Civil rights divide the Democratic Party in the South
LeMaistre remembers how civil rights divided the Democratic Party in the South. Democratic electors in Alabama did not want to support John F. Kennedy's presidential bid in 1960. The issue of whether electors must cast their ballots for their party's candidate had arisen in 1952, when the Alabama Supreme Court upheld an elector's right to choose how to cast his ballot. But in 1960, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, ruling that the state Democratic Party's use of a pledge to enforce loyalty was legitimate in <cite>Ray v. Blair</cite>. The issue was defused in 1952 by Truman's decision not to run for reelection, and in 1960 by Kennedy's win in Illinois, making the state's electoral votes irrelevant.
Citing this Excerpt
Oral History Interview with George A. LeMaistre, April 29, 1985. Interview A-0358. Southern Oral History Program Collection (#4007) in the Southern Oral History Program Collection, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Full Text of the Excerpt
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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Yeh. And they were organized before going to Philadelphia, I guess that
Nixon and McCarthy all—
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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They were not organized. They were organized in this sense, they were
organized to oppose him
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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But they had no—
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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They were organized to defeat a civil rights plank, and when they failed
on both of those, they walked out. They didn't organize till they came
to Birmingham and had their convention. That's when they called all the
ones who had walked out there plus whatever other
eighteen—thirteen minds they could get their hands on to come
join 'em and that's where they put together the Dixiecrat group.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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But now the Democratic Executive Committee, the state executive
committee—my impression was that McCorvey kind of ran
the—although he wasn't chairman of it.
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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He was chairman.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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He was chairman.
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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McCorvey was extremely conservative, not a deep thinker politically, was
more interested in how you control issues to keep them either from
coming flaring up in your face or to go along the way you want to go
than he was in what the issue was. I'm—I have to get into
some of the press files to find out just how he managed to manipulate
things so that the Democratic Party of Alabama did not nominate electors
that could vote for Truman.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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I know that was—
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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The result was that we didn't have a vote in the election when it came
down to a choice between Republicans and Democrats.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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And they tried to challenge it in the courts but it was too late, I think
that there wasn't time enough or something.
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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Well, I took the case to the Supreme Court, asking whether the electors
could be bound and we had a resolution through the Democratic Committee
requiring anybody elected as a Democrat to at least one time vote for
the nominee of the Party, and the Supreme Court struck it down, said
that you couldn't follow through.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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You couldn't—
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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I regret to say, however, I'm familiar with that one. I was the one to
take it up there.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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And that's been from back the . . .
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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And now that came right after McCorvey. This was when McCorvey had taken
the electors away. Then Ben Ray was elected president—
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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Chairman.
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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Chairman of the Committee. That's when Clement organized a group to bring
Ray in and loyal Democrats into the Committee. And the first thing they
did was try to shore up that position by saying anybody else who gets
nominated by this party is gonna have the support of the party. And the
court held they could not. Well, it hasn't hurt very much. We had one
instance where an elector voted for Harry Byrd and one vote for Paul
Bryant one time and one or two others like that but none that changed a
result in any serious way. In 1960, though, when Illinois was still
out
[END OF TAPE 3, SIDE B]
[TAPE 4, SIDE A]
[START OF TAPE 4, SIDE A]
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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So you were talking about the Illinois vote in 1960.
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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While they were still counting the vote, as you remember, the Illinois
vote was delayed for about a day and a half, and gave rise to the famous
wisecrack which Jack Kennedy made that his father didn't have to buy the
entire election; all he had to do was to buy
Illinois—something of that sort. Well while that vote was
out, it had already been determined that some people who had been
nominated or named [elected] as electors in Alabama were not going to
support the Kennedy ticket, and Governor Luther
Hodges of North Carolina, who was a big supporter of the Democrats,
called, at the request of John Kennedy, to ask if I would file a law
suit to compel the Alabama electors to support the party which elected
them or to enjoin them from voting against it, whichever one could work
out. I thought about the results of the Ray case back in 1953 and didn't
hold out a lot of hope of being able to compel them to vote for the
Democratic Party even though they had been elected as Democrats. He
called back the next morning early to say it really wasn't necessary any
more, to let them vote for anybody they wanted to because Illinois had
come in for Jack Kennedy, and so we didn't have to file a follow-up law
suit. Sometimes I think it might have been better if we had because
there may have been a possibility of reversing that decision in view of
the fact that the nominations for electors were made by the Committee
which also prescribed the oath which they refused to abide by, and the
failure to abide by the oath really should have been tantamount to
refusing the nomination.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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But was that the same situation in the case you took to the Court in
1953?
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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It was not the same because there wasn't any such loyalty oath in
the—well, I say there wasn't any; there was one, but it had
just already been declared unconstitutional. They still had it on there
and the wording of the oath appeared on the ballot, and in the case of
the ballot it was not a sworn oath—it
simply said that by voting in this primary I pledge to support the
nominees of the primary, but the people who were named as party nominees
as a result of that vote in qualifying had taken an oath and signed
before a notary public that if nominated in the primary they would
support the nominees of the party. And they also certified that they had
not supported any other party in the immediately previous election.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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Now, to clarify the other court case, which occurred the year before,
1952, after the Loyalists had . . . No, no, I meant the one in 1952 that
the State-Righters started when they were trying to undo what the
Democratic Committee had prescribed as a loyalist oath—that
was the one that the Alabama Supreme Court held for the
State-Righters—You were not involved in that one
directly?
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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As I recall it, Truman Hobbs filed that suit . . . along with Gordon
Madison and somebody from Birmingham; it may have been Dick Rives; that
was before Dick's appointment to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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Before he became judge?
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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Yes, I think he represented the Party in that case.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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And then the Supreme Court reversed that in essence—I guess,
held that the Committee could handle . . .
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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Well, actually, as I recall the case (and I haven't looked it up for
years), but as I recall it, the Supreme Court really decided that that
was a political question which they would not decide. They didn't come
right out and say yes or no, but when they got to
the Ray case in the case of electors after having been elected not
voting for the people that elected them for the nominee of that party,
then they decided that it was a substantive question that was not a
political question, and that in naming an elector the constitution
assumed that he would be a man of such integrity that he would not go
back on a pledge or whatever and that he had a right to do so if he felt
compelled to do it. I suppose that the Supreme Court's idea was that if
a man committed murder between the time he was nominated and the time
the Electoral College met, that the electors wouldn't have to vote for a
murderer for President of the United States. There's not much argument
against that logic really. We have a representative form of government
where you name somebody to do what you want done, but as your
representative, he's not bound by statements made at other times or by,
in that case, oaths to the Party.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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Right. This controversy between the Loyalists and the State Righters for
control of the Committee, as I understand it, took place before it was
known that Truman was not going to offer himself again, and after that
when Truman withdrew, then it was said, I read, that that took the steam
out of the State-Righters.
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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Well, it didn't give them a target where before it had the Fair
Employment Practices Committee and the Executive Order requiring fair
employment practices. Now all they had was the memory of Truman, and he
was no longer the candidate and announced he was
not going to be. I recall going to the dinner in Washington at which
Truman made the statement that he would not be a candidate and
introduced Adlai Stevenson, and that action was pretty startling to some
of the people there. They really didn't think that Truman was going to
take himself out of consideration. But the atmosphere at the time was
simply overwhelmingly against Truman. It was just believed that
everybody that was hired by the national administration was in some way
corrupt, and you remember Harry Vaughan, who was Truman's right-hand man
from Kansas City, had been the recipient of some freezers, or something
of that sort, deep freezers. It was pretty much like the Goldfine
scandal in the Eisenhower administration when Sherman Adams had to
"walk the plank." Vicuna coats and rugs. There was
quite a lot of talk in the country about what had been described by some
of the writers as the "mess in Washington," and
Stevenson stepped into a trap at the very beginning of his campaign.
Somebody asked him what he would do about the mess in Washington if
elected, and instead of replying on the question of whether there
actually was mess in Washington, he tried to tell them what he would do
as president. And everybody took that to mean he accepted the fact that
Washington was corrupt, and that something ought to be done.
- ALLEN J. GOING:
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But Stevenson did not provoke the bitterness and adverse reaction in the
South that Truman had?
- GEORGE A. LeMAISTRE:
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No, Stevenson had been a pretty good governor in Illinois and received a
great deal of praise for some of the things he did as governor, and he
insisted on pitching his campaign on a very high level; he didn't talk
about personalities. He might have been better off if he had talked
about Eisenhower's lack of political know-how and Eisenhower's lack of
knowledge of political science. But instead he talked about goals for
the United States and stayed above a battle in which he was really a
part. He should have been fighting his battle instead of using these
lofty phrases to describe his campaign.