165;
recital of wrongs perpetrated by, 168-173;
the campaign of, considered as a military movement, 173-175.
Slocum, Maj. Genl. H. W., 2, 8, 44, 72.
Smith, Captn., 137.
Smith, Lieut. Genl. E. Kirby, 6.
Smith, Maj. Genl. G. W., 6, 7;
operations of, near Atlanta, 21-22;
retreats from Jonesboro to Macon, 22;
ordered to Augusta, 25-26;
destination of his command changed to Savannah, 32;
arrives at Savannah, 33;
ordered to Grahamville, 33-34;
commands at battle of Honey hill, 35-42;
returns to Savannah, 42;
where stationed and his command during the
siege of Savannah, 85-86, 112, 148;
ordered to Augusta, 158, 159.
Smith, Captn. L. J., 100.
Smith, Maj. Genl. M. L., 23.
St. Catherine island, battery on, 97.
Steele, Capt. S. W., 70.
Stewart, Lieut. J. M., 70.
Strong, Maj., 132.
Stuart, Captn., 39.
Page 184
Talbott, Captn., 44.
Taliaferro, Brig. Genl. W. B., 158, 161,
Tattnall, Commodore, 155.
Taylor, Lieut. Genl. R., 6, 25.
Thomas, Maj. Genl. Geo. H., 4.
Thomas's station, affair at, 65.
Thunderbolt, batteries at, 98, 99, 103, 151.
Toombs, Genl. Robt., 55.
Tullifinney trestle, action near, 94.
Turner's point battery, 102, 151.
Twiggs, Captn., 53.
Tybee island battery, 97.
Von Zinken, Coln., 114.
Waddy, Lieut. Coln. J. R., 100.
Wagner, Captn., 113.
Warsaw island battery, 97.
Wayne, Adjutant General Henry C., at Gordon, 44;
at Oconee bridge, 45-52; at Millen, 54;
at station 4 1/2 C. R. R., 55.
Waynesboro, affair at, 62-66.
Wheeler, Maj. Genl. J., 7, 9; arrives from Alabama, 22;
disputes the Federal advance, 23;
report of cavalry operations of, 57-72, 96;
arrives in Savannah, 135; operates on left bank of
Savannah river, 137-145, 147; and in rear of Sherman's
army, 147, 160.
White, Major, 94.
White, Captn. Thos. S., 125.
Whitemarsh lines, 102, 151.
Williams, Brig. Gen. A. S., 2, 75.
Williamson's plantation, batteries on, 80-82.
Willis, Coln., 39.
Wilson, Coln., 39.
Worthen, Lieut. Coln., 113.
Wright, Maj. Genl. A. R., 19, 20, 86, 113-114, 148, 159.
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